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For many, epistemology is a normative discipline in much the same sense as ethics. According 
to the analogy, just as ethics is about what we should do and how we should live our lives, 
epistemology is about what we should believe and how we should go about forming our 
beliefs. What complicates the analogy, however, is that believing things is also a part of living 
life. Our beliefs aren’t only evaluable with respect to whether they are credible, true, or amount 
to knowledge, but also with respect to whether they are useful, beneficial, or contribute to our 
happiness and wellbeing. The analogy implies that epistemic considerations (like evidence, 
truth, or knowledge) settle questions about what we should believe just as ethical 
considerations (like duty, goodness, or virtue) settle questions about what we should do and 
how we should live. The present work is an attempt to challenge this general picture of the 
subject matter of epistemology. Specifically, I argue that the normative assessment of belief 
cannot be understood in isolation from the broader social practices and human activities in 
virtue of which what we believe is ethically and practically significant. Chapter I introduces the 
central issues and raises a challenge to views that distinguish between epistemic and ethical 
assessment in terms of reasons for belief and reasons for action, respectively. The conclusion 
of this chapter is that there must be some conceptual link between the norms of belief and the 
norms of action. Chapter II builds upon this challenge by spelling out that conceptual link: 
	 viii 
reasons for belief entail reasons for action, and vice versa. The main conclusion of chapters I 
and II is that epistemology cannot settle questions about what we should believe without also 
settling questions about what we should do, and ethics cannot settle questions about what we 
should do without also settling questions about what we should believe. Chapters III and IV 
provide novel answers to two significant challenges to abandoning the analogy: providing 
plausible accounts of the relationship between reasons and rational motivation and the 
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Is epistemology about what we should believe in much the same sense that ethics is about 
what we should do? Each chapter of this dissertation serves to develop the case that it is not. 
The simple argument I advance here may be summed up as follows: ethics isn’t just about 
what we should do, but more broadly, how we should live our lives, and believing things is a 
part of living life. Therefore, the question “what should we believe” is at least partly an ethical 
question.  
In Chapter I, “The Epistemic and the Ethical,” I critically examine the analogy 
between ethics and epistemology by seeking an answer to the following question: if epistemic 
standards necessarily bear on what we should believe (just as moral requirements necessarily 
bear on what we should do), what explains their authority? According to a prominent view, 
we necessarily have good reason to conform to epistemic standards because belief “aims at 
truth,” and part of what it is to be a creature with the capacity for belief is to be directed 
toward realizing this aim; if our attitudes weren’t sensitive to epistemic standards, we wouldn’t 
be the sort of creatures capable of believing things. But what degree of sensitivity is necessary 
to count? I argue that the persuasiveness of these views depends on conflating the minimum 
necessary conditions for occupying a role with the conditions under which one excels in that 
role. Even if such views can explain why being a believer entails some commitment to 
epistemic standards, I argue that it fails to underwrite the claim that we always have good reason 
to conform to epistemic standards just in virtue of the fact that we are creatures with the 






In virtue of the limitations of locating epistemic normativity in the nature or concept 
of belief, I suggest that we should look elsewhere to explain the authority of epistemic 
standards. I argue that epistemic standards have authority insofar as we owe it to each other 
(and ourselves) to conform to them. However, if my view is right, the analogy between ethics 
and epistemology is fatally flawed. Unlike claims about what is true or what constitutes 
knowledge, I argue that claims about what we should believe are best understood, just like 
claims about what we should do and how we should live, as ultimately ethical judgments 
sensitive to decidedly non-epistemic, ethical concerns. The main question I grapple with in 
this chapter is, what makes an epistemic consideration a reason? The conclusion I reach is that 
it is a mistake to think the source of the authority of epistemic standards is independent from 
the broader social roles we occupy and the responsibilities we bear to each other. There must 
be a connection between our reasons for belief and our reasons for action.  
In Chapter II, “Reasons for Attitudes and Reasons for Action,” I spell out what I take 
that connection to be. I consider whether the analogy between ethics and epistemology is 
supported by a more general distinction in the literature on normative reasons, reasons for 
action and reasons for intentional mental states. Intentional mental states, like hope, desire, 
fear, regret, belief, love, etc., are importantly different from actions. With respect to these 
states, there are considerations that bear on whether being in these states is “correct” or 
“fitting,” which are distinct from considerations that bear on whether being in these states is 
valuable or ethical. For instance, you might have a moral reason not to laugh, but the fact that 
the joke is funny may make it correct or fitting to laugh nonetheless. According to some, when 






in that state determine whether one should be in that state. This view assumes that intentional 
mental states are governed by wholly distinct norms from those that govern intentional 
actions.  
I develop my reply by defending some intuitively plausible general principles that spell 
put the relationship between what Sellars termed “ought-to-be’s” and “ought-to-do’s.” Briefly, 
insofar as we’re capable of performing actions that bring it about that we are in specific states, 
questions about what we should do are relevant to answering questions about how we should 
be. For example, if you should be in some state, and you are capable of bringing it about that 
you are in that state, then (ceteris paribus) you should bring it about that you are in that state. 
Likewise, if you are in a state you shouldn’t be in, and performing some action is necessary to 
bring it about that you are no longer in that state, then (ceteris paribus) you should perform 
that action. However, I argue that it isn’t always the case that you should perform actions 
necessary to bring it about that you’re no longer in an incorrect or unfit state. If ought-to-be’s 
imply ought-to-do’s, but being in an incorrect state doesn’t necessarily imply any ought-to-do, 
then how one ought to be isn’t necessarily determined solely by considerations of correctness. 
I argue from the fact that ought-to-be’s imply ought-to-do’s to the conclusion that the 
distinction between epistemic and practical standards of assessment cannot be explained in 
terms of the difference between a reason for an intentional mental state and a reason for 
action. The upshot is that if there are epistemic reasons for belief, there are also epistemic 
reasons for action, and if there are practical reasons for action, there are also practical reasons 






assessment cannot be explained in terms of the difference between reasons for intentional 
mental states and reasons for intentional action, respectively.  
In Chapter III, “Reasons for Belief and the Basing Requirement,” I explore a related 
question concerning the relationship between reasons and rational motivation. According to 
many, only epistemic considerations can settle normative questions about belief because we 
are only capable of basing our beliefs on claims we take to be evidence for their truth. 
Consequently, if we are incapable of basing a belief in something on the fact that believing it 
would be useful, valuable, or otherwise beneficial, how can such facts be reasons for us? The 
underlying assumption is that a fact is a normative reason for someone only if that person can 
respond appropriately to that reason in virtue of recognizing it as the reason it is and basing 
their response on that recognition. After investigating various accounts of what this capability 
amounts to, I conclude that the basing requirement is either too restrictive or else, fails to rule 
out the possibility of basing beliefs on non-evidential considerations. 
 Finally, in Chapter IV, “Weighing Reasons for Belief,” I examine a debate about the 
comparability of evidence and practical reasons for belief. Practical reasons seem to balance 
permissively. If you have equally good reasons to leave or stay, both options are available. 
However, evidence balances to suspension. If you have equally good evidence for and against 
a proposition, neither option is available; you should suspend judgment on it. If there are 
practical reasons for belief, they also seem to balance permissively, and this contrast generates 
a puzzle concerning how practical and epistemic reasons for belief could be meaningfully 
compared. According to some, the best explanation of this combinatorial contrast in the way 






govern belief and action, respectively. While chapters 1 and 2 raise concerns about the 
plausibility of this explanation and challenge the underlying assumptions about epistemic 
normativity that motivate it, chapter 4 attempts to provide a plausible positive account of how 
evidence and practical reasons for belief can meaningfully be compared. The upshot is that 
providing a plausible account of such comparisons depends on abandoning the claim that 
belief has its own ethics, and the assessment of belief is not independent of the social practices 




































CHAPTER I—The Epistemic and the Ethical 
 
As I understand it, being justified is a status one has in relation to a person or group of people. If that’s not what 




For many, epistemology is a normative discipline in much the same sense as ethics. According 
to the analogy, just as ethics is about what we should do and how we should live our lives, 
epistemology is about what we should believe and how we should go about forming our 
beliefs.2 What complicates the analogy, however, is that believing is also a part of living life. 
What we believe often matters to us and to one another, and our beliefs aren’t only evaluable 
with respect to whether they are credible, true, or amount to knowledge, but also with respect 
to whether they are useful, beneficial, or contribute to our happiness and wellbeing. To 
illustrate, consider a well-known passage from James’s “The Will to Believe”: 
Suppose, for instance, that you are climbing a mountain, and have worked yourself 
into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Have faith that you 
can successfully make it, and your feet are nerved to its accomplishment. But mistrust 
yourself, and think of all the sweet things you have heard the scientists say of maybes, 
and you will hesitate so long that, at last, all unstrung and trembling, and launching 
yourself in a moment of despair, you roll in the abyss. In such a case (and it belongs 
to an enormous class), the part of wisdom as well as of courage is to believe what is in 
the line of your needs, for only by such belief is the need fulfilled. Refuse to believe, and 
you shall indeed be right, for you shall irretrievably perish. But believe, and again you 
shall be right, for you shall save yourself. You make one or the other of two possible 
universes true by your trust or mistrust,—both universes having been only maybes, in 
this particular, before you contributed your act (59). 
 
Let’s suppose that, given our climber’s evidence, it’s unlikely she’ll make the jump. Moreover, 
let’s assume that believing she’ll make the jump raises the probability that she’ll make it, but 
																																																						
1 as cited in Goldberg (2018). 






not by much.3 Thus, regardless of what she believes, it’s unlikely she’ll make the jump. 
According to James, she should nonetheless believe she’ll make it because she’ll perish if she 
doesn’t. The underlying assumption is that what the climber should believe in this instance is 
determined by the personal value of believing she’ll make it, and whatever value attaches to 
having an accurate belief about the likelihood of making the jump is presumably swamped by 
the immense value of not falling into the abyss. Yet, the climber’s need to believe is commonly 
taken to be irrelevant from an epistemological point of view. After all, the fact that having an 
accurate belief will lead the climber to perish has little effect on the probability that she will 
perish. Since it is likely she will perish, if epistemology is about what we should believe, the 
climber should believe it’s unlikely she’ll make the jump, even though believing this guarantees 
her a tragic end. Those who think epistemology settles questions about what we should believe 
just as ethics settles questions about what we should do must explain why the climber should 
proportion her belief to the evidence and not believe what is in line with her needs, especially 
given the immense personal cost of doing so. 
 
§2 
For a while, epistemologists seemed content to talk about what we epistemically should believe, 
distinguishing a uniquely “epistemic” sense of normative terms like “should,” “reason,” 
“reasonable,” “justified,” and “rational” relevant to the normative assessment of beliefs. Many 
																																																						
3 This qualification is necessary to distinguish two readings of James’s case. If believing she’ll make the jump 
made the climber’s success likely, one could argue that it is epistemically rational for her to believe she’ll make 
the jump because believing that changes her evidential situation. However, I am imagining a scenario in which 
believing makes success likelier, but still unlikely. The relevant fact is that, if the climber doesn’t believe she’ll 






began their papers by specifying that they were interested in providing theories concerning the 
“epistemic” justification of beliefs, while acknowledging that beliefs might be justified or 
obligatory relative to other normative standards, like those of morality or prudence. To cite an 
early instance, Firth claims: 
If I say that it would be unreasonable for S to accept h, I may mean, in a purely 
epistemic sense, that non-h is, let us say, more probable than h on the basis of the 
evidence available to S. But I may intend this sentence, on the other hand, to express 
an ethical judgment. I may mean that it would be ethically unreasonable for S to accept 
h (1959: 498).  
 
Similarly, according to Alston:  
 
To say that someone is justified in believing that p is to say that in believing that p he 
is proceeding as he ought...Furthermore this dimension of evaluation is a distinctively 
epistemic one. What counts towards S’s knowing that p is not that he is morally, 
prudentially, or legally justified in believing that p, but rather that his belief that p 
satisfies some specifically epistemic standards (276-7).  
 
To cite another example, Bonjour asks us to imagine that a friend has been accused of a 
horrible crime, and he argues: 
If in these difficult circumstances I can bring myself to believe in his innocence, it is 
surely plausible to say that there is a sense in which I am justified in so believing; 
indeed such a belief might well be regarded as obligatory. But the justification in 
question is plainly not epistemic justification, but rather a kind of moral justification: 
even if my friend is in fact innocent, I obviously do not know on this basis that he is 
innocent, no matter how compelling a reason of this sort I may have for my belief” 
(1985: 6).  
 
Finally, in a discussion of epistemic obligations, Feldman writes: 
 
Sometimes it makes sense to treat beliefs like other actions and to evaluate their 
practical or prudential merit. [The climber’s] optimistic belief scores well in this 
evaluation, and this accounts for our judgment that it is a belief he ought to have. The 
contrary intuition concerns epistemic obligation. The peculiarly epistemic judgment 
concerns not these practical merits but rather the propriety of a disinterested believer 
in [the climber’s] situation having that belief. Since [the climber’s] optimistic belief 
does not come out so well on these grounds, it is epistemically improper. Epistemic 
obligation, then, concerns obligations to believe to which the practical benefits of 







I want to highlight two important points from these passages. First, each writer assumes that 
beliefs can be evaluated from multiple normatively significant perspectives, which may conflict 
in their directives. Secondly, these passages all suggest a distinctively “epistemic” perspective 
of normative assessment, from which concerns about the believer’s interests or wellbeing are 
irrelevant. But what makes a standard of assessment “epistemic”? Following Feldman, we 
might imagine some disinterested onlookers standing at the base of the mountain, carefully 
weighing the same evidence as our poor climber, with the sole aim of arriving at an accurate 
view of the climber’s prospects. The conclusion they would come to (presumably, that the 
climber will perish) is, according to Feldman, what the climber “epistemically should” believe 
and the source of a uniquely “epistemic obligation.” Alston offers a very similar suggestion 
about justification: 
Being epistemically justified in believing that p is the kind of state an ideal epistemic 
subject, one whose overriding concern in cognition is to believe that p iff p is true, 
would take as a sufficient ground for a positive attitude toward S’s belief (277). 
 
§3 
The picture we are left with in cases like that of James’s climber is one according to which the 
climber “prudentially-should” believe she’ll make the jump but “epistemically-should” 
disbelieve she’ll make it. However, we might still be inclined to ask, given these considerations, 
“what should the climber believe?” How should she respond to these competing demands? 
More specifically, why should the climber care about whatever conclusion she would reach if 
she were one of those disinterested onlookers below? Feldman is skeptical that such questions 






In cases in which what it is epistemically rational to believe clearly diverges from what 
it is practically advantageous to believe, there is simply no genuine question about 
what one should believe: Although we can ask what one should believe from the 
epistemic perspective, and we can ask what one should believe from the practical 
perspective, there is no third question: what one should believe, all things considered. 
In any case in which epistemic and practical considerations pull in opposite directions, 
there is simply nothing to be said about what one should believe all things considered 
(2000: 15). 
 
Yet, if James is correct—if the climber’s need to survive is relevant to determining what she 
actually should believe in her circumstances—then it certainly seems something could be said 
about what the climber should believe, all things considered. If knowledge, truth, and accuracy 
are generally valuable aims, it seems perfectly possible that their value in a specific instance 
can meaningfully be weighed against the value of other things we care about. By analogy, I 
might want to complete a video game but also want to complete a doctorate in philosophy. 
Given the relative importance of each of these goals in my life, it is implausible to conclude 
that, from the “gamer perspective,” I should play for the rest of the day, from the “academic 
perspective,” I should work on my dissertation instead, but there is simply nothing to be said 
about what I should do, all things considered. Completing the dissertation is far more 
important to me than completing the video game, and this fact is clearly significant to settling 
the question, what should I do, all things considered. Why do Feldman and others think these 
familiar weighing explanations are unavailable when it comes to belief? 
 
§4 
A commitment that stretches back at least to Aristotle and figures prominently in the Kantian 
tradition is that epistemic standards are essential to the evaluation of belief. In the Nicomachean 






production, right and wrong functioning consist in the attainment of truth and falsehood 
respectively” (1139a). According to this philosophical tradition, our capacity to reason has two 
distinct applications, the theoretical and the practical. The basic thought is that reasoning 
about what to do is fundamentally unlike reasoning about what is true. The former sort of 
reasoning concludes in intention and intentional action. The latter concludes in belief. When 
we reason about what is true, we necessarily aim for our representation of how things are to 
align with how things really are, independently of those representations. In contrast, when we 
reason about what to do, we aim to bring it about that the way things are aligns with how we 
want them to be or believe they ought to be.  
The contrast between the “aims” of theoretical and practical reasoning is often raised 
in the context of debates over doxastic voluntarism—about whether it is ever possible to 
choose to believe at will. In his landmark essay, “Deciding to Believe,” Williams famously 
remarks that “beliefs aim at truth” (1973: 136). While we act to achieve various aims, according 
to Williams, belief has a single “aim,” being true. From this purported necessary truth about 
belief, Williams reasons that choosing to believe at will is a conceptual impossibility. Returning 
to the question about weighing explanations, the epistemologists quoted above all seem 
committed to the notion that believing has its own “internal” standard of assessment, 
grounded in the distinctive aim of theoretical reasoning or the nature of belief, the authority 
of which is independent of any “external” value that might be advanced by this activity. I’ll 
refer to this basic commitment as the “separation thesis.” According to this thesis, there are 






justification, obligation, etc.), the epistemic and the practical, which reflect fundamentally 
different kinds of normative assessment, the assessment of belief and action, respectively.  
The separation thesis is compatible with the claim that beliefs can be assessed from 
multiple normatively significant perspectives. As the quotation above suggests, Feldman 
thinks it might sometimes make sense to treat beliefs like other actions and evaluate their 
“practical or prudential merit.” To illustrate, consider Conee and Feldman’s (1985) influential 
“evidentialist” theory of epistemic justification: “doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is 
epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t” (15, 
my emphasis). Conee and Feldman restrict their attention to epistemic justification and 
acknowledge that there are other senses of justification for belief (e.g., moral, prudential, etc.). 
They write: 
having acknowledged…that justified attitudes are in a sense obligatory, we wish to 
forestall confusions involving other notions of obligations. It is not the case that there 
is always a moral obligation to believe in accordance with one’s evidence. Having a 
fitting attitude can bring about disastrous personal or social consequences” (22).  
 
Conee and Feldman’s thesis leaves open the possibility that beliefs may be justified or 
unjustified relative to other standards of assessment. So, for example, while James’s climber 
might believe what she epistemically-ought not to believe, she might also believe what she 
prudentially-ought to believe.  
However, according to advocates of the separation thesis, the latter kind of assessment 
is “extrinsic”4 to the nature of belief. Even Bonjour, who is sympathetic to the thought that 
concerns unrelated to the truth might be relevant to other senses of justification for beliefs, 
																																																						






similarly claims that “epistemic justification is that species of justification which is appropriate 
to beliefs or judgments” (6, my emphasis) because epistemic justification has an “essential or 
internal relation to the cognitive goal of truth” (8, my emphasis). According to Bonjour,  
one's cognitive endeavors are epistemically justified only if and to the extent that they 
are aimed at this goal, which means very roughly that one accepts all and only those 
beliefs which one has good reason to think are true. To accept a belief in the absence 
of such a reason, however appealing or even mandatory such acceptance might be 
from some other standpoint, is to neglect the pursuit of truth; such acceptance is, one 
might say, epistemically irresponsible (ibid). 
 
§5 
When understood as a distinct kind of evaluation, the authority of which is wholly independent 
of broader ethical concerns, we might wonder why we should care about being epistemically 
responsible or about whether all our beliefs are epistemically justified. In contrast, we might 
disagree about whether an action is morally justified, or whether a person has acted 
irresponsibly, but we know roughly what we’re talking about when we make such assessments, 
and most of us recognize the significance of this dimension of assessment. In contrast, 
“epistemic justification” and “epistemic responsibility” are philosophical terms of art. Once it 
is specified that epistemic justification and responsibility are not a matter of justifying 
ourselves to others or being responsible for or accountable to others, it becomes more difficult 
to identify the normativity at issue. In the case of our poor climber, adopting the perspective 
of our imagined disinterested onlookers is of little value for her. Why does the climber have 
any reason (or obligation or responsibility) to consider their perspective? Whatever small 
benefit there may be in acquiring an accurate belief about her prospects seems massively 






More generally, why does the specific sense of “should” (“reason,” “rationality,” 
“justification,” etc.) relevant to epistemology have any normative significance for us? Once it 
is specified that epistemology is not interested in what we should believe, all things considered, 
but only what we should believe “epistemically speaking,” it is an open question why anyone 
should care about what they “epistemically should” believe at all. To illustrate, we imagined 
some onlookers solely interested in arriving at an accurate belief about the climber’s prospects 
to represent the epistemic perspective of normative assessment. However, we can just as easily 
imagine a group of people interested in all sorts of odd things to represent various perspectives 
of assessment. For instance, suppose Bob is mildly curious about how many grains of sand 
comprise his nearby beach. We might imagine a group of people who are solely interested in 
knowing the exact number of grains of sand on nearby beaches to represent the sand-counting 
standard of assessment. The conclusion the sand-counters would come to represents what 
Bob “sand-counter-should” do. For instance, Bob “sand-counter-should” quit his job, find a 
bucket and a pair of tweezers, and get to work. However, it’s clearly an open question whether 
Bob really has any reason to do what he “sand-counter-should” do. (I submit that he has no 
reason at all to do what he “sand-counter-should” do because knowing how many grains of 
sand comprise his nearby beach is, all things being equal, a worthless aim.) If epistemology is 
“a normative discipline as much as, and in the same sense as, normative ethics” (Kim, 1988: 
383), it must be explained why the epistemic perspective, like the ethical perspective but unlike 
the sand-counting perspective, is important and worth considering, regardless of whatever else 
we want or care about. Why does the “epistemic should” necessarily have normative 








According to a popular attempt at an explanation consistent with the separation thesis, the 
crucial difference is that, unlike the sand-counter perspective, which we may choose whether 
it is worth considering, adopting the epistemic perspective is inescapable for us. If belief has a 
constitutive epistemic aim, then insofar as we are creatures with the capacity for belief, we are 
necessarily directed toward attaining that aim. For example, here’s Feldman:  
There are oughts that result from one’s playing a certain role or having a certain 
position...I suggest that epistemic oughts are of this sort—they describe the right way 
to play a certain role...They are based on what’s good performance. Furthermore, it is 
plausible to say that the role of a believer is not one that we have any real choice about 
taking on. It is our plight to be believers. We ought to do it right (2000: 676). 
 
Similarly, Railton argues that taking epistemic norms to have authority over our beliefs is part 
of what distinguishes these attitudes as beliefs:  
as an agent, you must possess beliefs...you must represent certain of your 
propositional attitudes as accountable to truth and as disciplined by truth-oriented 
norms...irrespective of what other goals this might or might not serve. A self-
representation of certain of one’s attitudes as ‘aiming at’ truth is partially constitutive of 
belief, which in turn is partially constitutive of agency. Let us, then, call this sort of 
argument a constitutive argument (1997: 98-99). 
 
 A certain activity or role has a constitutive aim if part of what it is to engage in that 
activity or assume that role is to be directed at attaining the aim. For example, part of what it 
is to engage in the activity of doing dishes or occupying the role of dishwasher is to be directed 
at attaining the aim of the dishes being done. In general, according to constitutive arguments, 
if an activity or role is inescapable for us, and that activity or role has a constitutive aim, then 






aim of that activity or role necessarily involves conforming to certain norms, then we 
necessarily have good reason to conform to those norms.  
The underlying thought behind constitutive arguments like Railton’s is that being 
believers is inescapable for us, belief aims at truth,5 and attaining true beliefs requires 
conformity to epistemic norms, so we necessarily have good reason to conform to epistemic 
norms. If part of what it is for an attitude to be a belief is that it “aims at truth,” and it is our 
plight to be believers, then it is our plight to aim at truth. If aiming at truth is a matter of taking 
epistemic norms to have authority over our beliefs, then we necessarily take epistemic norms 
to have authority over our beliefs. According to the constitutive argument, the nature of belief 
and the inescapability of being a believer explain why epistemic norms have authority for us 
and why we should (and necessarily do) care about taking up the epistemic perspective when 
we deliberate about what to believe. As Wiland puts the point, “we can extract a norm about 
how we should believe based upon what it is to believe...Truth is the constitutive aim of belief, 
and so reasons to believe are necessarily related to considerations concerning the truth of 
what’s believed” (2012: 117-118).  
 
§7 
What exactly does it mean that belief “aims at truth”? Wedgwood playfully remarks, “beliefs 
are not little archers armed with little bows and arrows: they do not literally ‘aim’ at anything. 
																																																						
5 There is much debate about whether the aim of belief is truth or some other epistemic status (e.g., knowledge, 
evidential support, etc.), but this issue is beside the point of the present discussion. For views according to which 
truth is the aim of belief, see, e.g., Williams (1973), Wedgwood (2002), Shah (2003), Gibbard (2005). For views 
according to which knowledge is the aim of belief, see e.g., Williamson (2000) and Littlejohn (2013). For a view 






The claim must be interpreted as a metaphor” (2002: 267). Before looking more closely at 
various ways philosophers have interpreted the “aim of belief” metaphor, I’ll summarize the 
general structure of my argument and then illustrate the problem it causes for each of the 
prominent interpretations I discuss below. However, before turning to the argument, it is 
worth situating my remarks in the context of the established debate concerning constitutivism 
about action. According to constitutivists about action (e.g., Velleman 2000 and Korsgaard 
1996; 2009) we necessarily have good reason to act in certain ways just in virtue of the fact 
that we are agents. One attractive feature of constitutivism about action is the promise of 
providing an answer to skeptical challenges concerning the objectivity of norms of action (like 
the demands of morality). If being agents necessarily commits us to caring about acting well, 
the question “why care about acting well” is shown to be incoherent. According to the 
constitutivist, insofar as you are an agent, and action has certain constitutive aims or norms, 
you do care about realizing these aims and conforming to these norms.  
Perhaps the most influential argument against constitutivism about action comes from 
Enoch (2006), who argues that constitutivism cannot ground the norms of action. According 
to the constitutivist, in order for something to be classified as an action, it must be constituted 
partly by the application of certain norms. If we could violate these norms, we wouldn’t 
actually count as performing actions (or we wouldn’t actually count as agents). However, 
Enoch argues that we are left with a different skeptical question: why care about whether we 
count as agents? He illustrates this point by introducing the character of a “schmagent.” The 
schmagent simply rejects the constitutivist norms concerning what he should do: 
Classify my bodily movements and indeed me as you like. Perhaps I cannot be 






agent? Perhaps I can’t act without aiming at self-constitution, but why should I act? 
If your reasoning works, this just shows that I don’t care about agency and action. I’m 
perfectly happy being a “Schmagent”—a nonagent who is very similar to agents but 
who lacks the aim (constitutive of agency but not “schmagency”) of self-constitution. 
I am perfectly happy performing “schmactions”—nonaction events that are very 
similar to actions but lack the aim (constitutive of actions but not schmactions) of 
self-constitution (Enoch 2006, 179). 
 
The plausibility of the schmagency objection depends on whether agency, as the constitutivist 
characterizes it, is actually avoidable in the way Enoch imagines. The constitutivist must deny 
that it is possible for us to avoid being agents (or to perform schmactions instead of actions). 
If any intentional activity counts as an action in the constitutivist’s sense, then the alleged 
schmagent is simply confused. If, according to the constitutivist, the alleged schmagent 
unavoidably aims at X (where X stands for whatever the constitutivist claims the constitutive 
aim of action is) whenever she engages in any intentional activity, her question—why should 
I aim at X when engaging in intentional activity—is incoherent.  
 However, even if it is granted that agency, as the constitutivist characterizes it, is 
unavoidable, the constitutivist must allow for the possibility of realizing the constitutive aim 
of agency to varying degrees (Katsafanas 2018). If agents unavoidably aim at X, and what it is 
to act well just is to aim at X, then agents unavoidably act well, but this leaves no room for the 
possibility of acting poorly.6 The absurd result is that all actions, just in virtue of being actions, 
																																																						
6 This problem should be familiar to readers of Kant’s practical philosophy, as it is reminiscent of the old 
challenge raised by Reinhold (1792) and later by Sidgwick (1888) to Kant’s account of freedom. According to the 
objection, Kant is committed to thinking that a free action is necessarily chosen from respect for the moral law, 
but it seems to follow that it is impossible to choose freely to violate the moral law. If what it is to be free is to 
choose out of respect for the moral law, then evil cannot be attributed to free agency. Similarly, according to the 
constitutivist, some goal is constitutive of action, but it seems to follow that it is impossible for something to be 
an intentional action and fail to aim at that goal. If what it is to be an intentional action is to aim at the goal, then 
bad actions cannot be intentional. For a version of this criticism raised specifically against Velleman’s 







are good actions, and bad action is impossible. Therefore, the constitutivist must concede that 
agents can realize the constitutive aim of action to varying degrees. To aim at X isn’t necessarily 
to aim at X well or to succeed in realizing X. At this point, the constitutivist about action (and, 
as I will argue, the constitutivist about belief) faces a more difficult challenge. Briefly, if only 
some degree of commitment to the constitutive aim is necessary for agency, the constitutivist 
cannot ground the normativity of success in realizing that aim in basic facts about what is 
necessary for agency.  
 
§8 
The argument here owes a debt to Wolf’s influential discussion of the “moral saint.” As Wolf 
characterizes such a person, a moral saint is “a person whose every action is as morally good 
as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be” (419). Wolf goes on to argue 
that moral sainthood “does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it 
would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive” (ibid). The 
substance of Wolf’s argument is not at issue here. Rather, my aim is to highlight and apply 
Wolf’s insight about the relationship between moral norms and ideals to the epistemic domain. 
The notion of the moral saint demonstrates how perfect conformity to a set of norms 
characterizes an ideal. Perfect conformity to moral norms demonstrates what being an ideal 
moral agent, or moral saint, looks like just as perfect conformity to dish-washing norms 
demonstrates what being an ideal dishwasher looks like. Similarly, according to Feldman, 
epistemic norms can tell us what “good performance” or being an ideal believer looks like. 






demonstrates perfect conformity to moral norms, we can imagine an “epistemic saint” to be 
a person whose every belief is as epistemically good as possible and who demonstrates perfect 
conformity to epistemic norms. (I’ll set aside the important question whether epistemic 
sainthood “constitutes a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly 
rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive” until chapter II.) 
Recall that according to constitutive arguments, if an activity or role is inescapable for 
us, and that activity or role has a constitutive aim, then being directed toward realizing that 
aim is inescapable for us. And, if realizing the constitutive aim of that activity or role necessarily 
involves conforming to certain norms, then we necessarily have good reason to conform to 
those norms. As we saw in the previous section, what is ambiguous in this general way of 
presenting the argument is what degree of conformity or “being directed to attaining that aim” 
is entailed by occupying the role or engaging in the activity. In a discussion of constitutivist 
views in ethics, Katsafanas refers to this ambiguity as the maximization problem. He writes, “If 
our commitment to acting simply generates a commitment to realizing the constitutive 
standards to some degree, but good action is action that fulfills the aim either completely or to a high 
degree, then it seems that our commitment to action is not yet a commitment to good action.” 
(388).  
Certainly, perfect conformity to epistemic norms, or what I’m calling “epistemic 
sainthood,” cannot be a necessary condition of being a believer. If it were, none of us would 
count; it is likely that all of us possess beliefs that aren’t warranted by our evidence, and most 
of us know this fact about ourselves. Yet, we don’t cease to count as creatures with the capacity 






hired as dishwashers, Smith, Jones, and Lee. Lee works hard to be the best dishwasher she can 
be. She goes above and beyond the job requirements, brings a ton of energy and enthusiasm 
to her responsibilities, always stays late when asked, and washes more dishes than any of her 
colleagues. On the other hand, Smith does exactly what is required of him and nothing more. 
He brings only the required amount of energy to his responsibilities, never stays late, keeps to 
himself, and washes exactly the minimum number of dishes necessary to avoid being fired. 
Finally, Jones has never bothered showing up to work. His father owns the restaurant, and 
everyone is too scared to report his absence. Jones clearly isn’t actually a dishwasher, and Lee 
clearly is, but what about Smith? Insofar as Smith is meeting the bare minimum requirements 
of his job, he does count as being a dishwasher. He may not be a great dishwasher like Lee, 
but just because he’s not excellent at attaining the constitutive aim of dishwashing doesn’t 
entail that he fails to count as being a dishwasher at all.  
Given that even mediocre epistemic subjects still count as believers, the epistemic 
constitutivist needs an account of the aim of belief that can allow that aim to be realized to 
different degrees. However, once it is granted that the aim of belief can be achieved to various 
degrees, it is unclear why it follows just from the nature of belief and the unavoidability of 
being a believer that we are committed to absolute conformity with epistemic norms. I grant 
there is some minimum degree of conformity with epistemic norms necessary for counting as 
a believer at all. If none of a creature’s attitudes were responsive to evidence, or that creature 
didn’t represent any of their attitudes as accountable to truth and disciplined by truth-oriented 
norms, it would be difficult to imagine that that creature had the capacity for belief. However, 






some of our beliefs are true and whether we conform to some degree to epistemic norms, but also, 
that we have good reason to care about the truth, accuracy, degree of evidential support, etc. 
of all our beliefs and that we conform to a high degree. In other words, it seems to follow from 
the constitutive argument that we all necessarily have good reason to be epistemic saints. We 
might frame this problem as a modified version of Enoch’s objection. Imagine a “schmeliever” 
as someone who has the capacity to represent some of her propositional attitudes as 
accountable to truth and as disciplined by truth-oriented norms, but she doesn’t do this very 
well in particular contexts. For example, suppose she has an optimism bias that results in her 
assessing herself as slightly more capable than she actually is, and as a result, she leads a happier 
life than if her assessment of herself we more accurate.7  
Classify my doxastic attitudes and indeed me as you like. Perhaps I cannot be classified 
as a creature with the capacity for belief without aiming to some degree at truth. But why 
should I strive to make sure all of my beliefs are true all of the time? If your reasoning 
works, this just shows that I have a reason to care about truth to some degree, which of 
course I do, but I’m perfectly happy being a mediocre epistemic subject, given the 
various other aims I have. 
 
What can the constitutivist say to our “schmeliever”? As we’ve seen, the constitutivist 
must have an account of the constitutive features of belief that is realizable to varying degrees, 
so it is unhelpful to deny that our schmeliever counts as a believer or that her attitudes don’t 
count as beliefs at all. Why do constitutivists think that merely being creatures with the capacity 
for belief necessarily gives us good reason to strive to be ideal believers, as opposed to merely 
adequate or mediocre believers, i.e., schmelievers? Answering this question requires 
understanding how philosophers interpret the aim of belief metaphor. What I’ll argue next is 
																																																						
7 A more detailed discussion of examples like these and the relevant empirical literature can be found in chapter 










Perhaps, the most natural way of interpreting the metaphor is that, with respect to every belief 
we have, we care about whether that belief is true. The “aim of belief” is our aim. On this 
understanding, we might compare believing to other straightforwardly aim-directed activities, 
like doing dishes. In one sense, it seems odd to say doing dishes has an aim. After all, doing 
dishes is not an agent. However, in another sense, it is natural to say doing dishes has an aim: 
to do dishes is to aim at dishes being done. When we say doing dishes has an aim, what we 
really mean is that insofar as I’m doing the dishes, I have an aim. I’m aiming for the dishes to 
be done. If I’m not aiming at all at the dishes being done, then I’m not really doing the dishes. 
Imagine, instead, that I’m aiming for it to appear that the dishes are done. I give them a 
superficial rinse in water and place them, still dirty, on the dishrack. I may have succeeded in 
pretending to do the dishes, but I have failed actually to do them. Aiming for the dishes to be 
done is part of what it is to do the dishes. That doing dishes has a constitutive aim explains 
why doing dishes is characterized by certain norms; there are better and worse ways to achieve 
the aim, and adhering to these norms is partly constitutive of engaging in the activity of doing 
dishes. For instance, if you’re not using a sponge or scrubbing or making the dishes clean, 
you’re just not doing the dishes. These basic facts about activities like doing dishes explain 
why particular responses may be correct or incorrect relative to the constitutive aim of 






water is an incorrect way of doing the dishes because it utterly fails to achieve the constitutive 
aim of doing dishes.  
 According to some, believing is relevantly similar to straightforwardly aim-directed 
activities like doing dishes. Steglich-Petersen, for example, argues that when you judge that 
someone believes something, “in addition to having judged that [they regard] the proposition 
as true, you have judged that [they have] a certain aim or intention in so doing, namely, the 
aim of regarding that proposition as true only if it in fact is true” (2006: 499). In other words, 
just as my doing dishes entails that I aim for the dishes to be done, insofar as I believe 
something, I aim or intend to believe it only if it’s true. If this is true of everything I believe, 
then the epistemic constitutivist has an easy reply to the maximization problem. If being a 
believer entails that I intend, with respect to any proposition I believe, to believe that 
proposition only if it’s true, then being a believer, on its own, does imply a commitment to 
absolute conformity with epistemic norms.  
However, doing dishes seems importantly different from believing things. Unlike 
doing dishes, I’m not always aiming at knowing the truth (or at anything else) when I come to 
believe something. For example, when I looked at the sink and saw that it was dirty, I didn’t 
necessarily aim to learn the truth about whether the sink was dirty. Perhaps, I would have 
preferred to remain blissfully ignorant about the state of the sink (Kelly 2003). Doing dishes 
seems more analogous to one way we form beliefs: deliberate inquiry. Deliberately inquiring 
about whether some proposition is true does seem to entail an intention to arrive at the truth 







First, we regularly form beliefs immediately and involuntarily in response to our 
environment; not all instances of belief formation seem necessarily to involve any deliberate 
aim or intention. When my cat looks up and sees me opening the front door, his behavior 
suggests that he believes he can now get outside, but it’s unlikely that, in addition to believing 
he can get outside, he also intends anything with respect to his belief. (It’s controversial 
whether he even knows what beliefs are or that he has them.)  
Secondly, some instances of belief formation occur in the explicit absence of an 
intention to form a true belief. When I ramble on about my dissertation to friends, they 
undoubtedly form many true beliefs about my dissertation, but it isn’t necessarily the case that 
they aimed or intended to arrive at these true beliefs. Some of them really don’t care at all 
about what my dissertation is about and are just being kind.  
Thirdly, belief formation can run counter to our expressed intentions with respect to 
the truth. Here’s a helpful example from Kelly: “I tend to see newly-released movies after 
many of my friends...I often make a conscious, deliberate effort to avoid finding out how the 
movie ends” (2003: 626). If a friend accidentally blurts out the ending of the movie, the fact 
that I now know how the movie ends does not entail that I desired or intended to know how 
the movie ended. I expressly desired and intended not to know. 
Finally, beliefs formed through wishful thinking and motivated reasoning don’t 
necessarily involve an aim or intention only to form true beliefs. To return to a version of 
James’s mountain climber example, suppose the climber believes she’ll make the jump because 
she desperately wants to make it and, consequently, fails to appreciate the overwhelming 






explicitly aims, desires, or intends to believe she’ll make the jump only if it is true that she’ll 
make it. This sort of wishful thinking seems precisely to involve a lack of concern for or 
interest in the truth.  
If every belief necessarily involved an intention or desire for truth, then the 
maximization problem wouldn’t be a problem; just in virtue of being a believer, we would all 
necessarily be striving to be ideal believers. However, it is implausible that every instance of 
belief in a proposition is necessarily accompanied by an intention or desire only to believe that 
proposition if it’s true. It may be the case that agents generally desire or intend to believe truths 
and avoid believing falsehoods, or desire or intend to believe truths and avoid believing 
falsehoods when it matters to them to get things right and avoid error, but such qualifications 
are problematic for the constitutive argument, as the resulting view does not entail that we 
necessarily have good reason always to adopt the epistemic perspective or conform to 
epistemic standards.  
 
§10 
Instead of understanding the aim of belief metaphor as necessarily concerning our aims or 
desires, another way to interpret the metaphor is that truth is the aim, or purpose, of a belief 
itself, and of the cognitive system that produces beliefs (see, e.g., Velleman 2000). Just as the 
purpose of a clock is to display the time accurately, the purpose of a belief is to depict the state 
of affairs it represents accurately. A belief that doesn’t achieve its aim is a bad belief, just as a 
broken clock is a bad clock. As McHugh articulates the view, “when a proposition is taken up 






part of what it is for the attitude so formed or regulated to count as belief that the regulating 
processes have this aim or function” (2012: 426). He specifies in a footnote that “such 
regulation can involve the subject taking up the aim in her conscious intentions, where these 
intentions play a role in bringing about or affecting the state. But it need not involve the agent’s 
conscious intentions. Belief-regulation is often carried out automatically...by cognitive systems 
which have the relevant aim or function” (ibid., fn 1). According to this interpretation, the 
claim that belief aims at truth doesn’t mean that we necessarily always intend or desire to have 
true beliefs. Rather, regulating beliefs for truth is the aim, or purpose, of our cognitive system, 
and a good cognitive system is one that performs this function well. 
Leaving aside the plausibility of the descriptive claim that the function of our cognitive 
system is to generate true beliefs, does this interpretation answer the maximization problem? 
In other words, does it explain why we necessarily have good reason to have an ideally 
functioning cognitive system that only produces true beliefs (or which produces only beliefs 
that achieve the constitutive aim of a belief)? Even if false beliefs are worse beliefs, and the 
cognitive system that produces them is a worse cognitive system, does this explain why we 
have a good reason to avoid epistemically unjustified beliefs or prefer a better cognitive 
system? To return to the clock analogy, suppose I have a strong sentimental attachment to a 
pocket watch my grandfather gave me before he died. It isn’t very good at keeping time, but I 
would never prefer a better-functioning pocket watch just because it works better, given my 
attachment to this one. In this instance, whether my watch performs the characteristic function 






Granted, all things being equal, a better cognitive is probably better for us, just as a 
working clock is, all things being equal, preferable to a broken one.8 However, if certain 
cognitive blind spots stably contribute to our wellbeing, it is unclear why we wouldn’t prefer 
a cognitive system with such blind spots. More importantly, though, the constitutive argument 
is supposed to explain the authority of epistemic norms independently of the contribution true 
beliefs make to our wellbeing, so explanations of the authority of epistemic norms that appeal 
to the practical value of a well-functioning cognitive system are unavailable to the epistemic 
constitutivist.  
The problem with identifying the aim of belief with the function of our cognitive 
system is that it fails to explain why we necessarily have good reason to prefer an ideally-
functioning cognitive system, especially when we consider circumstances like James’s climber, 
in which a less-than-ideally-functioning cognitive system seems obviously preferable. To 
illustrate, let’s return to our mediocre dishwasher, Smith. Being a dishwasher has a constitutive 
aim, which explains why absent Jones fails to be a dishwasher. However, this aim can be 
realized to different degrees. Smith realizes the aim to a mediocre degree, while Lee realizes 
																																																						
8 For some influential instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity along these lines, see Quine (1990), 
Kornblith (1993), and Maffie (1990). Kornblith, for instance, writes “epistemic evaluation finds its natural ground 
in our desires in a way which makes truth something we should care about whatever else we may value. This 
provides us with a pragmatic account of the source of epistemic normativity, but an account which is universal 
and also allows truth to play a central role” (373). While I agree with Kornblith that the source of epistemic 
normativity is ultimately practical, the objections I raise in the main text of the previous section seem to apply 
with equal force to his claim that epistemic reasons are universal. According to Kornblith, insofar as I have any 
goals at all, I have good reason to favor a cognitive system that is generally successful at producing true beliefs. 
However, the question is how successful? If having a cognitive system that is generally successful at producing true 
beliefs but systematically malfunctions in ways that stably contribute to my wellbeing, why wouldn’t I prefer that 
cognitive system to one that is more effective at producing true beliefs? The objection seems even more 
worrisome on Kornblith’s account, given that he thinks the only reasons to prefer one cognitive system to 
another are considerations having to do with wellbeing. For further criticisms of instrumentalist accounts, see 






the constitutive aim to a very high degree; she is a better dishwasher than Smith. Does Smith 
necessarily have a good reason to be more like Lee, simply in virtue of occupying the role of 
dishwasher? Suppose Smith also occupies many other roles. Perhaps, he is a single parent, a 
suicide hotline operator, and a soup kitchen volunteer. He doesn’t particularly like that he 
must wash dishes instead of spending more of his time fulfilling these other roles, but he must 
pay the bills. Suppose further that if Smith were more like Lee, he would have less time and 
energy to fulfill the other important roles in his life. It seems to me that Smith doesn’t 
necessarily have good reason to be a better dishwasher just in virtue of the fact that he occupies 
this role, given the relative importance occupying this role has in his life and the other things 
he cares about, especially on the assumption that he is already meeting the minimum 
requirements of the job.  
Similarly, we might imagine two believers, Jules and Jim. Jules has a lot of faith in 
people; she’s inclined to believe they will generally do the right thing and act decently if given 
the opportunity. This character trait leads her to form more epistemically unjustified beliefs 
than Jim, who has no such optimism. Jim forms beliefs about how people will treat him solely 
based on the evidence on a case-by-case basis; he is not inclined to believe that people will 
generally do the right thing or act decently. Simply, Jim has little faith in humanity.  
Now suppose that the people around Jules appreciate her optimism and faith in 
humanity9 and that she has more close friends and is generally a happier person than Jim, and 
this is due at least in part to dispositions that result in a less-than-ideally-functioning cognitive 
																																																						
9 For a defense of the claim that a virtuous person’s faith in humanity is at odds with the ideal of epistemic 






system. Again, it seems to me that Jules doesn’t necessarily have good reason to be more like 
Jim just in virtue of the fact that her cognitive system performs its function less optimally than 
Jim’s, especially on the assumption that her cognitive system is performing its function 
adequately enough to help her navigate her surroundings, avoid calamity, achieve her goals, 
etc. Interpreting the aim of belief metaphor as a claim about the ideal functioning of our 
cognitive system fails to explain why we necessarily have good reason to care about whether 
our cognitive system is functioning optimally in all instances or why we necessarily have reason 
always to prefer beliefs that serve the purpose of belief rather than beliefs that serve other 
purpose, like contributing to our wellbeing. 
 One might object that the example of Jules and Jim begs the question against the 
separation thesis. A proponent may reply that while Jules might not have a practical reason to 
be more like Jim, epistemic reasons are completely different. For instance, insofar as Jules 
believes some proposition p without adequate epistemic justification, she has an epistemic 
reason not to believe p, and whatever benefit or value attaches to believing p is irrelevant to 
her epistemic reasons. However, the point of the example is that Jules’s dispositions—the 
ways she is inclined to think about others—are responsible for this minor epistemic 
impropriety. Therefore, if constitutivism (on this interpretation) can explain why Jules 
necessarily has good reason not to believe p, it must also explain why she necessarily has good 
reason to have a cognitive system that results in not believing p-like propositions in similar 
circumstances, i.e., a cognitive system that is more like Jim’s than her own.  
Recall that, according to this interpretation of the aim of belief metaphor, one 






properly functioning belief (or more precisely, a properly functioning cognitive system) is one 
that reliably produces true beliefs. What I have argued is that this interpretation fails to explain 
why one necessarily has reason to have properly functioning beliefs (or a properly functioning 
cognitive system) just because they are properly functioning beliefs (or cognitive system). 
Granted, we have good reason not to have a poorly functioning cognitive system—one which 
is likely to cause us significant harm or prevent us from achieving our goals—but the lesson 
of the examples in this section is that there this a gap between having good reason not to have 
a poorly functioning cognitive system and having good reason to have an ideally functioning 
cognitive system. In other words, the functional interpretation fails to answer the 
maximization problem.  
 
§11 
According to one final interpretation of the aim of belief metaphor, the metaphor should be 
understood in normative terms: a belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is true. 
Wedgwood, for example, writes, “I propose to interpret this claim as a normative claim—
roughly, as the claim that a belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is true” 
(2002: 267). On this interpretation, what it means to say belief aims at truth is that a belief that 
isn’t true is incorrect, wrong, etc., where these terms are understood as inherently reason-
giving. However, it is not necessarily the case the correctness and incorrectness are inherently 






“normativity.” (2016: 3182).10 To illustrate, recall the example of the imagined group of people 
who are solely interested in knowing the exact number of grains of sand on nearby beaches. 
Relative to their goals, there are certain things Bob “sand-counter-should” do, like quit his job 
and find a bucket and some tweezers. Relative to the sand-counter dimension of assessment, 
these are the correct things to do. Yet, it is far from clear whether Bob has any reason at all to 
quit his job or sit with his tweezers. The bare fact that these actions are correct relative to 
some standard of assessment doesn’t imply that Bob has any reason to care about that standard 
in the first place. And, as Côté-Bouchard points out, the fact that believing is, unlike sand-
counting, something we necessarily engage in, doesn’t make a difference:  
we can very well ask the same normative question about norm-governed activities that 
are unavoidable for agents. Consider the activity of using a language. Languages have 
constitutive norms or rules. Moreover, using a language is arguably unavoidable and 
perhaps even constitutive of what it is to be a human agent. Yet rules of languages are 
often considered to lack necessary normative force (3194).  
 
Moreover, just like the other interpretations we discussed, understanding the metaphor as a 
claim about the correctness of a belief does not answer the maximization problem. At best, it 
explains why we necessarily have reason to have some correct beliefs or care about correctness 
to some degree, but this interpretation does not explain why we necessarily have good reason 
only to have correct beliefs and to care about the correctness of our beliefs to a high degree. 
 
§12 
To summarize, according to the separation thesis, belief is governed by a distinct set of norms, 
the authority of which is independent of any external value that might be advanced by 
																																																						
10 See also Parfit’s distinction between norms that are merely “rule-implying” and those that are “reason-






conformity with them. The main issue I have focused on is whether advocates of the 
separation thesis can explain the source of this authority. A popular strategy takes inspiration 
from Williams’s remark that “beliefs aim at truth” and asserts that part of what it is to be a 
creature with the capacity for belief is to be committed to epistemic norms. The central issue 
I raised for this answer is that aims can be realized to various degrees, so even if belief does 
aim at truth, it doesn’t follow that we necessarily have good reason to maximize the 
achievement of this aim. I considered three of the most prominent interpretations of the aim 
of belief metaphor and explained why they each fail to answer this maximization problem. 
However, it seems obvious that there are facts about what we should or should not 
believe, that these facts have an intimate connection with adopting the epistemic perspective, 
and that epistemic standards of assessment have normative significance for us in a way that 
sand-counting standards don’t. We typically care a great deal about the epistemic status of our 
beliefs. 
Let’s consider some commonplace examples in which we ordinarily take epistemic 
standards to have normative significance: members of a jury ought to render verdicts 
impartially by analyzing the facts and not let their biases and prejudices influence their beliefs 
about the case; doctors ought to form beliefs about the best course of treatment for their 
patients in a similar manner, by putting their economic and other interests aside and 
considering only the evidence. Finally, to cite Clifford’s famous example, a shipbuilder ought 
to form his beliefs about the safety of his vessel “by honestly earning it in patient 







JUROR JUAN believes the female defendant is guilty because he is prejudiced against women. 
 
DOCTOR JILL believes surgery is the best course of treatment for her patient because her 
mortgage is overdue. 
 
SHIPBUILDER BRUCE believes his vessel is seaworthy because his career will be ruined if the 
maiden voyage were delayed. 
 
Juror Juan, Doctor Jill, and Shipbuilder Bruce violate many commonly-discussed 
epistemic norms; they all believe things for reasons that have nothing to do with the truth; 
they all believe things for reasons that are not evidence; none of them believe things for 
reasons in virtue of which their beliefs could constitute knowledge; none of their beliefs are 
formed in a reliable (i.e., truth-conducive) manner. But why should Juan, Jill, and Bruce care 
about whether they conform to epistemic norms in forming their beliefs? Why do they have 
any reason to base their beliefs on adequate evidence or form their beliefs in truth-conducive 
ways?  
Two features of these cases are worth pointing out. First, in each of them, there is 
something morally significant at stake. Juror Juan would wrong the defendant if he were to let 
his biases and prejudices influence his verdict. Doctor Jill would wrong her patient if monetary 
incentives biased her in favor of a sub-optimal course of treatment. Shipbuilder Bruce wrongs 
everyone on board when he stifles his doubts and hastily concludes that the vessel is 
seaworthy. They each owe it to others to conform to epistemic standards in forming their 
beliefs and not let their biases and prejudices influence them. Secondly, in each of these cases, 
the people in question occupy specific social roles—juror, doctor, shipbuilder—and these 
roles are partly constituted by bearing certain responsibilities. A juror is (in part) a person 






person who has taken an oath to aim to heal and not to harm. A shipbuilder is (in part) 
someone whom people trust to build seaworthy vessels. Of course, there are bad jurors, 
doctors, and shipbuilders. The point is that occupying these roles implies bearing certain 
responsibilities to others, and in addition to how they act, these responsibilities include what 
they believe and how they go about forming their beliefs.  
However, according to advocates of the separation thesis, the normativity of these 
familiar moral demands is distinct from the purely epistemic sense of obligation. Whether 
Juror Juan, Doctor Jill, or Shipbuilder Bruce wrong the defendant, patient, and passengers, 
respectively, is commonly taken to be a separate issue from whether their beliefs are 
epistemically justified.  
Philosophers debate whether beliefs themselves can be morally wrong, or whether we 
should locate Juan, Jill, and Bruce’s wrongdoing in their actions: failing to inquire as they were 
obligated to, exhibiting various morally reproachable prejudices, not demonstrating adequate 
care and concern for others, etc. However, even among those who accept that beliefs 
themselves can be morally wrong, it is widely held that moral considerations do not positively 
bear on what we should believe.  
To illustrate, according to traditional epistemological orthodoxy, the only 
considerations relevant to the justification of a belief are epistemic. The Moral Encroachment11 
thesis (ME) challenges this orthodoxy. According to proponents, a belief’s justification is 
																																																						
11 The seminal defenses of the phenomenon of “pragmatic encroachment” in epistemology can be found in Fantl 
and McGrath (2002) and Stanley (2005). For an argument that moral encroachment constitutes a distinct 






sensitive to non-epistemic, moral factors. Consider an example:12 you are at a party, almost all 
the attendees are white, and almost all of the waiters are Black. Everyone is dressed in formal 
wear. You see a Black person in front of you in a tuxedo, and you believe, on the basis of the 
statistical evidence, that they are a waiter and not a guest. According to many of us, drawing a 
conclusion like this about an individual solely because of facts about that individual’s race is 
wrong. The lesson proponents of ME draw from cases like this is that moral considerations 
are relevant to epistemic justification because they partly determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to justify belief. According to ME, a certain degree or amount of statistical evidence 
may be sufficient to justify a belief in one context but not in another solely because of the 
presence of a moral consideration. Schroeder (2012), for example, argues that moral factors 
can give one a reason to suspend judgment or a reason against believing, but not a positive 
reason to believe.13 While encroachment views like Schroeder’s depart from epistemological 
orthodoxy in claiming that non-epistemic factors are relevant to a belief’s justification, they 
follow traditional epistemology in assuming the truth of the separation thesis, i.e., that the 
source of the authority of epistemic standards is, in some important respect, wholly 
independent of the demands of morality.14 
																																																						
12 The example is based on one introduced by Gendler (2011). Similar examples are discussed in Moss (2018), 
Basu and Schroeder (2019), and Bolinger (2020).  
13 Similar views are endorsed by Owens (2000), Fantl and McGrath (2002), Ganson (2008), Pace (2011), and Basu 
and Schroeder (2019).  
14 While a fuller discussion of ME is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, it is worth noting a tension in 
encroachment views. If the moral significance of believing p can make it more difficult to be justified in believing 
p when there is a something morally significant at stake, why doesn’t the moral significance of failing to believe 
p make it easier to be justified in believing p when there is something morally significant at stake? If I can wrong 
another person by believing something on evidence that would be sufficient if not for the moral considerations 
in play, what rules out the possibility that I can wrong another person by failing to believe something on evidence 
that would be insufficient if not for the moral considerations in play. In other words, why do the moral factors 






 Advocates of the separation thesis who aim to ground the authority of epistemic 
norms in the constitutive aim of belief must explain why Juan, Jill, and Bruce necessarily have 
reason to care about the epistemic status of their beliefs in the examples above. Even if it is 
true that their beliefs are incorrect or that their cognitive systems aren’t performing their 
characteristic function ideally, why do they necessarily have any reason to care about any of 
that? It is not as though they fail to be agents or believers at all simply because they each have 
an unjustified belief or a cognitive bias. A commitment to having true beliefs in general or 
having a decently functioning cognitive system does not yet entail a commitment to truth in this 
particular instance. Even if part of what it is to be a believer involves some sensitivity to the 
truth-aim, they do not fail to count as believers just insofar as they fail to maximize the 
achievement of that aim. The constitutivist strategy fails to explain why these subjects 
necessarily have reason to care about the degree to which they conform to epistemic norms 
in their particular circumstances. Obviously, constitutivists can help themselves to the 
commonsense explanation, namely, that Juan, Jill, and Bruce owe it to others (and arguably, 
to themselves) to form their beliefs in certain ways in these scenarios, but such an explanation 
goes beyond the limited resources of constitutivism. 
 
§13 
Similar objections to constitutive arguments have led some to conclude that epistemic norms 
do not necessarily entail reasons to believe. Côté-Bouchard, for example, suggests that, 
																																																						
of evidence, but never lower the standard for justification, or make it easier to be justified in believing on the 







Perhaps Epistemic Normativity is false  not  (or  not  only)  because  necessary  
normativity  does  not  exist,  but  rather because  our  concept  of  an  epistemic  
norm  is  not,  after  all,  that  of  a  norm  that necessarily entails good reasons. That 
is, perhaps epistemic norms have the same kind of normative authority as e.g. norms 
of etiquette, fashion, games, and the like. If this is right, then there can still be facts 
about what we epistemically should believe. But just like facts about what we should 
do according to etiquette, they are not genuinely normative facts (3195-6).15 
 
While I have argued that the constitutivist strategy cannot explain why we necessarily 
have good reasons to conform to epistemic norms, I also think we generally do have good 
reasons to conform to epistemic norms, even if examples like James’s climber offer important 
exceptions. Therefore, I take it that there is an important difference between the authority of 
epistemic norms and the authority of norms of etiquette or the rules of a game. First, as Côté-
Bouchard points out, believing is not a “game” we can choose not to play. We generally expect 
others to follow the rules of a game only insofar as they’ve agreed to play, but there are general 
expectations we have of one another and ourselves when it comes to responsiveness to 
evidence, regardless of whether they aim or desire to play “the belief game.” This is because 
believing is intimately connected with a host of other human activities and social roles. While 
I’m skeptical of Feldman’s claim that being a believer in itself constitutes a distinct role, the 
examples of Juan, Bruce, and Jill illustrate how forming beliefs and being held by others to 
certain epistemic standards is part of what it is to occupy specific social roles, like doctor, juror, 
or shipbuilder, and this extends to most social roles we adopt, like friend, partner, community 
member, source of information, fellow citizen, etc. The mistake that leads to the false 
dichotomy that epistemic norms must either be inherently reason-implying or merely rule-
implying arises from the assumption that epistemic norms are fundamentally distinct from 
																																																						






ethical norms; either they must be an independent source of reasons or not a source of reasons 
at all. According to the alternative view I advance here, epistemic norms have authority and 
are a source of reasons precisely because they are ethical rules that we owe it to ourselves and 
to one another generally to follow. This account explains both why we should care about 
conforming to epistemic standards and why epistemic considerations alone cannot settle 
normative questions about belief. 
To return to Juan, Bruce, and Jill, given the features of the examples I highlighted, I 
suggest that the simplest explanation why they should care about the epistemic status of their 
beliefs in these examples is that they owe it to others to do so; their beliefs in these examples 
are practically and morally significant. While knowing how many grains of sand comprise a 
nearby beach is probably useless, acquiring knowledge and avoiding error are generally 
practically significant. We expect one another to know various things, avoid believing 
falsehoods, think critically, reason well, etc. In a wide variety of contexts, we owe it to each 
other to conform to epistemic standards in forming our beliefs. Moreover, our lives are likely 
to go a whole lot better if we are generally disposed to form accurate beliefs about our 
surroundings. We make plans based on our beliefs, and we are much more likely to execute 
those plans successfully if the beliefs we reason from are accurate. 
 
§14 
While it may seem obvious that the practical significance of our beliefs is relevant to explaining 
why we should care about conforming to epistemic standards, explaining the authority of 






it does not account for the alleged “independence” of epistemic reasons from practical 
concerns. According to the broadly instrumentalist explanation I have sketched, it matters that 
we conform to epistemic norms only if something of practical or moral significance is at stake, 
and the practical or moral significance of true belief explains why epistemic norms have 
authority. The basic thought behind this explanation is that obligation and responsibility are 
fundamentally interpersonal ethical notions. To be obligated is to be obligated to others and 
to ourselves, and to be responsible or accountable is to be accountable to others and to 
ourselves. So, making sense of epistemic obligation and responsibility requires an account of 
what we epistemically owe to each other and to ourselves. In the examples above of our juror, 
doctor, and shipbuilder, the obligation to be appropriately sensitive to evidence is a moral 
obligation, and this explains why the subjects in these cases should care about the epistemic 
status of their beliefs and why we are entitled to hold them to certain epistemic standards.  
It follows from this practical conception of epistemic normativity that if nothing of 
practical or moral significance is at stake with respect to the doxastic attitude a person takes 
toward some proposition, there is no reason at all for that person to have any particular attitude 
toward that proposition. For example, if nothing of practical significance turns on having an 
accurate belief about whether the number of stars in the universe is odd or even,16 and you 
																																																						
16 I phrase this claim as a conditional in order to leave open the possibility that something of moral significance 
always hinges on having a belief that fits one’s evidence. For instance, one might deny that in this example, or in 
any other, nothing of moral significance turns on whether you have an epistemically justified doxastic attitude. I 
take this, roughly, to be Clifford’s position insofar as he claims that, when we believe without sufficient evidence, 
“it is sinful, because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind” (293). Perhaps, with respect to any 
proposition we consider, we are under a moral obligation to follow strictly the evidentialist principle. Or, perhaps 
we have a moral duty to develop good epistemic dispositions, and developing these habits involves a great degree 







happen to believe the number of stars in the universe is even because you like even numbers 
and it makes you feel good to believe that, you haven’t violated any obligation in so doing. 
You are under no special epistemic obligation to reconsider the matter and revise your belief 
so that you acquire a doxastic attitude that fits your evidence (i.e., suspend judgment on 
whether the number of stars in the universe is even) because it doesn’t matter whether you 
have an epistemically justified attitude toward this proposition, and there is some benefit to 
having an epistemically unjustified attitude.  
Some theorists find this result implausible. Kelly, for instance, considers some matters 
about which we are indifferent and have no preference for having true beliefs to false beliefs, 
such as whether Bertrand Russell was left-handed, and he writes: 
From the fact that some subjects are matters of complete indifference to me, it does 
not follow that I will inevitably lack epistemic reasons for holding beliefs about those 
subjects. If, despite my utter lack of interest in the question of whether Bertrand 
Russell was left-handed, I stumble upon strong evidence that he was, then I have 
strong epistemic reason to believe that Bertrand Russell was left-handed. Indeed, my 
epistemic reasons will be no different than they would be if I had acquired the same 
evidence deliberately, because I did have the goal of finding out whether Russell was 
left-handed. Once I come into possession of evidence which strongly supports that 
claim that p, then I have epistemic reasons to believe that p, regardless of whether I 
presently have or previously had the goal of believing the truth about p, or any wider 
goal which would be better achieved in virtue of my believing the truth about p. The 
fact that I can have epistemic reasons to believe propositions even though doing so 
holds no promise of better achieving any of my goals (cognitive or otherwise) fits 
poorly with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality, since whether it is 
instrumentally rational to Φ always depends on the contents of one’s goals (2003: 
625). 
 
If by “epistemic reason to believe,” Kelly just means “evidence,” his claim here is true, but the 
objection has no teeth. Of course, if I stumble upon strong evidence that Bertrand Russell was 
left-handed, I have strong evidence that Bertrand Russell was left-handed. But Kelly means 






entails some normative reason to go ahead and believe that proposition. In this chapter, I have 
tried to challenge this assumption. Suppose, for instance, that I like to think Bertrand Russell 
was left-handed because I’m left-handed too, he’s one of my intellectual heroes, and I feel 
affinity for fellow left-handed people. I stumble across some strong evidence that he wasn’t 
left-handed, but I fail to pay attention to it and quickly forget it. A little later, I remain 
convinced Bertrand Russell was left-handed because I want it to be true. Have I necessarily 
violated an obligation I’m under to remember the counter evidence and revise my belief 
accordingly? Do I necessarily have any reason to reconsider my judgment? Granted, we might 
imagine a friend, a Russell scholar whom I trust and admire, who informs me that I’m 
incorrect. I might owe it to my friend to defer to their expertise, to trust them, to respect their 
epistemic authority, etc. Or we might imagine that others count on me to be a reliable authority 
about such matters, and I owe it to them to form my beliefs about whether Russell was left-
handed in an epistemically responsible fashion. However, once we complicate the example 
with these broader ethical concerns, we risk muddling the point Kelly is making. According to 
Kelly, even if nothing at all of practical or moral significance turns on whether I have an 
accurate belief about which hand Bertrand Russell wrote with, I still should (am obligated to, 
have reason to, etc.) adopt the belief supported by my evidence.17 However, as I hope to have 
shown, it is not clear what sort of obligation this could be or why this notion of “epistemic 
																																																						
17 I specifically invoke an example involving permission here, or “negative” epistemic obligation. The claim that 
we have a “positive” epistemic obligation to believe a proposition that fits our evidence even if nothing of 
practical or moral significance hinges on believing it is more controversial, as is suggested by the fairly widespread 
endorsement of Harman’s “clutter avoidance” principle (Harman: 1986, 12). See also, Goldman (1986), Feldman 
(2000), Williamson (1998), and Wedgwood (2012). On the basis of similar considerations, Nelson (2010) denies 
that there are any such things as positive epistemic duties. I am sympathetic to Nelson’s argument, and in the 
main text, I suggest that similar observations should lead us to deny that there are any distinctively epistemic 






obligation” is normative. We can stipulate that what we’re talking about is a special epistemic 
sense of obligation, reason, should, etc., but if these notions have anything to do with what 
we are actually obligated to (or have reason to, or should) believe, they must be understood in 
terms of the human activities and social roles that give these notions normative significance 
and with what we owe to each other in virtue of occupying those roles.  
 
§15 
The focus of this chapter has been the entrenched distinction between two different kinds of 
normative assessment, the epistemic and the ethical, and the popular thought that 
epistemology is normative in much the same sense as normative ethics. I examined what I call 
the “separation thesis,” the view that these two sets of standards reflect two distinct sources 
of normativity for belief and action, respectively, and I critically examined some prominent 
explanations of epistemic normativity consistent with the separation thesis. I argued that 
advocates of the thesis cannot explain why epistemic norms necessarily entail good reasons 
for belief in the same sense that ethical norms necessarily entail good reasons for action. We 
do not always intend or desire to believe only truths; we do not necessarily have reason to 
prefer an ideally-functioning cognitive system; we do not necessarily have reason to possess 
only correct beliefs. Finally, I suggested that epistemic norms do not reflect an independent 
source of normativity governing the formation and revision of beliefs. Rather, epistemic 
standards have authority because in many facets of our social lives and with respect to many 
of the social roles we occupy, we owe it to one another to respect evidence, avoid bias and 






significance of epistemic standards explains why we have good reason to care about them, 
while the mere fact that we are creatures with the capacity for belief does not. We aren’t 
obligated to pursue truth just in virtue of the fact that we are believers. We are obligated to 










































CHAPTER II—Reasons for Attitudes and Reasons for Action 
 
The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing.   
—C. I. Lewis 
 
§1 
In the previous chapter, I challenged whether epistemic normativity follows from the nature 
or “aim” of belief, and I suggested that the authority of epistemic standards is better explained 
by the distinctive personal value and moral significance of truth (knowledge, objectivity, 
evidence, etc.) in our lives. The assumption behind this argument is that facts about our 
reasons for belief follow from facts concerning the practical value of belief. Since true belief 
is generally practically valuable, truth-relevant considerations ordinarily constitute good 
reasons for belief.  
However, according to some, the practical value of true belief cannot explain why 
evidence is a reason for belief. It is widely held that a reason is a consideration that “counts in 
favor,” and evidence for a proposition seems to count in favor of believing that proposition 
irrespective of whether arriving at the truth about that proposition is valuable. Returning to 
James’s climber, the climber seems to have two very different kinds of conflicting reasons for 
belief. Both kinds of considerations seem to be reasons to believe because they both “speak 
in favor” of believing. The evidence seems to be a reason to believe because it bears on the 
truth and potentially provides the sort of justification necessary for knowledge. The climber’s 
practical circumstances seem to be a reason to believe not because they bear on the truth or 
provide the sort of justification necessary for knowledge, but rather, because they show 






favor of believing because it shows believing to be good or worthwhile, irrespective of the 
truth.  
Among theorists interested in the nature of normative reasons, considerations like 
those we discussed in James’s example of the climber are often referred to as reasons “of the 
wrong kind” for belief. Philosophers writing about reasons frequently note an ambiguity 
between the “right” and “wrong” kinds of reasons. The distinction originates in debates over 
Fitting-Attitude theories of value.18 Such theories attempt to analyze one normative concept 
(value) in terms of another (reasons), thereby lending support to the larger claim that the 
fundamental normative concept is that of a reason—a consideration that counts in favor of 
an action or attitude. Thomas Scanlon’s influential “Buck-Passing” theory is a prominent 
contemporary example of a fitting-attitude theory. Scanlon writes, “to call something valuable 
is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways with 
regard to it” (1998: 97). 
 A prominent objection to fitting-attitude theories is the so-called “Wrong Kind of 
Reasons” problem (D’arms and Jacobson 2000; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). 
The problem is motivated by the thought that there may be reasons to value something that 
isn’t valuable. For instance, imagine that Yael’s boss is not an admirable person, but because 
he is a narcissist, it is very important to him that his underlings admire him, and he will treat 
her terribly unless she admires him. The fact that Yael’s boss will treat her terribly unless she 
admires him is a reason for her to admire him, but this fact has nothing to do with whether 
																																																						
18 A.C. Ewing, an early proponent, writes: “if we analyse good as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude,’ it will be easy 
enough to analyse bad as ‘fitting object of an anti-attitude’ this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, 






he is admirable.19 Therefore, to call someone admirable is not simply to say that they have other 
qualities that provide reasons for admiring them. Qualities like your boss’s narcissism don’t 
provide reasons “of the right kind” to feature in a fitting-attitude theory of value, yet they 
provide reasons for her to admire him nonetheless.  
The difficult problem for fitting-attitudes theories posed by reasons of the wrong kind 
is to explain what makes a consideration a reason of the right kind for valuing an object 
without appealing to the object’s value. Not just any property of an object generates reasons 
of the right kind to value it, but it would be circular for fitting-attitude theories to assert that 
only the valuable properties of an object are reasons of the right kind. If value is to be analyzed 
in terms of reasons, then such an answer would amount to saying that reasons of the right 
kind to value an object are those features of the object in virtue of which there are reasons of 
the right kind to value it, and this is no answer at all. 
 
§2 
While the wrong kind of reason problem is specifically an issue for proponents of fitting-
attitude theories of value, the distinction between reasons of the right and wrong kinds doesn’t 
only arise with respect to reasons for valuing (Reisner 2009; Hieronymi 2005; Schroeder 2010; 
Way 2012; Howard 2016). In addition to James’s example of the climber, Pascal’s wager offers 
perhaps the most famous historical example of a reason “of the wrong kind” for belief. Pascal 
writes, “Let us assess the two cases: if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you lose 
																																																						
19 Or consider a more fanciful example from Roger Crisp: “Imagine that an evil demon will inflict severe pain on 
me unless I prefer this saucer of mud; that makes the saucer well worth preferring. But it would not be plausible 
to claim that the saucer of mud’s existence is, in itself, valuable (2000, 459).” Similar examples can be found in 






nothing. Wager that he exists then, without hesitating!” (1995: 154). The argument implies that 
if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you lose nothing is a reason for you to believe that God exists 
even though this fact has nothing to do with whether God exists. Whatever you will win or 
lose by believing that God exists is not evidence one way or the other, and so does not bear 
on whether your belief is “right,” “correct,” etc., or whether it is “justified,” “warranted,” etc. 
However, if the fact that if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you lose nothing shows believing to 
be valuable, then there is another sense in which the belief that God exists is “right,” “correct,” 
etc., and in which it is “justified,” “warranted,” etc.20    
In attempting to characterize the general distinction between the right and wrong kinds 
of reasons, Schroeder identifies three “earmarks” of reasons of the wrong kind. First, 
according to Schroeder, there is a difference in how people are typically motivated to respond 
in virtue of recognizing these reasons. For instance, it seems more difficult for a follower of 
Pascal to believe that God exists just in virtue of considering the reasons Pascal provides. In 
contrast, it seems less difficult for a follower of Descartes to believe that God exists just in 
virtue of considering the reasons Descartes provides in his Meditations. This explains why 
Pascal offers the following advice to those convinced by his argument: “learn from those who 
have been bound like you, and who now wager all they have... [and] follow the way by which 
they began: by behaving just as if they believed” (1995: 155-6). Pascal’s suggestion to his 
readers is to take steps to help bring it about that they end up becoming believers. Presumably, 
this is because Pascal knows his argument won’t immediately convert a non-believer even if 
																																																						






they are convinced by it that they should believe in God. (I put aside a discussion of the 
implications of this asymmetry until chapter III.) 
Secondly, even if you’re convinced by Pascal’s argument, the reasons he adduces in 
favor of believing that God exists don’t seem to make the belief in God any more rational 
from an epistemic perspective. Returning to Feldman’s remarks on the epistemic perspective, 
these considerations would not be taken into consideration by disinterested onlookers solely 
interested in arriving at an accurate belief about God’s existence; they are idiosyncratic. In 
contrast, reasons of the “right kind” for an attitude bear on the ordinary dimension of 
rationality for attitudes of that kind. While Pascalian considerations might make it practically 
rational to believe, they do not affect the epistemic rationality of believing that God exists. 
Thirdly, according to Schroeder, reasons of the wrong kind don’t affect the correctness 
or incorrectness of belief. He writes, “a belief is correct just in case it is true, and epistemic 
reasons for belief bear on whether that belief is true, but pragmatic reasons are irrelevant to 
its truth” (2012: 459).  
However, it is controversial which of these earmarks is fundamental or how general 
the distinction is. For instance, if we focus on correctness and rationality, we can draw a 
completely general distinction between the right and wrong kinds of reasons as such. If a 
reason is a consideration that counts in favor of a response21 (where “response” might refer 
																																																						
21 Hieronymi (2005) argues that explaining what makes a consideration a reason of the wrong kind requires 
rethinking the notion of a reason itself. She argues that reasons of the wrong kind clearly count in favor of 
attitudes, but they are not reasons for those attitudes, so being a reason is not a matter of counting in favor. In 
its place, Hieronymi appeals to the notion of “settling a question.” She argues that forming an attitude of a 
specific type is in some sense equivalent to settling a corresponding type of question. For example, to believe 
that p is to have settled affirmatively the question, “is it the case that p?” and to admire Bob is to have affirmatively 
settled the question “is Bob admirable?” Having answered the question, Hieronymi argues, is partly constitutive 






to an action or an attitude), the distinction between the right and wrong kinds of reasons may 
arise whenever there is an ordinary way of evaluating a specific response (Schroeder: 2010). A 
specific response is typically an instance of a more general kind. The distinction between the 
right and wrong kinds of reasons can be drawn with respect to reasons for any response that 
may be classified as an instance of a general type characterized by a set of norms. For any such 
response, there are considerations that contribute to determining whether the response 
conforms to the norms that characterize the type of which it is an instance, but there may also 
be considerations that count in favor of a response but do not contribute to determining 
whether the response would conform to the norms that characterize the type of which it is an 
instance.22  
Consider a variation of an example from Schroeder (2010). Suppose you’re playing 
chess with your little cousin. The fact that he will have an opportunity to learn how to pin 
your knight might give you a reason to blunder by moving your knight to e5 in front of your 
king, but this doesn’t make blundering the right way to play chess. There are norms that 
characterize chess-playing in virtue of which one can be evaluated as performing correctly or 
incorrectly, well or poorly, etc. The fact that your cousin will have an opportunity to learn how 
																																																						
wrong kind are “extrinsic” (to the relevant attitude-constituting question). However, if all reasons bear on 
questions, what questions do reasons of the wrong kind answer? Hieronymi writes, “extrinsic reasons for 
believing p are constitutive reasons for a quite different attitude—a second-order attitude about the belief that 
p” (448). Despite challenging the traditional definition of a reason as a consideration that counts in favor, since 
Hieronymi’s view ultimately implies a similar explanation of reasons of the wrong kind that I will discuss in the 
next section, my objections to this explanation apply equally to her alternative account.  
22 My understanding of the scope of the distinction is indebted to Schroeder’s (2010) discussion. There, he 
introduces the notion of an “activity” and argues that “the right kind of reasons with respect to any activity, A, 
are the reasons that are shared by necessarily anyone who is engaging in A, and just because they are engaging in 
A” (13). While I agree that the right kind of reasons to φ are not idiosyncratic, I don’t think this is because they’re 
shared by everyone engaged in φ-ing. Rather, it’s because they relate to the norms that characterize good or 






to pin is a reason “of the wrong kind” to move your knight to e5. However, this fact may 
nonetheless be relevant to what you should do. Conversely, considerations that bear on 
whether a specific response would conform to the norms that characterize the type of which 
the response is an instance are not necessarily reasons for that response even though they are 
“of the right kind.” For example, there is also a right way to torment your little cousin. There 
are norms that characterize tormenting in virtue of which one can be evaluated as performing 
correctly or incorrectly, well or poorly, etc. Suppose that throwing the chess pieces in your 
little cousin’s face would be an excellent instance of tormenting. This fact is a “reason of the 
right kind” to throw the chess pieces in your little cousin’s face, but it has no bearing on what 
you ought to do because you ought not torment your little cousin in the first place.  
 Notice that this general way of drawing the distinction has nothing to do necessarily 
with a motivational asymmetry. In the action case, it is just as easy to decide to blunder by 
moving your knight to e5 for the purposes of teaching your cousin (a reason of the wrong 
kind) as it is to move a different piece because it is a better chess move (a reason of the right 
kind). If this general account of the distinction is correct, the fact that there is a motivational 
asymmetry with respect to reasons of the wrong kind for intentional mental attitudes but not 
actions isn’t a necessary feature of reasons of the wrong kind. Perhaps, purely descriptive facts 
about the biological function of our mechanisms of belief-formation can adequately explain 
the motivational asymmetry. Our beliefs dispose us to act in ways that will serve to satisfy our 
desires only if their contents are true. Therefore, a creature with a belief-forming mechanism 
that was not responsive to evidence of truth would not fare well in its environment, so it is 






well.23 Papineau, for example, draws a helpful analogy with blinking. Just as our evolved 
biological design forces us to be responsive to evidence, even when such responsiveness is of 
little or no practical value, our evolved biological design forces us to do many things, like 
blinking, even when these responses have little or no practical value. Being disposed to blink 
regularly is obviously a valuable habit, but Papineau asks us to “imagine that you can win a 
valuable bet by not blinking, and the circumstances are arranged so that no harm will come to 
you if you don’t. Even so, you can’t help yourself. You have no choice but to blink. But this 
doesn’t mean that you ought to blink. Insofar as prescriptive talk has a grip here, you surely 
ought not to blink” (78-9). Evolutionary function accounts of belief may be able to explain 
why beliefs offer motivational resistance to practical reasons without necessarily implying 
anything about the nature of reasons for belief. 
 
§3 
Some deny that the general distinction—between considerations that bear on whether a 
specific response would conform to the norms that characterize the type of which the 
response is an instance and those which bear on whether the response is practically valuable—
captures the difference between the right and wrong kinds of reasons. Moving your knight to 
e5 can be examined as a type of chess move, but it is also, more generally, an action. Some 
argue that there is a fundamental difference between reasons for attitudes and reasons for 
action, so the distinction between reasons of the right and wrong kinds cannot be understood 
as a distinction that applies to reasons as such. In attempts to “dissolve” the wrong kind of 
																																																						






reasons problem, some theorists have argued that reasons of the wrong kind are not, in fact, 
reasons for the relevant responses they appear to favor, and this explains why there can be 
reasons of the wrong kind for intentional mental states, but no reasons of the wrong kind for 
action. For example, according to Parfit, “if we want to have some desire, that might be 
claimed to give us a reason to have it. But state-given reasons to have some desire are better 
regarded as object-given reasons…to try to have it” (2001: 24).24 In a similar vein, Skorupski 
writes, “suppose the violin performance is not good, but the evil demon will punish me with 
eternal torture if I fail to admire it…the fact that the evil demon has his evil plans is a sufficient 
reason for me to do something—namely, bring it about that I admire the performance, if I can. 
In the circumstances, that would be a very good thing to bring about” (2010, 87-8).  
Unlike the views discussed in the previous chapter, according to which the separation 
thesis follows from the distinctive nature or aim of belief, these thoughts suggest that the 
separation thesis follows from a more general distinction between reasons for action and 
reasons for intentional mental attitudes.  
Many epistemologists and normativity theorists who endorse the separation thesis 
advance a similarly skeptical position regarding so-called reasons of the wrong kind for belief. 
Unlike the writers quoted above, these epistemologists are not content to talk about what we 
epistemically should believe and reject the claim that beliefs could be rational, justified, or 
obligatory relative to non-epistemic standards of assessment. According to Kelly, for example, 
																																																						
24 Parfit attempts to explain the difference between reasons of the right and wrong kinds in terms of the “state-
given” and “object-given” distinction. Unlike object-given reasons, e.g., for desiring, which favor desiring an 
object because of the object’s desirable qualities, “state-given” reasons favor desiring something because of the 
value of desiring (i.e., the state). For objections to distinguishing between reasons of the right and wrong kinds 







“practical considerations do not rationalize beliefs. With respect to beliefs, rationality just is 
epistemic rationality” (2003: 172). For Kelly and others, what our climber should do might be 
determined by her interests, but what the climber should believe is not. Similarly, moral 
considerations may be relevant to what Juan, Jill, and Bruce should do, but the question, what 
should they believe, is wholly determined by epistemic considerations. While the benefits and 
costs of doing something are relevant to whether you should do it, according to Kelly and 
others, the benefits and costs of believing something are never relevant to whether you should 
believe it. For these epistemologists, it doesn’t make sense to talk about non-epistemic 
justification, obligation, responsibility, or reasons for belief. They endorse a stronger version 
of the separation thesis according to which the epistemic standard of assessment is not only 
an independent source of normativity; it is the only normative standard for belief, and they 
argue that distinguishing different senses of justification for beliefs involves a fundamental 
category mistake. According to Kolodny, for example, “At most… [reasons of the wrong kind 
to believe that p] are…reasons to act so that I come to believe that p” (2005, 550-1). More 
recently, Berker argues that “what people call ‘practical reasons for belief’ are really practical 
reasons to perform a certain action, namely the action of bringing it about that one believes some 
proposition” (2018, 432; emphasis in original).  
The term “evidentialism” has unfortunately been adopted by several writers25 to refer 
to the claim that the only reasons for belief are those considerations, like evidence,26 that bear 
on the truth and provide the sort of justification necessary for knowledge. This is unfortunate 
																																																						
25 See, e.g., Adler (2002), Kelly (2002), and Shah (2006). 
26 As many have pointed out, evidence alone is too narrow. It is controversial whether moral beliefs, beliefs about 






for several reasons. First, some philosophers argue that only epistemic considerations are 
reasons for belief but that not all (or perhaps any) epistemic considerations are based in 
evidence. Secondly, as we have discussed, Conee and Feldman use the term “evidentialism” 
to refer to the view that all epistemic reasons for belief are based in evidence, but as I explained, 
this view about epistemic reasons and epistemic justification is compatible with the thought that 
there may also be non-epistemic reasons to believe and a non-epistemic justification for 
believing.27 Finally, the traditional debate about “evidentialism” in the ethics of belief has 
historically had little to do with the nature of belief, rationality, or epistemic normativity. 
Clifford understands his evidentialist principle, that “it is wrong, always and everywhere, for 
anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence,” as a moral doctrine, as is evidenced by 
the fact that he defends the principle by appealing to our duties to others, not to a sui generis 
epistemic sense of obligation, the authority of which is independent of what we owe to others.28 
Therefore, it is a complicated question what relation traditional moral evidentialism in the 
sense associated with Clifford bears to the views of the “new evidentialists”29 like Kelly. The 
practical consequences of believing on insufficient evidence are central to Clifford’s case for 
evidentialism,30 but according to the new evidentialists, the practical consequences of believing 
make no difference to what anyone should believe.  
Critics of the “new evidentialism” often use the term “pragmatism” to refer to the 
rejection of views like Kelly’s, given that some of these writers draw inspiration from the 
																																																						
27 For helpful discussion, see Berker (2018).  
28 I am assuming here that, for Clifford, the “wrong” in question is primarily a moral failing, an interpretation 
well-supported by the text. Haack (2001) argues that Clifford did not carefully distinguish between epistemic and 
moral senses of key concepts. See Wood (2002) for discussion.  
29 I borrow this term from Rinard (2015). 






classical pragmatism of William James. However, this term is also unfortunate because a non-
epistemic consideration favoring belief is not necessarily “pragmatic” in the sense that it does 
not necessarily appeal to the benefits or costs of believing for the believer. To illustrate, one of 
Blackburn’s criticisms of James’s own view is that it mistakenly concentrates “upon the private 
satisfactions that follow upon settling a matter in one’s own mind (2005: 8). Blackburn’s worry 
is that James’s view “leads to relativism: my belief ceases to exist in a public space, up for 
acceptance and rejection for all who pay attention. It starts to be a matter of ‘my truth’ or ‘your 
truth’, like my ornaments or your ornaments, which serve fine if they are to my taste or yours, 
and about which we can be indifferent to the taste of others (ibid, 9). I’m not here concerned 
with evaluating the merits of Blackburn’s criticism of James. The point is that rejecting the 
claim that reasons for belief necessarily bear on the truth does not entail the sort of 
subjectivism that concerns Blackburn. Similar relativistic worries have been raised against 
decidedly anti-pragmatist views like Clifford’s. As Mitova (2008) points out, “Clifford thinks 
that what makes the evidence-norm a good norm of believing is that it promotes moral 
goodness and social cohesion. But these considerations are, from the epistemic point of view, the 
point of view of truth and knowledge, as arbitrary as James’s passional decisions...So although 
Clifford seems to avoid Blackburn’s ‘my truth or your truth’ charge, he faces an ‘our truth or 
their truth’ charge” (484). Moreover, denying that reasons for belief necessarily bear on the 
truth is compatible with also denying that all reasons are grounded in benefits or costs. If there 
are other reasons to believe that have nothing to do with the benefits and costs of believing 
(but also have nothing to with truth or knowledge), it is misleading to call these “pragmatic 






While it is important to flag these potential terminological sources of confusion, I’ll 
defer to what is common in discussions of these issues and restrict the use of “evidentialism” 
to views like Kelly’s and “pragmatism” to their rejection. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I evaluate the case for skepticism about reasons of 
the wrong kind by examining whether intentional mental states and action could be governed 
by wholly distinct norms, and I argue that they cannot. I develop the argument by defending 
some intuitively plausible general principles that spell put the relationship between what Sellars 
termed “ought-to-be’s” and “ought-to-do’s.” Briefly, given that you are sometimes capable of 
performing actions that bring it about that you are in a specific state, if you ought to be in 
some state, and you are capable of bringing it about that you are in that state, then (ceteris 
paribus) you ought to bring it about that you are in that state. For example, if you ought to be 
at the bus station at 5pm, and leaving your house at 4pm is necessary to bring it about that 
you are at the bus station at 5, then you ought to leave your house at 4pm. I argue from the 
fact that ought-to-be’s imply ought-to-do’s to the conclusion that the distinction between the 
epistemic and practical domains of assessment cannot be explained in terms of the difference 
between a reason for belief and a reason for action. I conclude that if there are epistemic 
reasons for belief, there are also epistemic reasons for action, and if there are practical reasons 
for action, there are also practical reasons for belief. Thus, the distinction between the 
epistemic and the practical does not reflect two different sources of normativity that govern 








Those unsympathetic to evidentialism are often moved by cases in which it seems implausibly 
rigid. While we often care about whether our beliefs are true, this isn’t always the case. 
Sometimes, we care far more about the consequences of believing something than we do about 
whether our belief is true. That’s because our beliefs can have a significant impact on ourselves 
and others. They shape the ways we think about our relationships and projects, and some of 
them are integral to our identities and the meaning we give to our lives. Even if beliefs 
necessarily “aim” at truth, they are also features of a believer’s psychology that have 
significance for her life and the lives of others, and it strikes many as too extreme to think the 
consequences of believing are never relevant to what one ought to believe, especially when 
those consequences are far more significant than the consequences of epistemic impropriety.  
There are independent reasons some don’t find Pascal’s wager a compelling example. 
For one thing, it is dubious whether the prudential benefits are as significant or the costs as 
immaterial as Pascal thinks. Walter Kaufmann, for example, writes, “a special area in hell might 
be reserved for those who go to mass. Or God might punish those whose faith is prompted 
by prudence… Perhaps he reserves special rewards for those who deny themselves the 
comfort of belief” (Kaufmann 1958: 171). For another thing, it is controversial whether 
religious commitments even bear enough similarities with ordinary beliefs to be correctly 
identified as such. Van Leeuwen (2014), for example, marshals empirical evidence to support 
the claim that “psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious 






effects” (699). Therefore, let’s briefly consider a few widely discussed31 examples that do strike 
many as particularly compelling. 
TERMINAL ILLNESS: Youssef has a terminal illness, and he has strong evidence that he only 
has a few months to live. However, unless he believes he will recover, his last few months of 
life will be unbearably painful. 
 
GRIEVING FATHER: Joaquin’s son was fatally struck by a drunk driver, and Joaquin has strong 
evidence that his son suffered terribly before he died. However, unless Joaquin believes his 
son was killed on impact, his son’s suffering will haunt him forever and tear his life apart.  
 
In both cases, there appears to be a conflict between the subject’s believing in a way 
that respects the evidence and avoiding terrible suffering. Moreover, the benefits for the 
subject of believing without epistemic justification seem greatly to outweigh the costs of 
avoiding an epistemically unjustified belief. It isn’t unreasonable to imagine realistic versions 
of these examples in which there is no meaningful cost if Youssef believes he’ll recover or 
Joaquin believes his son died on impact and nothing to be gained if either were to have more 
accurate beliefs about these matters.32 Granted, we could spell out the examples to ensure the 
costs of believing without epistemic justification outweigh the benefits. If Youssef’s distressed 
																																																						
31 For similar sorts of examples, see Firth (1981), Foley (1989), McCormick (2015), Rinard (2015), and Maguire 
and Woods (2020). 
32 It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to consider how to compare the relative practical benefits and 
costs of epistemic impropriety more generally. Positions according to which the practical costs of epistemic 
impropriety always outweigh the benefits or according to which the evidentialist principle is an absolute and 
inviolable moral requirement are compatible with the argument I offer here. The point I’m making in the main 
text is simply that it’s reasonable to imagine contexts in which the practical benefits of minor epistemic 
impropriety may be significant, while the costs may be minimal. One way to develop this point would be to 
consider the extent to which epistemic dispositions are context-dependent. For instance, if minor epistemic 
impropriety in one domain has significant benefits but is unlikely to lead to more detrimental epistemic vice in 
other domains, then circumstances in which practical benefits outweigh epistemic costs would likely be more 
common. Regardless, it is worth noting that even some staunch defenders of moral evidentialism (e.g., Ryan 
2015) recognize the possibility that moral reasons to proportion belief to the evidence may be outweighed and 
that the evidential principle should be understood as a prima facie and not an absolute obligation. Ryan writes, “it 
remains true that you have a moral obligation to believe in accordance with your evidence unless you run into 
one of these highly unusual situations in which you have strong evidence showing that it would be morally wrong 
to do so” (416). I leave aside for future work a discussion of my disagreement with Ryan concerning how unusual 






family desperately needs him to come to terms with his fate, or Joaquin owes it to his grieving 
spouse to face the awful truth about their son, these circumstances would likely affect our 
intuitions about what Youssef and Joaquin ought to believe in these scenarios. However, even 
if one were to question whether the costs of believing out of step with the evidence are as 
small or the benefits as great as the examples initially suggest, it is strange to think that the 
costs and benefits of believing are wholly irrelevant to what Youssef or Joaquin should believe, 
especially when they are so significant.  
 
§5 
Another challenge to evidentialism arises from reflecting on the significance of our beliefs for 
our relationships (Meiland 1980, Baker 1987, Keller 2004, Stroud 2006; Marušić 2015). Stroud 
(2006) characterizes the conflict by drawing an analogy with the longstanding issue of partiality 
in ethical theory. Briefly, according to many ethical theories, impartiality is a central moral 
concept. For instance, according to simple hedonistic act utilitarianism, we ought always to do 
whatever most increases pleasure and/or diminishes suffering. It doesn’t matter whose suffering 
is at stake. However, we typically care far more about the happiness of our friends and loved 
ones than we do about the happiness of strangers. Moreover, friendship and love seem 
constitutively to involve this partial care and concern; part of what it is to be a good friend is 
to take a special interest in your friend’s wellbeing. Our close relationships are an important 
part of what makes life worth living for many of us. Ethicists must explain how adherence to 






a good person is fundamentally at odds with building and sustaining the relationships necessary 
to live well.  
In similar fashion, Stroud argues that the partiality constitutive of good friendship 
extends beyond our feelings and motivations and includes also what we believe about our 
friends. Like the impartial demands of morality, evidentialism implies the demand to believe 
only when the evidence is sufficient, regardless of the effects our beliefs might have on our 
relationships. However, it is commonplace that good friends are sometimes insensitive to 
evidence that paints their loved ones in a negative light and are ordinarily more eager to seek 
alternative explanations of negative information about friends than they would be with respect 
to strangers or mere acquaintances. The ways we interpret the conduct and character of our 
loved ones is often more generous and charitable than our assessments of others, even given 
similar conduct and character traits. We are partial not only in our treatment of those whom 
we care about, but also in our beliefs about them. As Stroud points out, that we are biased in 
various ways toward ourselves and those whom we care about is well-documented by social 
psychologists.33  
																																																						
33 See, e.g., Taylor and Brown (1988), Kunda (1990), and Murray and Holmes (1993). In their seminal discussion 
of positive illusions, Taylor and Brown note that “one’s friends are evaluated more positively and less negatively 
than the average person…and, compared with others, close friends and relatives receive more credit for success 
and less blame for failure…individuals are inclined to appraise themselves and their close associates in far more 
positive and less negative terms than they appraise most other people” (1988: 195). About these tendencies, 
Taylor and Brown argue that “evidence from social cognition research suggests that, contrary to much traditional, 
psychological wisdom, the mentally healthy person may not be fully cognizant of the day-to-day flotsam and 
jetsam of life. Rather, the mentally healthy person appears to have the enviable capacity to distort reality in a 
direction that enhances self-esteem, maintains beliefs in personal efficacy, and promotes an optimistic view of 
the future. These…illusions…appear to foster traditional criteria of mental health, including the ability to care 
about the self and others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative 






Trust is a phenomenon that many take to support observations like Stroud’s. Trust in 
close relationships seems paradigmatically to involve believing without making calculations 
about what the evidence supports and maintaining belief even when there is strong 
counterevidence. Regardless of whether believing your partner when they tell you that p is 
warranted by the evidence that they’re telling the truth, the very act of making a calculation 
about what the evidence supports—even if you ultimately determine that the evidence 
supports believing them that p—seems less a matter of trusting them than it is a matter of 
trusting your own calculation concerning the likelihood that p is true.34 Trust typically involves 
assuming vulnerability to betrayal. This is a fixed point in philosophical discussions of trust 
and a central feature that distinguishes trust from related attitudes like reliance (Baier 1986). 
Granted, “trust” is a broad enough term to include cases in which people make calculations 
about others based on evidence for their reliability. For instance, I might deliberate about 
whether to trust a colleague’s statement by considering his past reliability concerning similar 
matters. However, we encounter a more “substantial” form of trust in close, intimate 
relationships (McGreer 2008). As McGreer aptly characterizes it:   
Substantial trust…neglects or abjures such strategic judgments. Specifically, 
substantial trust may be characterized by two related features: (1) it involves making 
or maintaining judgements about others, or about what our behaviour should be 
towards them, that go beyond what the evidence supports; and (2) it renounces the 
very process of weighing whatever evidence there is in a cool, disengaged, and 
purportedly objective way (ibid, 240). 
 
Let’s consider an example to illustrate the tension between evidentialism and substantial trust:   
 
TRUSTING LOVER: Paola has trouble with honesty. She’s generally honest when it comes to 
important matters, but sometimes, she’ll lie to evade an uncomfortable conversation or avoid 
hurting her partner, Hassam’s feelings. Paola knows this is a bad quality, and she is working 
to be more honest in her relationship with Hassam. Hassam has caught Paola in lies before, 
																																																						






and her dishonesty has been a source of conflict in an otherwise healthy and rewarding 
relationship. On some occasion, Hassam has evidence that Paola lied about her whereabouts 
the previous evening. She told him she was at the library all evening with her study group, but 
Paola’s friend Jacob mentioned to Hassam that he saw Paola at the bar having a beer with 
friends. Unless Hassam believes Paola was being honest with him, this will be the last straw; 
he’ll no longer be able to see Paola as an honest person, and their relationship will be 
irreparably damaged. 
  
We can fill out the example by imagining that Hassam does not immediately revise his belief 
upon hearing from Jacob that Paola was at the bar. Perhaps, he first questions whether Jacob 
is a reliable witness. Maybe Jacob is being deceitful, or maybe he’s confused; perhaps he only 
saw someone who looks like Paola. If these sources of doubt aren’t compelling to him, we can 
imagine Hassam looks for others. “Paola wasn’t being dishonest; she just forgot to mention 
she went for a beer after her study group.” Or “I’m sure she had a good reason for not telling 
me her true whereabouts.” He makes a considerable effort to believe she wasn’t being 
dishonest with him and consequently, he remains capable of seeing her as an honest person. 
Hassam concludes that there must be some reasonable explanation. He believes Paola, despite 
the evidence to the contrary, and is unwilling even to consider the evidence in a cool, 
disinterested, and objective way. This scenario illustrates the sort of subtle biases Stroud points 
to. She writes:  
What is characteristic of the good friend seems typically to come in at this level of 
interpreting the reported actions and placing them in perspective, rather than at the 
level of denying the base-level facts and events being related by the teller of the story. 
In general, a good friend is likely to interpret what she hears in a less damaging way 
than is a stranger…she is more likely to look for alternative interpretations to the 
obvious, and damning, ones and—furthermore—to draw different inferences about 
her friend’s character than would a stranger. This need not be a matter of flatly 
denying the obvious. It is rather a matter of extending more interpretive charity to 
your friends than you naturally would to strangers—of offering your friends more 
leeway. The result, though, is that your beliefs about your friends will be slanted in 







Insofar as Hassam trusts Paola and believes her, does he believe something he 
shouldn’t? Hassam’s evidence suggests that Paola lied. Moreover, her spotty track record 
indicates that she is not a very honest or trustworthy person. These are the conclusions an 
impartial, outside observer would come to. Hassam manifests a bias in favor of Paola. If she 
weren’t his partner, it is unlikely she would be as trusting or sympathetic, and this partly 
explains why others would be less likely to trust his opinion about her. We commonly 
acknowledge that an assessment of a person’s character proffered by a parent, friend, or loved 
one is usually biased at least to some degree in the person’s favor. Hassam’s continued 
commitment to Paola’s honesty, from the perspective of purely epistemic evaluation, is 
unjustified. 
Yet, whether Paola is an honest person isn’t wholly settled the facts about her track 
record. As James famously remarks, sometimes “a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary 
faith exists in its coming” (25). If Hassam believes Paola, his trust may help her see herself 
through his eyes and motivate her to live up to his vision of her. In contrast, if Hassam no 
longer sees Paola as an honest person, it won’t only destroy their relationship; it will also make 
it far more difficult for Paola to see herself that way. Granted, believing Paola leaves Hassam 
vulnerable to future betrayal. It’s possible that she will continue to lie, and it may cost Hassam 
more down the line to continue to trust her. If this is the case, at some point, the evidence will 
become too compelling for him to ignore. As Stroud herself points out, “what seems to be 
characteristic of the good friend is not a stubborn denial of obvious, incontrovertible facts 






However, evidentialism implies that Hassam should never believe Paola whenever he 
has insufficient evidence that she’s telling the truth. Therefore, he should never demonstrate 
substantial trust. Regardless of whether believing Paola is warranted by the evidence that she’s 
telling the truth, substantial trust is a matter of not making a calculation about what the evidence 
supports. If Hassam must first determine what the evidence supports to believe Paola, he does 
not place his trust in her, but rather, in the results of his own calculation about the likelihood 
that what she’s telling him is true.  
Hassam’s belief that Paola was honest demonstrates his trust and faith in her, and 
these traits often engender our admiration and approval even as we see those who possess 
them led into error. For instance, one might imagine that Jacob knows the couple well and 
admires Hassam’s trust in his partner, even as he thinks Hassam’s belief is incorrect and that 
Paola did tell another one of her little white lies. Moreover, while Paola might not expect a 
stranger to believe her, it could nonetheless be hurtful to know that Hassam doesn’t. We 
typically expect more of our close friends and loved ones than we do of strangers, and this 
extends beyond how they treat us. We expect to be believed, trusted, and taken at our word. 
If Hassam’s cognitive dispositions were in no way affected by his relationship with Paola—if 
he coldly and impartially assessed the facts and arrived at a verdict on whether she was telling 
the truth as an outside observer would—we might reasonably question the sincerity of his 
love. Perhaps, an impartial observer doesn’t owe Paola anything more than taking her word as 
just one among the many pieces of evidence and proportioning her level of credibility to the 
evidence that she’s telling the truth. However, Hassam is her partner, and he shouldn’t take 






that, unlike an outside observer, Hassam might owe Paola his trust, or at the very least, whether 
he owes it to her to believe her is not determined solely by whether the evidence that she’s 
telling the truth provides epistemic justification. If Hassam fails to believe Paola, it doesn’t 
seem necessarily unreasonable for her to feel hurt that he doesn’t trust her, her spotty track 
record notwithstanding.   
One might object that Hassam shouldn’t form beliefs about Paola with the cold 
impartiality of an outside observer because he knows Paola and has a significant amount of 
evidence about her that outside observers lack. Thus, his partiality toward her is 
straightforwardly compatible with evidentialism. While Hassam’s intimate knowledge of his 
partner may account for some differences in his cognitive responses, I don’t think these 
differences capture all the ways substantial trust seems to depart from epistemic propriety. 
First, as Baker (1986, 5) points out, trust between friends and loved ones often outruns the 
available evidence and is resistant to counter-evidence. For instance, it often takes much longer 
and requires more evidence for someone to change their mind about a friend than is 
epistemically appropriate. Likewise, Stroud argues that “our differential epistemic practices 
where our friends are concerned seem not to track evidentialist principles but rather—at 
times—to run counter to the evidence. Those shifts in practice do not always seem to 
constitute an epistemic improvement” (516). For example, Hassam may be disposed to pay 
disproportionate attention to the evidence that paints Paola in a positive light and to downplay 
counterevidence. Moreover, while it is certainly true that Hassam has much more information 
about Paola than an outside observer, a lot of this information is likely colored by his strong 






about one’s friends and loved ones can be accounted for by appealing to differences in the 
kind of information one has about one’s friends and loved ones that an outside observer lacks, 




As in TERMINAL ILLNESS and GRIEVING FATHER, we may find ourselves with conflicting 
intuitions about whether Hassam believes what he should. The question appears to admit of 
two very different answers, depending upon how it is understood. Again, the judgment that 
Hassam doesn’t believe as he ought to concerns an epistemic sense of ought; Hassam does not 
believe rationally or justifiably in the sense required for knowledge. Assuming Hassam’s belief 
diverges from the judgment at which an objective, impartial, and disinterested believer would 
arrive, this accounts for the judgment that he does not believe as he should.  
However, the intuition that Hassam does believe as he should concerns an ethical sense 
of “ought.” Hassam’s belief that Paola was honest with him demonstrates his trust and faith 
in her. And, given their close relationship, it isn’t unreasonable to think Hassam might owe 
Paola something more than an impartial and objective assessment of the evidence. Insofar as 
Hassam loves Paola and demonstrates his love by believing her even when the evidence is 
wanting, this accounts for the judgment that Hassam does believe as he ought to, although he 








It is difficult to deny the normative significance of the apparent reasons of the wrong kind to 
believe in scenarios like TERMINAL ILLNESS, GRIEVING FATHER, and TRUSTING LOVER. 
Therefore, many evidentialists would concede that the relevant considerations do provide the 
subjects with reasons in these scenarios, just not any reasons for belief. While they maintain that 
only considerations that bear on the truth are reasons for the subjects in these scenarios to 
believe, they would argue that the appearance of reasons of the wrong kind to believe in 
TERMINAL ILLNESS, GRIEVING FATHER, and TRUSTING LOVER is to be explained by the fact 
that the subjects in these scenarios have ordinary reasons (of the right kind) for something 
else. According to these error theories, the fact that his last few months of life will be 
unbearably painful may be a reason for Youssef to want,35 try,36 intend,37 or act to bring it about38 
that he believes he’ll recover, but it is not a reason for him to believe.  
In this section, I’ll critically examine what I take to be the most plausible version of 
the error theory—that apparent reasons of the wrong kind for belief are, in fact, ordinary 
reasons for action—but insofar as subjects ought to do something to satisfy their wants or 
execute their intentions, what I’ll say in response should apply to this strategy more generally.  
In defense of the error theory, it might be argued that the subjects in question would 
respond to the relevant considerations by acting in certain ways. Recall, for instance, Pascal’s 
advice to those convinced by his argument: “learn from those who have been bound like you, 
and who now wager all they have... [and] follow the way by which they began: by behaving 
																																																						
35 Gibbard (1990): 37; Parfit (2001): 24 and (2011): 51; Kolodny (2005): 550-51; Persson (2007): 1; Way (2012): 
492; and Cohen (2016): 428. 
36 Parfit (2001): 24 and Persson (2007): 1. 
37 Shah (2006): 495-98 and Persson (2007): 1. 
38 Berker (2018): 432; Kelly (2003): 171; Kolodny (2005): 550-51; Shah (2006): 495-98; Skorupski (2010): 87-88; 






just as if they believed” (1995: 155-6). According to evidentialists, Pascal’s wager might give 
one a good reason to act to bring it about that they believe God exists—by doing the things 
Pascal advises—but this doesn’t show that the wager provides any reason to believe God 
exists; only evidence is a reason for belief.  
 The notion that the challenge posed by apparent reasons of the wrong kind can be 
dissolved by appealing to the error theory is pervasive in the philosophical literature. However, 
there are several problems that should convince us that the error theory is deeply 
unsatisfactory. First, and most obviously, it doesn’t succeed in explaining away the intuitions 
in the cases. Consider TRUSTING LOVER again. The fact that Paola would be hurt if Hassam 
didn’t believe her might be a reason for him to believe her without being a reason for him to 
act in ways that bring it about that he believes her. Under at least one description of “acting 
to bring it about that he believes her,” insofar as Hassam needs to do these things to believe 
Paola, his actions constitute a lack of substantial trust in her, not an instance of it. If Hassam 
has a reason to express substantial trust in Paola, and expressing substantial trust implies 
believing her without having to do anything to bring it about that he believes her, then 
Hassam’s reason to believe Paola is not really a reason for him to act to bring it about that he 
believes her. Regardless, even if Hassam also has a reason to bring it about that he believes 
Paola, a simple explanation of this fact is that a reason to φ implies (ceteris paribus) a reason 
to bring it about that one φs. However, this explanation is unavailable to those who think 
Hassam has a reason to bring it about that he believes Paola but lacks a reason to believe her. 
Secondly, and relatedly, if the subjects in the scenarios already believe the relevant 






However, evidentialism implies that, under these circumstances, the subjects believe things 
they shouldn’t. For example, in TERMINAL ILLNESS, suppose Youssef already believes (without 
sufficient epistemic reason) that he will recover. He therefore has no reason to act to bring it 
about that he believes. However, it still seems as though the fact that he will suffer counts in 
favor of his believing he’ll recover, but the error theory cannot accommodate this intuition.   
Thirdly, and most importantly, the error theory entails that the subjects in the scenarios 
face incoherent demands. Recall that according to evidentialism, one’s epistemic reasons for 
belief combine to determine what one should believe full stop. However, it follows from the 
error theory that, in GRIEVING FATHER, it is possible that Joaquin should bring it about that 
he believes his son died on impact, but that he also shouldn’t believe his son died on impact. 
However, if Joaquin succeeds in doing what he should do, he will fail to be as he should be. 
The error theory thus implies that Joaquin is bound by an incoherent set of demands that he 
can’t possibly satisfy. If he does what he should do—act to bring it about that he believes his 
son died on impact—then he necessarily believes something he shouldn’t believe—that his 
son died on impact.  
 
§8 
At this point, evidentialists might reply that, while it’s true that if Joaquin should bring it about 
that he believes his son died on impact but also should not believe this at the same time, then he 
would face incoherent normative demands. However, evidentialists often emphasize that the 
question “what should Joaquin believe” is fundamentally distinct from the question “what 






between “synchronic” and “diachronic” normative questions. An evidentialist who endorses 
the error theory might reply that the question “what should Joaquin believe” is a “synchronic” 
question, so whatever Joaquin should do is irrelevant to answering it. For instance, Feldman 
writes: 
Evidentialism is best seen as a theory about synchronic rationality. It holds that the 
epistemically rational thing to do at any moment is to follow the evidence you have 
at that moment. It doesn’t address questions of how to conduct inquiry over periods 
of time. Thus, it does not address questions about how to gather evidence, when one 
ought to seek additional evidence, and so on. In my view, these diachronic questions 
are moral or prudential questions rather than epistemic questions. (2000: 189). 
 
With this distinction in mind, the evidentialist can respond that given their insufficient 
evidence at some specified time, the subjects in the examples shouldn’t believe the relevant 
propositions, but they might still have all sorts of moral or prudential reasons to act to bring 
it about that they believe the relevant propositions at some later time. However, none of this 
shows that these are reasons of the wrong kind to believe. Again, the error theorist argues, this 
merely shows that what appear to be reasons of the wrong kind to believe are ordinary reasons 
(of the right kind) for action. 
 It is unclear to me what a purely synchronic conception of epistemic normativity 
amounts to. Suppose for instance that at t1, Joaquin shouldn’t believe his son died on impact 
(because his evidence is insufficient), but he also should do whatever he can to convince 
himself that his son did die on impact. Now suppose that at t2, he succeeds in doing what he 
should do, and the result is that he now believes his son died on impact. Unless his epistemic 
position has changed, it is still true at t2 that he shouldn’t believe his son died on impact; his 






everything he should do—to bring it about that he believes—and didn’t do anything he 
shouldn’t have done, but the result is that he is in a state he shouldn’t be in.  
The error theory is inadequate because it disregards the fact that there is an important 
connection between synchronic norms (e.g., norms concerning how one ought to be) and 
diachronic norms (e.g., norms concerning what one ought to do). If a consideration is only 
relevant to a synchronic normative assessment (how things ought to be), but is totally 
irrelevant to any diachronic normative assessment (what ought to be done), it is unclear in 
what sense that consideration is normative for any actual human beings.  
To illustrate, suppose that Jean believes some proposition p at t1, but her evidence at 
t1 is insufficient to warrant believing p at t1. According to evidentialism, Jean believes 
something she shouldn’t at t1; Jean shouldn’t believe p at t1 since she lacks sufficient evidence 
at t1 to warrant believing p.39 However, suppose further, as is often the case, that it isn’t 
obvious to Jean at t1 that her evidence for p is insufficient. It would require some minimal 
cognitive effort on her part for her to become aware that her evidence for p is insufficient. If 
evidentialism is a theory concerning only synchronic rationality, it has nothing to say about 
whether Jean should make that minimal cognitive effort. However, if it has nothing to say 
about whether she should make that minimal cognitive effort, but that minimal effort is 
required for her to avoid believing p at t2, what meaning is left to the evidentialist’s claim that 
Jean really shouldn’t believe p at t2? In this example, assuming evidentialism, it follows that:  
(1) Jean shouldn’t believe that p at t1,  
																																																						
39 As in Chapter I, I am framing things in terms of permission here as opposed to obligation in order to remain 
agnostic on the issue of whether there are positive epistemic duties (epistemic duties to believe things) in addition 
to negative epistemic duties (epistemic duties not to believe things). For a challenge to the existence of positive 
epistemic duties, see Nelson (2010). Regardless, the claims I make here apply mutatis mutandis to positive epistemic 






(2) a minimal cognitive effort (from t1-t2) is required if Jean is to satisfy the normative 
demand spelled out in (1); and 
(3) it is perfectly possible that Jean has decisive reason not to make the minimal cognitive 
effort from t1-t2.  
(4) Jean shouldn’t believe that p at t2. 
 
It strikes me as unfair for Jean to be held to the normative demand specified in (4) if it is 
assumed that she had decisive reason not to make the effort specified in (2). By analogy, it 
makes little sense to say that I should have been at my meeting on time if I had decisive reason 
not to leave the house. On the other hand, if Jean really shouldn’t believe that p, then if not 
believing p requires that Jean make a little cognitive effort, then she should make the effort. 
Therefore, the evidentialist cannot explain away the challenge posed by reasons of the wrong 
kind merely by identifying such reasons with ordinary reasons (of the right kind) for action.  
 However, if evidentialists reject the synchronic conception of epistemic normativity, 
it’s difficult to see how the error theory could support skepticism about reasons of the wrong 
kind. Recall that, according to the error theory, what seems like a practical reason for belief is 
really a practical reason to bring it about that one believes, so there is no conflict among reasons 
for belief; reasons for belief are exclusively determined by epistemic norms while reasons for 
action are exclusively determined by practical norms. However, if there are diachronic 
epistemic requirements, the evidentialist can no longer appeal to the error theory to explain 
away the apparent conflict between epistemic and practical reasons. If epistemic reasons are 
best understood as diachronic requirements, i.e., as reasons to bring it about that we believe 
in accordance with our evidence, then epistemic reasons straightforwardly conflict with 
practical reasons in the cases above, and the evidentialist must explain why the epistemic 






the epistemic and practical reasons conflict in their directives. The error theory promised to 
provide a way for the evidentialist to explain away reasons of the wrong kind and the 
appearance of rational conflict between epistemic and practical norms without having to 
grapple with substantive questions about comparing epistemic and non-epistemic concerns.  
 
§9 
The failure of the error theory is instructive. Its central flaw is that it implies that reasons for 
belief have no necessary implications for reasons for action. More generally, it implies that 
reasons-to-be have no necessary implications for reasons-to-do. In this section, I’ll develop 
this thought into a positive argument against evidentialism. Before proceeding, it is worth 
reiterating that, according to evidentialism, only facts that bear on the truth are reasons for 
belief, so only the truth-relevant facts combine to determine what one should believe full stop. 
In the examples discussed, it is stipulated that the truth-relevant factors do not warrant belief 
in the relevant propositions. Therefore, given the way the examples have been spelled out, it 
follows from evidentialism that Youssef shouldn’t believe he’ll recover, Joaquin shouldn’t 
believe his son died on impact, and Hassam shouldn’t believe Paola was honest with him.  
My argument will challenge these conclusions by expounding on the attractive thought 
that there is an important connection between facts about things being as they should be and 
facts about what people should do or should have done.40 To illustrate, consider that more 
																																																						
40 My argument here is indebted to Chrisman (2008), in which he draws on Sellar’s distinction between “rules of 
criticism” (or “ought-to-be’s”) and “rules of action” (or “ought-to-do’s”) to respond to the challenge for 
epistemic deontology posed by doxastic involuntarism. Briefly, according to epistemic deontology, at least some 
sentences of the form “S ought (or ought not) to believe that p” are true. According to doxastic involuntarism, 
the formation of beliefs is not under our direct, voluntary control. The challenge is generated by the following 






than a hundred and fifty million children won’t have enough food to eat tonight. I assume we 
agree that it shouldn’t be the case that a hundred and fifty million children don’t have enough 
food to eat tonight. However, people disagree about what this tragic reality demands of us. 
Some people think this fact implies that everyone should do what they can to make it 
the case that every child has enough to eat tonight. On this view, the fact that it shouldn’t be 
the case that children don’t have enough to eat tonight implies that we all have a responsibility 
to do what we can (ceteris paribus) to bring it about that every child has enough to eat tonight.  
According to others, this fact implies that someone should do what they can to make it 
the case that every child has enough to eat tonight. On this view, the fact that it shouldn’t be 
the case that children don’t have enough to eat tonight implies that someone has a 
responsibility to do what they can (ceteris paribus) to make it the case that every child has 
enough to eat tonight.  
Finally, still others think only those responsible for it’s being the case that children won’t 
have enough to eat tonight should do what they can (ceteris paribus) to make it the case that 
every child has enough to eat tonight. On this last view, the fact that it shouldn’t be the case 
that children don’t have enough to eat tonight doesn’t necessarily imply that anyone should 
do anything about this. Only if someone is responsible for this tragic reality (and the person 
or people responsible are able to do something about it) does the fact that it shouldn’t be the 
																																																						
voluntary control over whether S believes that p. Chrisman argues that if we understand the “ought” as a rule of 
criticism that implies rules of action, there is no tension between epistemic deontology and doxastic 
involuntarism. By analogy, if the clock ought to read 12:00pm, the truth of this claim doesn’t imply that anyone 
has direct voluntary control over whether the clock reads 12:00pm. However, it might imply that someone ought 
to do something to make it the case that the clock reads 12:00pm. My argument here, like Chrisman’s, draws on 
Sellar’s insight that “ought-to-be’s…have an essential connection with [ought-to-do’s]. The connection is, 
roughly, that ought-to-be’s imply ought-to-do’s (Sellars 1969: 508). However, nothing I say here depends on 






case that children don’t have enough to eat tonight imply that anyone should do anything 
about it.  
For our purposes, it doesn’t matter which view best captures the relationship between 
the way things should be and what people should do in this instance. What matters is that 
there is some necessary connection between facts about things being as they should not be and 
facts about what people who are capable of doing something about it should do.  
My argument is premised on the thought that, regardless of how we interpret the 
connection between the state a person should be in and the things that person and/or others 
should do or should have done about it, any of the candidate ways of interpreting the 
connection spell trouble for evidentialism. I divide the arguments into two kinds. The first is 
forward-looking; it exploits the connection between the fact that a person is in a state they 
shouldn’t be in and facts concerning what that person and/or others should do in the future. 
The Call-to-Action Argument  
1. If A shouldn’t be φ (where “φ” stands for some state A is in), then either: 
a. everyone should do what they can (ceteris paribus) to make it the case that A is not φ. 
b. someone should do what they can (ceteris paribus) to make it the case that A is not φ. 
c. if some person(s) is responsible for A being φ, then that person(s) should do what they 
can (ceteris paribus) to make it the case that A is not φ. 
2. No one should do anything to make it the case that Youssef doesn’t believe he’ll recover, 
Joaquin doesn’t believe his son died on impact, or Hassam doesn’t believe Paola was 
honest with him. 
3. Therefore, it is not the case that Youssef shouldn’t believe he’ll recover, Joaquin shouldn’t 
believe his son died on impact, or Hassam shouldn’t believe Paola was honest with him. 
4. If evidentialism is true, Youssef shouldn’t believe he’ll recover, Joaquin shouldn’t believe 
his son died on impact, and Hassam shouldn’t believe Paola was honest with him.41 
5. Therefore, evidentialism is false. 
																																																						
41 Note that (4) is a different claim than “it is epistemically incorrect for Youssef to believe he’ll recover…” where 
“epistemically correct” refers to how we might evaluate beliefs from the epistemic perspective. The point of the 
argument is that if ought-to-be’s imply ought-to-do’s, but being in an epistemically incorrect state doesn’t 








Concerning the first premise, the three models (a, b, and c) each have intuitive appeal in 
specific scenarios. For instance, consider some statements that satisfy A shouldn’t be φ, like 
“children shouldn’t be food-insecure.” Here, (a) seems to me to be quite plausible. Everyone 
should do what they can to make it the case that no children are food-insecure. Or, consider: 
“that child over there shouldn’t be food-insecure.” Here, perhaps (b) seems more plausible. 
This fact implies that someone should feed that child. Finally, suppose you promised me a 
ride to work at 3pm, but now it’s 3:30pm, and I’m waiting outside, late for work. Here, perhaps 
(c) seems more plausible. Since I shouldn’t be waiting outside, and you are the one who 
promised to give me a ride, you are the one who should do what they can to make it the case 
that I’m not waiting outside anymore. The argument doesn’t turn on accepting any one view 
of the connection between how things should be and what people who are in a position to 
intervene should do. It depends simply on accepting that there is some necessary connection 
between how things should be and what should be done.  
 It may be objected that, while premise 1 might apply to some states, like waiting 
outside or being hungry, it doesn’t apply to belief. However, consider some statements that 
seem to satisfy A shouldn’t be φ involving belief, like “Don shouldn’t believe that human-caused 
climate change is a hoax invented by the Chinese.” If it is true that Don shouldn’t believe this, 
it seems plausible that either (a), (b), or (c) must also be true. If it’s Don’s own fault that he 
believes this fiction, and he shouldn’t believe it, then he should reeducate himself. Or if some 
other party is responsible for the fact that Don believes this fiction, and he shouldn’t believe 
it, then that party should do what they can to reeducate him. It is debatable whether everyone 






believe dangerous fictions only goes so far. Regardless, even when it comes to belief, the 
general principle spelled out in premise 1 seems quite plausible. If Don believes something he 
shouldn’t, then something should be done about it. If Don’s believing something he shouldn’t 
involves a failure to respond to epistemic reasons (for belief), and this failure is partly 
constituted by his neglecting to do various things, then failing to do these things also involves 
a failure to respond to epistemic reasons (for action). 
 To defend the second premise, let’s return to the examples. Imagine that Youssef’s 
brother recognizes that Youssef is much better off not facing the awful truth about his fate, 
Joaquin’s partner knows he’s much better off believing his son died on impact, and Hassam’s 
friend knows it’s ultimately best for their relationship if Hassam believes Paola was being 
honest with him. In all these cases, it strikes me as obvious that Youssef’s brother, Joaquin’s 
partner, and Hassam’s friend shouldn’t do anything to make it the case that Youssef, Joaquin, 
and Hassam no longer belief the things that are best for them to believe. In fact, given the 
circumstances, it would be downright cruel if Youssef’s brother tried to make Youssef more 
aware that the evidence doesn’t support believing he’ll recover, Joaquin’s partner tried to make 
Joaquin more aware that the evidence doesn’t support believing that their son died on impact, 
or Hassam’s friend tried to make Hassam more aware that the evidence doesn’t support 
believing that Paola was honest with him. 
 
§10 
One might object that there is a difference between whether one should do something to bring 






be “correct” or “appropriate” for them to do so. Kiesewetter draws a similar distinction when 
it comes to criticism in defense of the following principle: “If A is rationally required to φ, 
then A would be criticizable for not φ-ing” (2017: 25). He distinguishes between the 
“correctness conditions of criticism” and the “ethics of criticism,” arguing that “the fact that 
a criticism would upset a person and cause her to make matters worse might provide a decisive 
reason against confronting her with a criticism even if she is in fact criticizable” (ibid. 27). 
While my argument does not rely on whether the subjects are criticizable for their beliefs, 
(since “criticizable” is subject to the same ambiguities we’ve discussed with respect to terms 
like “justified”), one might make a similar point about my argument. According to this 
objection, it may be true that the subjects in question believe things they shouldn’t believe 
even if it’s also true that the outside observers in question shouldn’t do anything about this. 
 I’ll admit I find the distinction between the correctness conditions of criticism and the 
ethics of criticism somewhat ambiguous. After all, there is another sense in which the fact that 
criticizing someone would upset them and make matters worse might make it inappropriate or 
incorrect to criticize them. Employing the distinction as an objection to the Call-to-Action 
argument runs the risk of begging the question in favor of evidentialism insofar as drawing 
the distinction leads to an analogous wrong kind of reasons problem. Why doesn’t the fact 
that Youssef will suffer bear on whether it’s correct to criticize him for believing without 
sufficient evidence?  
However, even if the distinction between the correctness conditions of criticism and 
the ethics of criticism is well-defined, it doesn’t apply to the Call-to-Action argument. If it is 






revise their beliefs to fit their evidence, then the fact that there is some sense in which it would 
be “correct” to do something is beside the point. What I’m arguing is that the fact that a 
person shouldn’t be in a certain state implies facts about what people (including that person) 
should actually do, not that the fact that a person shouldn’t be in a certain state implies facts 
about what it would be “correct” for people to do, independently of what they actually should 
do. Perhaps, facts concerning epistemic justification imply facts about what it would be 
“correct” for people to do (if such phrases make any sense absent their ordinary normative 
implications), but insofar as evidentialism is a thesis about what people should actually believe, 
it is irrelevant to the Call-to-Action argument that there is some sense in which it would be 
correct for people to act. What I’m suggesting is that the fact that no one should do anything 
to bring it about that the subjects revise their beliefs to fit their evidence tells us something 
important, namely, that the subjects don’t believe things they really shouldn’t believe.  
 
§11 
The second argument is backward-looking; it exploits the connection between the fact that a 
person is in a state they shouldn’t be in and facts concerning what that person and/or others 
should have done in the past. 
 The Action-Relevance Argument 
 
1. If A shouldn’t be φ (where “φ” stands for some state A is in), then either: 
a. everyone should have done what they could (ceteris paribus) to prevent it from being 
the case that A is φ. 
b. someone should have done what they could (ceteris paribus) to prevent it from being 
the case that A is φ. 
c. if some person(s) is responsible for it being the case that A is φ, then that person(s) 
should have done what they could (ceteris paribus) to prevent it from being the case 






2. No one should have done anything to prevent it from being the case that Youssef believes 
he’ll recover, Joaquin believes his son died on impact, or Hassam believes Paola was honest 
with him. 
3. Therefore, it is not the case that Youssef shouldn’t believe he’ll recover, Joaquin shouldn’t 
believe his son died on impact, or Hassam shouldn’t believe Paola was honest with him. 
4. If evidentialism is true, Youssef shouldn’t believe he’ll recover, Joaquin shouldn’t believe 
his son died on impact, and Hassam shouldn’t believe Paola was honest with him. 
5. Therefore, evidentialism is false. 
 
Like the Call-to-Action argument, premise 1 expresses the intuitively plausible thought that 
there is some necessary connection between the ways things should be and what should have 
been done. Premise 2 is also supported by thinking about the cases. Suppose Youssef believes 
something he shouldn’t believe, but no one (including Youssef) did anything they shouldn’t 
have done in preventing this from being the case. Perhaps, Youssef actively ignored the 
evidence that he was going to die, purposefully collected misleading evidence that he would 
recover, etc., and as a result, he came genuinely to believe he would recover. If Youssef should 
have done all these things, and doing these things predictably resulted in him being as he is, it 
is strange to think he is not as he should be. Conversely, if Youssef is not as he should be, and 
this is the direct result of what he did, then at some point, he shouldn’t have done what he 
did. If he shouldn’t believe he will recover, then he shouldn’t have actively ignored the 
evidence that he was going to die, purposefully collected misleading evidence that he would 
recover, etc. Insofar as we think he should have done these things, and doing these things 
predictably resulted in him believing what he does, we should conclude that he should believe 








In “The Ethics of Belief,” Clifford famously argued that “it is wrong, always and everywhere, 
for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence” (1877: 295). In addition to his 
principle, Clifford is remembered primarily for asking his readers to imagine a ship owner who 
overlooked the evidence that his vessel was not seaworthy and believed it was safe “not by 
honestly earning [that belief] in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts” (ibid, 290). 
According to Clifford, even though the ship owner sincerely believed that the ship was safe, 
he is nonetheless blameworthy because he “had no right to believe on such evidence as was 
before him” (ibid), and his failure to proportion his beliefs to his evidence makes him morally 
responsible for the deaths of his passengers when the ship “went down in mid-ocean and told 
no tales” (ibid, 289). Reiterating the point, Clifford claims that, when we believe without 
sufficient evidence, “it is sinful, because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind” (ibid, 
293), and he goes on to consider the bad consequences and dangers to society of adopting 
beliefs on insufficient evidence. So, while Clifford’s principle implies that Youssef shouldn’t 
believe he’ll recover, Joaquin shouldn’t believe his son died on impact, and Hassam shouldn’t 
believe Paola is being honest with him, the reason is not that the practical significance of 
believing is irrelevant to what one should believe. Rather, it would be because Youssef and 
Joaquin do what is best for themselves, and Hassam does what is best for Paola and their 
relationship, at the expense of their moral duty to mankind.  
James famously criticizes Clifford’s moral case for evidentialism, replying that it is not 
always immoral to believe when the evidence is insufficient. James objects to the inflexibility 
of the principle because it implies that anyone who holds a religious belief not supported by 






morally permissible (and perhaps, morally required) for someone to believe something even 
when the evidence is insufficient. As some scholars have noted,42 Clifford and James both 
emphasize the practical impact of belief in defending their positions concerning doxastic 
obligation. In other words, despite their disagreement about whether it is ever permissible to 
believe absent sufficient evidence, both Clifford and James seem to think that the practical 
significance of belief is central to an explanation why we ought always (or ought not always) 
proportion belief to the evidence.  
The arguments I have presented are intended to revive the terms of this earlier debate. 
Even if Clifford is right and we should never believe anything on insufficient evidence, the 
authority of this demand cannot be explained by the difference between the characteristic 
norms of belief and action or the difference between action and intentional mental states. 
Whether the cases I’ve discussed are ultimately compelling turns on both whether the subjects 
in the examples are as they should be and are doing what they should do/living as they should 
live. What I hope to have shown thus far is that the ethics of belief cannot be wholly isolated 
from the ethics of action, and the familiar picture according to which epistemic reasons bear on 

















CHAPTER III—Reasons for Belief and the Basing Requirement 
 
I can believe things that are true and things that aren't true and I can believe things where nobody knows if they're true 
or not. I can believe in Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny and the Beatles and Marilyn Monroe and Elvis and Mister 
Ed. Listen - I believe that people are perfectable, that knowledge is infinite, that the world is run by secret banking cartels 
and is visited by aliens on a regular basis, nice ones that look like wrinkled lemurs and bad ones who mutilate cattle and 




Not all reasons why we believe things are also reasons for which we believe them. And the point 
generalizes. There are reasons for which I got out of bed this morning, reasons for which I was 
frustrated with my work, reasons for which I intended to brew extra strong coffee, reasons for 
which I wanted to surf instead of write, reasons for which I decided to write anyway. With respect 
to any condition I can be in for a reason (I’ll call these conditions “reasons-responsive”), it 
makes sense to ask about the reasons for which I’m in that condition. In contrast, it makes 
little sense to ask about the reasons for which I’m one hundred and seventy centimeters tall. 
While there are reasons why I am that height,43 perhaps having to do with my genetics, these 
are not my reasons for being that height; being one hundred and seventy centimeters tall isn’t 
a condition I’m capable of being in for any reason. If there was a cat stuck in a tree, and being 
two hundred and forty centimeters tall would allow me to save the cat, this fact might make 
being two hundred and forty centimeters tall a very valuable thing to be, but it is not a reason 
for me to be two hundred and forty centimeters tall. Being a certain height is not a reasons-
responsive condition. With respect to reasons-responsive conditions, there is an explanatory 
																																																						
43 For the purposes of this discussion, I focus exclusively on reasons why that are relevant to the explanation of 
human behavior since I am primarily interested here in the relationship between reasons why and reasons for 
which, but it is worth noting that the class of explanatory reasons is much broader, encompassing explanations 






relation between me and the reasons for which I’m in that condition that is distinct from the 
explanatory relation between me and the various reasons why I’m in that condition. For 
instance, missing my morning coffee may explain why I was so angry with you for forgetting 
to write down a phone message, but it wasn’t my reason for being angry; my reason for being 
angry was that you forgot to write down the message.  
Epistemologists sometimes refer to the explanatory relation between a person and the 
reason for which they believe a proposition as the “basing relation.” Following others (e.g., 
Neta 2019), I will use this expression to refer more generally to the explanatory relation 
between a person and a reason for which they φ, where “φ” refers generically to any reasons-
responsive condition. 
The basing relation plays an important role in some theories of normative reasons. A 
common thought is that it must be possible for us to respond to our reasons. Intuitively, a 
creature that completely lacked the ability to respond to reasons could not be obligated or 
expected to do so. Considering the relationship between normative reasons and basing has led 
many to accept what I’ll call the “Basing Constraint” on normative reasons (hereafter, BC), 
according to which a consideration is a reason for someone to φ only if it can be a reason for 
which they φ. 
Versions of BC have been employed in a wide range of arguments for various 
conclusions. On one interpretation, BC is a premise in Williams’s (1981) well-known case 
against so-called “external” reasons: reasons for a person to act that are unconnected to their 
existing desires and motives. Williams states the constraint as follows: “If it is true that A has 






that reason, then that reason will be the explanation of his acting.[…]This is a basic 
connection” (1995a 38-39). More recently, Lord (2015), Gibbons (2013), and Kiesewetter 
(2016; 2017) all appeal to BC to defend perspectivism, the view that a fact is a reason for 
someone to φ only if it’s possible for them to know that fact. According to perspectivists, facts 
we aren’t in a position to know cannot be reasons for us to respond because we can’t base our 
responses on facts we aren’t in a position to know.  
Finally, and most importantly for our present discussion, according a prominent 
argument,44 BC captures why there are no reasons of the wrong kind because it explains how 
reasons count in favor. Reasons for us to believe things are facts that can be reasons for which 
we believe those things. For instance, someone convinced by Pascal’s argument cannot believe 
in God just in virtue of considering the fact that if I win, I win everything; if I lose, I lose nothing. As 
we have seen, even Pascal acknowledges this, giving the following advice: “learn from those 
who have been bound like you, and who now wager all they have... [and] follow the way by 
which they began: by behaving just as if they believed” (1995: 155-6). If the fact that if I win, I 
win everything; if I lose, I lose nothing cannot be a reason for which anyone believes in God, then 
assuming BC, this fact is not a reason for anyone to believe. Perhaps, this fact is a reason for 
people to want to believe or to act to bring it about that they believe, but according to the 
argument, we must be able to respond to our reasons. To put the argument a bit more 
precisely: 
The Basing Argument 
1. (BC) that p is a reason for someone to φ only if they can φ for the reason that p. 
2. No one can believe for reasons of the wrong kind. 
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Therefore, there are no reasons of the wrong kind to believe. 
  
My goal in this chapter is to explain why the basing argument is a bad argument. I’m not alone 
in thinking it’s a bad argument. Many writers on the topic have argued that the second premise 
is false, and they attempt to give an account of the basing relation that explains how people 
do, in fact, believe for reasons of the wrong kind.45 I’ll explain why I don’t find these views 
compelling. Briefly, an account of the basing relation must explain what makes a reason why 
also a reason for which, but any account expansive enough to accommodate basing belief on 
reasons of the wrong kind collapses the distinction. However, I’ll argue that an interpretation 
of BC that assumes a narrower account of the basing relation is implausibly restrictive. My 
diagnosis is that the basing argument exhibits a fallacy of equivocation. Its attractiveness 
depends on equivocating on the word “can.” The plausibility of the first premise depends on 
an “expansive” reading of “can,” while the plausibility of the second premise depends on a 
“narrow” reading. Thus, there is no consistent reading of “can” that does the argumentative 
work the argument needs it to do.  
 
§2 
To determine under what conditions a person can φ for a reason, let’s first specify what is 
involved in φing for a reason. A reason for which a person φs is often referred to as a 
“motivating” reason, in contrast with the normative and explanatory senses of “reason.”46 
Normative reasons are considerations that count in favor of someone’s φing and combine to 
																																																						
45 For replies along these lines, see Booth (2008), Rinard (2015; 2018), McCormick (2015), Crawford (2017), 
McHugh (2016), and Leary (2017). 






determine whether a person should or shouldn’t (or is permitted to) φ. In contrast, motivating 
reasons are considerations for which someone φs. Motivating reasons are considerations that 
a person takes to count in favor of their φing and for which a person φs but which may or may 
not actually count in favor of their φing. Finally, explanatory reasons are considerations that are 
part of the explanation why someone φs but are not necessarily among the motivating reasons 
for which they φ. 
To illustrate, suppose that Albert unknowingly consumed some LSD at a party, and 
he is now convinced that consuming water is the key to unlocking the mysteries of the 
universe, so he puts his mouth around the kitchen faucet and drinks some water. 
Unbeknownst to Albert, he is also severely dehydrated. Intuitively, that Albert is severely 
dehydrated is a normative reason for him to drink some water; it counts in favor of his doing so 
and bears on what he ought to do. However, this fact is not among Albert’s motivating reasons 
for drinking water. His reason for doing so is that drinking water will unlock the mysteries of 
the universe (or so he thinks). That Albert consumed LSD is an explanatory reason why he drank 
the water, but it wasn’t his reason for doing so. He didn’t consider the fact that he consumed 
LSD to count in favor of drinking the water. The fact that he consumed LSD is a reason why 
he put his mouth around the faucet and drank water, but it was not a reason for which he did. 
This fact plays a role in the causal explanation of Albert’s drinking water, but not by being a 
consideration he took to favor drinking the water. 
These different senses of “reason” also correspond to different senses of “because.” 
There is a sense in which Albert puts his mouth on the faucet because he consumed LSD—the 






on the faucet because he’s dehydrated—the “because” of grounding or justification. Finally, 
there is a sense in which Albert puts his mouth on the faucet because drinking water will unlock 
the mysteries of the universe (or so he thinks). This is the “because” of basing and the relevant 
sense for BC. BC implies that if some consideration is a normative reason for Juan to φ, then 
it must be possible for that consideration to be among Albert’s motivating reasons for φing. 
It is plausible that motivating reasons are a subset of explanatory reasons. Both the 
fact that Albert thinks drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the universe and the fact 
that he consumed LSD explain why he puts his mouth around the faucet. Moreover, both of 
these facts dispose Albert to put his mouth around the faucet. The difference is that a merely 
explanatory reason is not connected to what Davidson (1963) termed a “rationalization.” The 
fact that Albert consumed LSD is not a consideration he saw in the action of putting his mouth 
around the faucet—“some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action [he] wanted, desired, 
prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable” (ibid., 685). Like the 
putative fact that drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the universe, the fact that Albert 
consumed LSD is part of the causal explanation of his action, but it doesn’t explain his action 
by revealing what he saw in the action that made it seem to him at the time to be worth doing. 
Albert responds to the putative fact that drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the 
universe. This fact disposes him to put his mouth around the faucet because he takes this fact 
as a reason to put his mouth around the faucet. In contrast, Albert doesn’t take the fact that 
he consumed LSD as a reason to put his mouth around the faucet, and while having consumed 
LSD does dispose Albert to put his mouth around the faucet, it does not dispose him to do 






motivating reason for which they φed only if that reason is part of the explanation why they φed 
because they regard47 it as a normative reason for φing, and regarding it as a normative reason 
for them to φ disposes them to φ. Since the fact that Albert is on LSD has a causal influence 
on his actions, but not by being a consideration he regarded as a reason for him to put his 
mouth around the faucet, it is not among the reasons for which he did so even though it was a 
reason why he did so.  
Importantly, even if regarding a consideration as a reason is necessary, it is not 
sufficient for φing for that reason. Not only must it be the case that the person regards the 
relevant consideration as a reason for them to φ, this motivates them to φ, and they φ. The 
motivation that results from regarding the consideration as a reason must actually cause them 
to φ. For instance, suppose Albert is struck by the thought that drinking water is the key to 
unlocking the mysteries of the universe, and he regards this as a reason for him to put his 
mouth around the faucet. However, two seconds later, he forgets all about this because he is 
struck by the further thought that he can’t remember what water tastes like, so he puts his 
mouth around the faucet. In this case, Albert believes water will unlock the mysteries of the 
universe, regards this as a reason for him to drink water, and drinks water, but his belief that 
drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the universe doesn’t cause him to put his mouth 
around the faucet. 
																																																						
47 I use the term “regard” to remain neutral on the question whether someone must have an additional normative 
belief—that the relevant consideration is a reason for her to φ—in order to count as φing for that reason. Perhaps 
a less sophisticated intentional attitude than an explicit belief about one’s reasons, such as experiencing the 
consideration in a way that makes φing appear attractive, suffices to distinguish motivating reasons. I’ll use the 






Moreover, the disposition cannot merely cause a person to φ; it must cause them to φ 
“in the right way” to be a reason for which they φ. This additional constraint arises from the 
notoriously difficult problem of deviant causal chains. Consider a variant of an example from 
Davidson (1973: 79). Albert is struck by the thought that drinking water will unlock the 
mysteries of the universe. This thought disposes him to put his mouth around the faucet. 
Reflecting on this disposition causes Albert to experience the sensation of the inside of his 
mouth being on fire, so he puts his mouth around the faucet to cool it off. In this case, Albert’s 
reason for putting his mouth around the faucet is not that drinking water will unlock the 
mysteries of the universe even though he believed this, regarded it as a reason for him to put 
his mouth around the faucet, was disposed, as a result, to put his mouth around the faucet, 
and the disposition caused him to put his mouth around the faucet. The problem is that the 
causal chain is deviant. His belief that drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the universe 
does cause him to put his mouth around the faucet but not in the right way. 
Providing a complete account of the basing relation is clearly a difficult task. What 
does causing “in the right way” amount to? What attitude(s) must be involved in “regarding” 
a consideration as a reason to φ? It seems that if a subject S succeeds in φing for a reason 
(leaving aside more complex cases, like Juan’s, of false belief) several things must be the case: 
(1) A fact F obtains; 
(2) F is a reason for A to φ in circumstance C. 
(3) S knows F;48 
(4) S regards F as a reason for S to φ. 
(5) S’s regarding F as a reason for S to φ disposes S to φ. 
(6) S’s disposition to φ (non-deviantly) causes S to φ. 
																																																						
48 I assume the knowledge condition here, but my argument doesn’t turn on accepting this relation, as opposed 
to something weaker like justified true belief. One may substitute instances of “S knows F” with “S has a justified 








Given this admittedly rough outline of an analysis of the basing relation, let’s take a closer look 
at the basing argument. Why do the necessary conditions outlined above rule out the 
possibility of believing things for reasons of the wrong kind? To return to Pascal’s Wager, why 
can’t the non-believer (let’s call him Dawkins) convinced by Pascal’s argument believe in God 
for the reason that if I win, I win everything; if I lose, I lose nothing? It seems plausible to imagine 
Dawkins reasoning as follows: “believing in God is the best thing for me to believe regardless 
of whether there is a God, so I should believe in God.” It seems as though Dawkins can regard 
the relevant fact as a very good reason for him to believe in God. Moreover, this knowledge 
might dispose him to bring it about that he believes. Manifesting these dispositions—for 
example, by spending all his time with thoughtful believers, trying to see things from their 
perspective, behaving like them, etc.—might ultimately cause Dawkins to succeed in genuinely 
believing in God. Suppose all the following are true: (1) believing in God is the best bet for 
Dawkins, (2) he knows this fact, (3) he regards this fact as a good reason for him to believe in 
God, (4) his regarding this fact as a reason for him to believe in God disposes him to take 
steps to bring it about that he believes this, and (5) manifesting this disposition ultimately 
causes him to believe.  
Kelly (2002), a proponent of the basing argument, writes, “in cases in which one 
succeeds in acquiring a desired belief indirectly, the acquired belief is not based on one’s 
recognition that the belief would be practically advantageous to hold. If my desire to hold a 






belief is not based on practical considerations: rather, it is based on the newly-acquired 
evidence” (174). On what grounds would defenders of the basing argument, like Kelly, reject 
the claim that Dawkins believes in God for the reason that if I win, I win everything; if I lose, I lose 
nothing in the circumstances described?  
 As Kelly points himself out (2003; 174-5), and Rinard (2015) emphasizes, appealing to 
the distinction between direct and indirect causal influence does not explain why Dawkins’s 
belief is not based on the pascalian reason. To illustrate, recall our addled friend, Albert. 
Suppose Albert responds to his belief that drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the 
universe by opening the door to the kitchen, walking over to the faucet, turning it on, and 
putting his mouth around it. Presumably, his putting his mouth around the faucet is still based 
on his belief that drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the universe even though this 
belief did not immediately cause him to put his mouth around the faucet; it only immediately 
caused him to open the door to the kitchen. That the causal influence of the relevant belief on 
his eventual action is indirect does not rule out that his action is based on this belief. Therefore, 
claiming that Dawkins’s regarding the relevant fact as a reason for him to believe does not 
immediately cause him to believe cannot explain why he doesn’t believe for the pascalian 
reason, but Albert does drink water for the reason that doing so will unlock the mysteries of 
the universe. 
 Unfortunately, Kelly’s answer to this question is not entirely convincing. He argues 
that the crucial difference can be explained in terms of counterfactual dependence: “whether 
R is a reason on which S’s φ-ing is based, or whether R merely plays a role in the history of S’s 






(175). Suppose Dawkins is convinced that it would be better for him to believe in God, 
regardless of whether God actually exists, so he takes the steps described above. More 
specifically, he hangs out with followers of Vishnu and behaves just like them. Over time, he 
comes sincerely to believe in Vishnu. Next, imagine that some months later, Dawkins returns 
to Pascal’s Wager. He learns that Pascal was a Christian and that his argument concerned belief 
in the Christian god. Kelly’s view would suggest that recognizing this change in his practical 
circumstances would not cause Dawkins to abandon his belief in Vishnu. While Pascal’s Wager 
may have caused Dawkins ultimately to become a believer in Vishnu, the fact that if I win, I win 
everything; if I lose, I lose nothing is not his reason for believing in Vishnu because, even if he were 
to lose this reason, his belief in Vishnu would not thereby be extinguished. Kelly writes, “the 
fact that the belief is not abandoned in response to the change in expected utility indicates that 
the belief is not based on considerations of utility” (176). 
 However, given that Kelly concedes directness of influence is not the relevant factor, 
counterfactual dependence can be indirect as well. For example, suppose that after 
reconsidering the argument, Dawkins believes the Christian god is really the way to go. The 
problem is, he really does believe in Vishnu. So, he takes steps to bring it about that he believes 
in the Christian god. Perhaps, he stops hanging out with followers of Vishnu and surrounds 
himself with followers of Jesus. In time, he genuinely becomes convinced in the Christian god 
and loses his commitment to Vishnu. If the directness of the causal influence of Dawkins’s 
reason on his belief is not doing the work to explain why he doesn’t believe for the pascalian 
reason, then the counterfactual dependence of the belief on the reason doesn’t do the 






and still be based on that reason, the counterfactual dependence of a belief on a reason may 
also be indirect and still be based on that reason. Just as Dawkins may be disposed to abandon 
his belief in response to counterevidence, he may also be disposed to abandon his belief 
(indirectly) in response to pascalian reasons. The fact that manifesting the first disposition is a 
direct cause of belief while the second is indirect is, by Kelly’s own admission, beside the 
point.49 
Shah (2006) offers a different explanation why people like Dawkins do not believe for 
pascalian reasons. He connects BC to a related principle, the Reasoning Constraint, or RC: that p 
is a reason for someone to believe that q only if they can reason from that p to believing that q. 
He writes: 
Claiming that a consideration is a for which an agent φs…implies that the 
consideration guided the agent in its capacity as a reason. A consideration could not 
guide an agent to φ in its capacity as a reason unless the agent were capable of φing 
on the basis of his recognition of the consideration as a reason to φ. Deliberation, or 
reasoning, is the process in which agents recognize reasons, and then φ on the basis 
of this recognition. So something could not be a reason for an agent to φ unless it was 
capable of swaying him towards φing in his deliberation about whether to φ (485-6). 
 
According to Shah’s version of the argument, if a consideration is a reason for someone to φ, 
it must be possible for that consideration to guide them in their reasoning about whether to φ 
in its capacity as a reason to φ. How does this explain why Dawkins doesn’t believe for a 
pascalian reason? In other words, how does this account show that Dawkins cannot be guided 
in his reasoning about whether to believe in God by the fact that if I win, I win everything; if I lose, 
I lose nothing? Again, Dawkins might reason as follows: “believing in God is the best thing for 
																																																						






me to believe, regardless of whether God exists, so I should believe in God.” Doesn’t this 
show that the relevant fact can guide Dawkins’s reasoning? 
There are two different sorts of reasoning that might fall under the heading “reasoning 
about what to believe.” First, we reason to determine how things are in the world. “Does God 
exist?” “Did I turn the oven off?” “Will a government stimulus bill fix a broken economy?” 
We can reason to try to answer these questions, and the considerations that will help us answer 
them are facts about how things are that support the answers on which we settle. Secondly, 
we reason to determine what to do. “Should I go to church?” “Should I go back and check if 
the oven is on?” “Should I vote yes on the stimulus bill?” In the example above, Dawkins 
does not appear to be engaged in the first activity. He’s not considering whether God exists 
or the reasons for or against God’s existence. Rather, he is trying to determine how he should 
be independently of how things are. Dawkins does not take the relevant fact to settle the 
question “does God exist?”  
However, it is trivial that believing something entails believing it to be how things are. 
If I believe the government stimulus bill won’t fix the broken economy, I believe that’s how 
things are. If Dawkins believes that God exists, he too believes that’s how things are. 
Therefore, only things I take to be facts about how things are can guide me insofar as I’m 
aiming to answer a question about how things are. (This is roughly the same point I made 
about deliberate inquiry in chapter I, §8.) More generally, if someone is engaged in reasoning 
that concludes in believing something, one must take the content of the belief from which one 
reasons to support the content of the belief to which one reasons. For instance, suppose I reason 






which I reason to support the content of the proposition to which I reason. However, this is 
not what’s happening in Dawkins’s case. While Dawkins’s reasoning might cause him to 
believe in God, he doesn’t take the content of the beliefs from which he reasons to support 
the content of the belief to which he reasons. He doesn’t reason: “believing in God is the best 
thing for me to believe, regardless of whether God exists, so God exists.” Rather, he takes the 
content of the belief from which he reasons to support something else, such as adopting a 
certain policy of belief-formation. In contrast, when I reason from the fact that the ground is 
wet to the belief that it must’ve rained, I do take the fact that the ground is wet to support the 
proposition: it must’ve rained.  
The same support relations are evident in the case of Albert. While Albert’s reasoning 
does not directly conclude in his drinking water, he does take the fact that drinking water will 
unlock the mysteries of the universe to support drinking water. This recognition takes him 
through each of the steps necessary to bring it about that he drinks water (opening the kitchen 
door, walking to the sink, putting his mouth around the faucet, and turning on the faucet) to 
the execution of his intention. At any point in the causal chain that leads to Albert drinking 
water, Albert takes the content of his intention, “drink water,” to be supported by the content 
of the relevant belief, “drinking water will unlock the mysteries of the universe.” In contrast, 
at no point does Dawkins take the content of his belief, “believing in God is the best thing for 
me to believe” to support the content of the belief, “God exists.” The lack of support relations 
among the contents of the relevant attitudes explains why the causal influence and 
counterfactual dependence of the pascalian reason are necessarily indirect. Recognizing the 






acknowledges it as the reason it is, he doesn’t take it to support the content of the proposition 
it favors believing.  
Someone doesn’t believe p for the reason that q insofar as they take q to support 
believing p. Rather, someone believes p for the reason that q only if they take q to support p. 
Similarly, someone doesn’t intend to φ for the reason that q insofar as they take q to support 
intending to φ. Rather, someone intends to φ for the reason that q only if they take q to support 
φing. What seems difficult to imagine is Dawkins concluding that God exists in virtue of 
reasoning from the premise that believing in God would be beneficial, given that Dawkins 
takes the relevant fact not to bear on the question whether God exists.  
 
§4 
One might object at this point that appealing to the support relations among the contents of 
the relevant attitudes fails to show that people like Dawkins don’t believe for pascalian reasons. 
Instead, it only shows that people don’t believe things for reasons they take to be pascalian. For 
example, Dawkins might mistakenly think the utility of believing in God is evidence for God’s 
existence and believe for that reason (Way 2016). To illustrate, suppose Dawkins mistakenly 
thinks that the fact that a belief is tremendously beneficial to have is strong evidence that the 
belief is true. Given this crazy background belief, it seems possible for Dawkins to reason: 
“believing in God is tremendously beneficial, so God exists.” Therefore, it does seem possible 
for someone to believe for a pascalian reason insofar as it is possible for them to mistake the 
relevant fact for evidence. Given Dawkins’s background belief, he takes the belief from which 






he believes is, in fact, a pascalian reason for him to believe. Doesn’t this show that Dawkins 
believes for a pascalian reason?  
No. In this case, Dawkins is mistaken about whether the fact that a belief is 
tremendously beneficial bears on whether its content is true. Therefore, he believes for what 
he takes to be evidence. It would be a mistake to conclude that, in such a case, Dawkins 
believes for a practical reason. Insofar as he takes the reason to support the content of the 
belief, he believes for what he mistakenly thinks is evidence. By analogy, suppose Dawkins 
puts money in the collection plate at church because a large percentage of the money is 
donated to the homeless. Dawkins also mistakenly thinks that most of the homeless people 
who receive donations will use the money for drugs and thus be at greater risk of disease and 
death, and he believes his donation will ultimately help reduce the homeless population in his 
neighborhood and increase his property value. The fact that a large percentage of the money 
is donated to the homeless is a moral reason for Dawkins to put money in the collection plate, 
and he puts money in the collection plate for this reason, but he clearly doesn’t act for a moral 
reason.  
Responding to reasons doesn’t only involve being moved or caused by them; it 
involves being moved by them in their capacity as reasons for the responses they favor. To 
illustrate with a different example from Mantel (2018), imagine that Ling is babysitting Joe and 
his younger sister, Kim. On separate occasions, Ling and Joe both notice Kim playing with 
scissors. Both are moved by this fact to take the scissors away. However, Ling is moved by 
this fact because she wants to keep Kim safe, while Joe is moved by this fact because he wants 






Ling acts for a good reason, even though both Ling and Joe are moved to perform the same 
action in virtue of their recognition of the same fact, that Kim is playing with scissors. Whether 
Ling or Joe acts for a good reason depends on more than being moved by knowledge of the 
same fact to respond in the same manner. Whether someone φs for a reason depends on how 
they respond to the reason-giving fact—whether they respond to it in virtue of recognizing it 
as the normative reason it is and are moved by that recognition to the response the reason 
favors. And, what seems difficult to imagine is a person believing a proposition for a reason 
that they themselves take not to support the content of the proposition. 
 
§5 
As the example with which I began illustrates, not all reasons why someone believes are 
reasons for which they believe. One feature that distinguishes reasons for which someone 
believes some proposition that p is that they are facts from which that person could reason to 
the conclusion, that p, in virtue of recognizing them as the reasons they are. Reasons of the 
wrong kind for believing p are not facts from which a person can reason to the conclusion, 
that p, in virtue of recognizing them as the reasons they are. Recognizing them as the reasons 
they are entails recognizing that they are irrelevant to answering the question whether p.  
Consider a passage from McCormick (2015), who argues that people do sometimes 
believe things for reasons of the wrong kind. She imagines a juror in a criminal case: 
Consider our juror. In the process of deliberation, he is thinking about how good he 
would feel if he believes the witness and can be done with this process…If these 
considerations can be causes of Sam’s belief and Sam can even recognize them as 
such, it does not seem impossible (or even implausible) for Sam to say I believed the 
witness because I was fed up and exhausted. This sounds a lot like saying it was at least 







There is an ambiguity in this passage between the causal and rationalizing senses of “because” 
and “reason.” The fact that Sam was fed up and exhausted is a reason why he believed the 
witness. However, there may be many other things that caused Sam to believe the witness. For 
instance, imagine that a quirk about Sam is that when he drinks too much coffee, it makes him 
eager to believe and go along with what people tell him. He decides to drink a bunch of coffee 
the morning the prosecution’s star witness will give her testimony. As he listens to the 
testimony in his caffeine-induced mania, it all sounds very plausible to him. He believes the 
witness that she saw the defendant commit the crime. When Sam settles the question “is the 
witness credible,” he takes that to be how things are in the world. Sam might later reflect on 
what happened that day in court and say, “I really only believed the witness because I drank too 
much coffee.” There’s a difference between the things that influenced Sam’s reasoning at the 
time he determined the witness was credible and the things he reasoned from in making that 
determination. The fact that Sam drank too much coffee is a reason why but not a reason for 
which he believed the witness. Similarly, the fact that Sam is exhausted and fed up is not a 
consideration from which he can reason to arrive at the conclusion that the witness is credible. 
Sam’s mood doesn’t have anything to do with the credibility of the witness. McCormick 
concedes that “if one admits to having a belief, one would also admit that what he believes is 
true. There is a trivial sense in which believing p entails believing p to be true.” (30). If Sam is 
determining whether the witness is credible, and he believes that the fact that he is fed up and 
exhausted as nothing to do with whether the witness is credible, and believing the witness is 
credible entails settling the question “is the witness credible” in the affirmative, the fact that 






credible in his reasoning about whether the witness is credible. The fact that he is fed up and 
exhausted might influence his beliefs insofar as his mood affects how he reasons about 
whether the witness is credible, but that’s no different than the effects of the coffee.  
Recall the example of Albert. Certainly, when thinking later about his actions during 
his LSD trip, it seems possible (and even plausible) for Albert to say I put my mouth around 
the faucet because I was on LSD. However, just because it is plausible for Albert to say this 
doesn’t show that Albert’s being on LSD was among his motivating reasons for belief. It 
wasn’t. It doesn’t explain what he saw, at the time he put his mouth around the faucet, that 
spoke in favor of doing that. Similarly, while Sam might recognize that his being fed up may 
have played a causal role in his coming to believe the witness, this doesn’t show that it was 
among his reasons for believing the witness.  
It is revealing that we commonly appeal to causal influences on belief as excuses. For 
instance, if another juror explained that the witness’s testimony was riddled with 
contradictions, Sam might try to avoid blame by appealing to the fact that he was exhausted 
and couldn’t think straight anymore in attempting to excuse himself for believing the dishonest 
witness. However, if his fellow jurors challenged him to explain why he believed the witness 
was telling the truth, he could hardly convince them or justify his belief by appealing to the 
fact that he is exhausted. Certainly, Sam’s mood might cause him to be more inclined to think 
the witness is reliable, but it’s facts about the witness—not the features of his mood that affect 
how he reasons from these facts—that he takes to support the content of his belief (and serve 








What is the upshot of this discussion about the basing relation? I’ve argued that an account of 
the basing relation must explain when a reason why is also a reason for which, and I suggested 
that basing involves the capacity to take the content of the premise (e.g., “the ground is wet”) 
to support the content of the conclusion (e.g., “it must’ve rained”) in a single piece of 
reasoning.50 I’ve shown how this distinction accounts for the difficulty of consciously adopting 
attitudes for reasons of the wrong kind. Yet, nothing I’ve said thus far shows that Dawkins’s 
pascalian reason is not a good reason for him to believe God exists. What must be shown is 
that a consideration only favors an attitude if it can be the reason for which someone possesses 
that attitude. Even if proponents of the basing argument are right that there is an important 
sense in which people cannot believe things for reasons of the wrong kind, this doesn’t ipso 
facto show that there are no practical reasons for belief. Perhaps, all it shows is that people 
cannot base their beliefs on all the reasons there are for them to believe. The proponent of 
the basing argument must explain why we should accept BC: that p is a reason for someone to 
φ only if they can φ for the reason that p.  
The condition I’m interested in exploring for the purposes of my argument is (2): S 
knows F. If in order to φ for the reason F, S must know F, how does this knowledge 
requirement translate to S’s capability to φ for the reason F? A first pass is that the condition is 
the same, knowledge. After all, if S doesn’t know F, there is an obvious sense in which S can’t 
																																																						
50 It is important to note that not all instances of basing need be products of explicit reasoning. For example, if 
a perceptual belief is based on direct perception, and the content of perception is not propositional, then not all 
instances of basing involve reasoning from the content of a premise to the content of a conclusion. What I 
suggest here is merely that basing involves the capacity to infer the conclusion of reasoning from the content of a 






φ for the reason F. For example, if I mistakenly believe the glass in front of me contains gin 
and tonic, but it really contains poison, there is an obvious sense in which I cannot refrain 
from drinking it for the reason that it contains poison. I cannot base my decision on a consideration 
about which I’m ignorant. So, perhaps the simplest way of spelling out the epistemic condition 
implied by BC is as follows:  
C1: S can φ for a reason F only if S actually knows F. 
However, this way of spelling out the epistemic requirement is too restrictive to be 
plausible. On this reading, BC implies: that p gives S a reason to φ only if S knows that p. A 
theory that implies that no one ever has a reason about which they are ignorant should be 
rejected. We look for reasons and discover them; we often realize we were ignorant of some 
of our reasons and regret not appreciating them in time. We sometimes rightly blame ourselves 
and others for failing to know facts relevant to our decisions, facts that we should have known. 
These events are commonplace. An account of normative reasons should be able to capture 
the platitude that we are at least sometimes culpably ignorant of, mistaken about, or otherwise 
unaware of our normative reasons.  
 
§7 
The mere capability to φ for a reason F doesn’t require that one actually know F. By analogy, 
there is a sense in which a professional bowler can’t bowl a strike if they aren’t in the bowling 
alley, but it also makes perfect sense to say professional bowlers can bowl strikes even if they’re 
not actively on the lane. The sense in which the bowler “can’t” bowl a strike if they aren’t on 






Similarly, a person may have the capacity to φ for a reason F even if, strictly speaking, it isn’t 
possible for them to φ for that reason in their actual circumstances. In other words, proponents 
of BC must idealize from a subject’s actual circumstances. 
 To illustrate, Williams (1981) famously rejects C1 (at least when it comes to reasons 
for action), appealing to counterexamples involving mistaken belief like the following: 
HYOUNG’S POISON: Hyoung loves a good gin and tonic. He mistakenly believes the glass of 
clear liquid in front of him is a gin and tonic. However, the glass contains poison. The fact 
that the glass contains poison is a reason for Hyoung not to drink its contents. However, he 
can’t refrain from drinking it for this reason. After all, he thinks it’s a delicious gin and tonic. 
 
Williams thinks the fact that the glass contains poison is a reason for Hyoung not to drink it 
because he doesn’t want to drink poison. Since Hyoung has a strong motive—not to be 
poisoned—that would be aided by refraining from drinking the contents of the glass in front 
of him, he has a reason to refrain from drinking, even if he doesn’t know he has it. Although, 
strictly speaking, Hyoung can’t respond to the fact that the glass contains poison, there is a 
clear chain of reasoning from Hyoung’s existing desires and motives to the decision not to 
drink poison. So, once suitably idealized, we see that Hyoung does possess the capacity to 
respond to that reason even if it isn’t strictly speaking possible for him to do so in his actual 
circumstances.  
According to Williams, our reasons don’t depend just on what we happen to know, 
but rather, how we would be motivated to respond if we were aware of the relevant reason-
giving facts. A less stringent, counterfactual version of BC might be spelled out as follows: 






 C2 avoids the objection to C1 insofar as it vindicates the plausible thought that we can 
have false beliefs about our reasons. It also captures the idea that we still have the capacity to 
be moved by a consideration even if we aren’t presently aware of it. Just as the professional 
bowler doesn’t lose the capacity to throw strikes whenever they’re not in front of the pins, 
Hyoung still has the capacity to reason from “this glass contains poison” to the intention 
“don’t drink” even when he’s not aware that the glass contains poison. Therefore, he may still 
have a reason not to drink the poison even if he’s unaware of it. 
However, C2 is subject to well-known counterexamples like the following sort of 
cases: 
DELUDED CHAD: Chad thinks he’s brilliant, but he’s not. In fact, most of the things that come 
out of his mouth sound stupid and arrogant. Unsurprisingly, he has trouble with relationships. 
If he didn’t talk so much and reveal his inflated opinion of himself, his dates might be less 
repulsed by him. Chad is on a first date and very much wants it to go well. If he talks too 
much, it certainly won’t. The fact that Chad says a lot of stupid and arrogant things that repulse 
his dates gives him a reason to talk less during this date. The more he talks, the more he’ll 
mess things up. However, in virtue of Chad’s inflated opinion of himself, he doesn’t recognize 
that he has any reason to talk less; he thinks he sounds impressive. If Chad were slightly more 
self-aware, he would be able to behave well and wouldn’t need to talk less; he would know 
how to avoid coming off as stupid and arrogant. The fact that Chad will say stupid and arrogant 
things is a reason for him to talk less during the date, but he cannot be moved by this reason. 
If he knew that most of the things he says are stupid and arrogant, he wouldn’t need to talk 
less.  
 
Chad seems to have a reason to keep quiet precisely because he lacks knowledge of the relevant 
reason-giving fact. That is why some writers have referred to reasons like these as “elusive” 
(Ridge and McKeever 2012: 112). If Chad knew that his comments were arrogant and stupid, 
he could avoid making such comments and would no longer need to keep quiet. It is precisely 
because he lacks the ability to recognize that his comments are arrogant and stupid that he 






 Some might deny that Chad has a reason to keep quiet. If Chad really isn’t capable of 
knowing that his comments are arrogant and stupid, he cannot, strictly speaking, respond to 
such facts in determining how to behave on his date. Perhaps, when it comes to his capacity 
to recognize his arrogance and stupidity, Chad is more analogous to my two-year-old nephew 
than the professional bowler. Along these lines, while it may be unfortunate for Chad that he 
can’t make his dates go better and get what he wants, given his capacities, he is not doing 
anything he shouldn’t do. In a discussion of a similar case from Markovits (2011) about a 
person who is under the delusion that they’re James Bond, Paakkunainen (2017) writes: 
No doubt the fact that I have the deluded belief makes it in some sense a good 
idea for me to seek help. But it’s unclear that we should interpret this intuitive 
reaction as an indication that the specific fact that I have this deluded belief is 
a reason for me to seek help. Perhaps my normative reason to seek help is the 
nearby and more general fact that I have a deluded belief—where this general 
fact is one that I can take into account and act on (164).  
 
Paakkunainen attempts to resist the worry by gesturing to some nearby reason which the 
subject can take into account, suggesting that this is what the subject ought to consider. So, for 
instance, Chad might start to correlate talking a lot during a first date and failing to secure a 
second date and come to have a reason to talk less without knowing that he comes off as 
arrogant and stupid. Perhaps, as a result of this, he has a reason to think about some of the 
things he says, a reason to consider himself in a slightly different light, etc. Perhaps, these are 
things he can do and things we can reasonably expect of him.  
Again, however, I worry that if Chad’s reasons include only what he can currently see 
from his perspective, he not only lacks a reason to keep quiet. He also has no reason to second-
guess his opinion of himself, no reason to become a better person, no reason to reflect on 






less reason he has to become better. While it may seem in DELUDED CHAD that there must 
be some nearby consideration Chad could reflect on and take into account, there are further 
examples in which the presence of a genuinely elusive reason seems even more apparent. 
Consider an example from Schroeder (2007): 
SURPRISE PARTY: “Nate...hates all parties except for successful surprise parties thrown in his 
honor. Given Nate’s situation, the fact that there is a surprise party waiting for him now at 
home is a reason for him to go home. But it isn’t a reason that Nate could know about or act 
on” (Schroeder 2007: 33). 
 
Unlike in DELUDED CHAD, Nate’s incapacity to regard the relevant consideration as a reason 
for him to act does not arise from a complex character flaw that he might become aware of 
and overcome gradually. It is just the nature of this reason for Nate to go home that he only 
has it insofar as he doesn’t know he has it. 
Proponents of BC might dig in their heels and argue that if Nate is incapable of 
regarding the fact that there’s a surprise party waiting for him as a reason for him to go home, 
it is not a reason for him to go home. Kiesewetter (2016), for example, writes: 
While Schroeder would conclude that some reasons cannot be responded to from the 
possibility of surprise party reasons, I would conclude that there cannot be surprise 
party reasons since such reasons could not be responded to. How can we decide the 
issue? On the one hand, we should all agree that it would be good for Nate to go to 
the surprise party, and that other things equal persons have reason to φ if φ-ing would 
be good for them. On the other hand, we should also agree that other things aren’t 
always equal. It would often be good for us to travel back in time to correct our past 
mistakes, but presumably we have no reason to do this. It can even be good for us to 
have hiccups, but that provides no reason for having them. Neither do we have 
reasons against having headaches or nightmares even though it would be good for us 
not to have them. When does the fact that φ-ing would be good for us provide a 
reason for us to φ and when not? A very natural answer is that it provides such a 
reason just when awareness of this fact can guide our φ-ing, when it is possible for us 
to φ in light of that fact (769-70). 
 
While all would agree that a past mistake does not give me a reason to travel back in time, the 






made a mistake in the past. The most natural explanation is simply that I can’t travel back in 
time.51 Like willing myself to have an itch or to hiccup, traveling back in time is not something 
I can do. An even more natural answer to Kiesewetter’s question—when does the fact that 
φing would be good for me give me a reason to φ—is when it’s possible for me to φ. Obviously, 
if it’s impossible for me to φ, the fact that it would be good for me to φ is not a reason for me 
to φ. However, I don’t see why these observations about physically impossible states of affairs 
support the stronger claim that a consideration is only a reason for someone to φ if it is possible 
for them to φ for that reason. Unlike the imagined time traveler, I assume it is physically possible 
for Nate to go home; he can just walk there.  
I agree with Schroeder (2007) that denying Nate has a reason to go home seems ad 
hoc. Schroeder writes, “I see no reason other than an attachment to some theory to think that 
there can’t be reasons that no one could ever act on. It is not as if such reasons don’t matter, 
after all—they still play a role in determining what [we] ought to do—they still show up on 
God’s list of pros and cons” (2007: 166). I would add that, not only do these considerations 
show up on God’s list of pros and cons. More importantly, they show up on ours. The fact 
that there’s a surprise party waiting for Nate plays a role in our reasoning about what it would 
be advisable for Nate to do, what we should advise him to do, etc. While he may not be able 
to act for the reason we all recognize favors his going home, we recognize it, and if we’re in a 
position to help him do what we recognize there is good reason for him to do, we should.    
 
																																																						
51 See Streumer (2018) for an argument that uses similar examples to defend this claim: that “there can only be a 







Perhaps the mistake that led to the puzzle of elusive reasons was the account of basing I 
sketched in §2. The thought that Nate can have a reason to go home even if he is unaware of 
it suggests another potential way of spelling out the relevant capacity implied by BC. This way 
of spelling out the requirement dictates revising some of our initial assumptions about basing. 
Recall that, in §2, I outlined a theory according to which S φs for a reason F only if: 
(1) A fact F obtains; 
(2) F is a reason for A to φ in circumstance C. 
(3) S knows F; 
(4) S regards F as a reason for S to φ. 
(5) S’s regarding F as a reason for S to φ disposes S to φ. 
(6) S’s disposition to φ (non-deviantly) causes S to φ. 
 
If, as I have been assuming, normative reasons are facts, then one and the same reason may 
be expressed in multiple ways. For example, Suzie may believe that Tylenol will cure her 
headache, and regard this fact as a reason for her to take Tylenol, but she may not believe that 
acetaminophen will cure her headache, and thus not believe that she has any reason to take 
acetaminophen. Since Tylenol is acetaminophen, if Suzie has a reason to take Tylenol, then 
she has the very same reason to take acetaminophen. However, intuitively, Suzie does not have 
two reasons: one reason to take Tylenol and a different reason to take acetaminophen (Mantel 
2018). She has one reason that can be expressed in multiple, extensionally-equivalent ways. It 
is therefore debatable whether Suzie has the capacity to take Tylenol for the reason that 
acetaminophen cures headaches despite not knowing about acetaminophen. This leaves room 
for proponents of BC to expand their account of basing to allow for this possibility. On such 
an account, S φs for the reason that p only if: 






(2) F is a reason for A to φ in circumstance C. 
(3) that p and that q are extensionally-equivalent ways of expressing F.  
(4) Either S knows that p or S knows that q; 
(5) Either S regards that p as a reason for S to φ or S regards that q as a reason for S to φ; 
(6) S’s attitudes are appropriately sensitive to the reason-giving fact F; 
(7) 4 and 5 (non-deviantly) cause S to φ; 
(8) S φs.52 
 
To apply this account, consider the following case: 
 
NOT-SO-SURPRISE PARTY: Lim hates all parties except for successful surprise parties thrown 
in her honor. Given Lim’s situation, the fact that there is a surprise party waiting for her at 
home is a reason for her to go home. Lim’s roommate, Ali, is trying to get her to go home 
without revealing the surprise. Ali tells Lim she has a good reason to go home. Lim knows Ali 
is a reliable judge of her reasons and therefore believes she has a good reason to go home.  
 
In this case, Lim knows that there is a good reason for her to go home, and her knowledge is 
appropriately sensitive to the reason-giving feature expressed by “that there is a surprise party 
waiting for Lin at home.” If there were no surprise party waiting for her, Ali would not have 
told her there was a good reason for her to go home, and she would not regard herself as 
having a good reason to go home.  
According to this view, just as Suzie takes Tylenol for the reason that acetaminophen 
cures headaches even though she doesn’t know what acetaminophen is, Lim goes home for 
the reason that there’s a surprise party waiting for her there even though she doesn’t know 
that there’s a surprise party at home.53 Like the issue with suggesting that there are two reasons 
in play in Suzie’s case, to claim that Lim goes home for the reason that Ali told her she has a 
																																																						
52 Writers who advance or suggest similar views include McKeever and Ridge (2012), Sinclair (2016), and 
Robertson (2018). 
53 Of course, the analogy here is imperfect given that Tylenol is acetaminophen, but the fact that there’s a surprise 
party waiting at home is not identical to the fact that Ali says Lim should go home. The relevant similarity for 
the purposes of the present discussion is that, in both cases, the agent knows there is a good reason for them to 






good reason to but not for the reason that there’s a surprise party waiting for her conflates the 
normative reason for which she acts with its mode of presentation.  
 Along these lines, the epistemic requirement specified by BC might now be spelled 
out as follows: 
C3: S has the capacity to φ for the reason that p only if S would be (at least somewhat) moved to 
φ were S to know that p or if S were to know that S has a good reason to φ, where S’s knowledge 
of this fact is appropriately sensitive to the reason-giving feature expressed by that p. 
 
However, regardless of whether C3 is a plausible way of spelling out the epistemic requirement 
in BC, it is an unwelcome suggestion for advocates of the basing argument. Consider the 
following case: 
MUSOPHOBIC LEAH: Leah is severely musophobic. Unless she believes there was no 
infestation in her building last year, she will suffer severe nausea every time she enters her 
apartment. This fact is a reason for Leah to believe there was no infestation in her building 
last year, but she can’t believe it for this reason. Reflecting on the bad consequences of 
believing doesn’t convince Leah that there was no infestation. 
 
According to the basing argument, the fact that Leah will suffer severe nausea is not a reason 
for her to believe there was no infestation because she lacks the capacity to believe it for this 
reason. However, C3 is consistent with the thought that Leah has the capacity to believe there 
was no infestation for this reason. To illustrate, consider: 
PRAGMATIST PATTY: Patty is Leah’s roommate. Patty knows that, unless Leah believes there 
was no infestation in her building last year, Leah will suffer severe nausea every time she enters 
her apartment. Patty believes this fact is a reason for Leah to believe there was no infestation 
in her building last year, and that this reason far outweighs any value for Leah in knowing the 
truth about this matter. However, Patty also knows that Leah can’t believe it for this reason. 
Leah trusts Patty and believes her to be a reliable judge of her reasons. Patty tells Leah she has 
a good reason to believe there was no infestation in the building last year. Leah trusts her and 
believes she has a good reason to believe there was no infestation in the building. 







Just as in NOT-SO-SURPRISE PARTY, Leah knows there’s a good reason for her to believe there 
was no infestation, and her knowledge is appropriately sensitive to the fact that it will make 
her nauseous if she were to believe that. If this weren’t the case, Patty would not have told her 
she had a good reason to believe there was no infestation. Therefore, if it makes sense to claim 
that Suzie takes Tylenol for the reason that acetaminophen cures headaches, and Lim goes 
home for the reason that there’s a surprise party there, then it also makes sense to claim that 






To avoid this result, proponents of evidentialism must provide some way of distinguishing 
between Lim and Suzie on the one hand and Leah on the other. Way and Whiting (2016) offer 
a response that relies on the distinction between specific and general capacities. While Nate, 
Chad, Lim, and Suzie all lack the specific capacity to respond to the relevant reason-giving 
facts in their circumstances, there are general patterns of reasoning in which they do have the 
capacity to engage. For example, while Chad can’t reason from wanting dates to go well and 
believing his arrogant remarks will prevent that to intending to keep quiet, he can reason from 
wanting dates to go well and believing that keeping quiet is a means to that end to intending 
to keep quiet. Similarly, while Lim can’t reason from liking surprise parties and believing there’s 
a surprise party at home to intending to go home, she can reason more generally from desiring 
to be happy and believing going home will make her happy to intending to go home. The trick 






cases like Lim’s but fine-grained enough to rule out cases like Leah’s. The suggestion is that 
subjects like Leah lack even the general capacity to reason from desiring to be happy and 
believing that believing p will make them happy to believing p. Putting these ideas together, 
one might explain the epistemic requirement specified by BC as follows: 
C4: S has the capacity to φ for the reason F only if S has the general capacity to reason from 
knowledge of F-type facts to responding in φ-type ways. 
 
On this reading, BC states: a fact F gives S a reason to φ only if S has the capacity to reason 
from knowledge of F-type facts to responding in φ-type ways. Why should we interpret the 
general capacity as coarse-grained enough to accommodate the thought that Lim has a reason 
to go home? After all, subjects lack the general ability to respond to elusive reasons, not just 
the specific ability to respond to them on particular occasions. Way and Whiting argue that if 
BC cannot accommodate the thought that the fact that there’s a surprise party waiting for Lim 
is a reason for her to go home, it yields unintuitive verdicts. They write: 
Spinach contains iron. That seems like it might be a reason for Elliot to eat his 
spinach. But Elliot lacks the concept of iron. So, he is not able to eat spinach for the 
reason that it contains iron. Given the very fine-grained version...it is not a reason for 
him to do so. That seems wrong. At least, it seems to run counter to our ordinary talk 
of reasons. Consider, for instance, that we would be happy to advise Elliot to eat his 
spinach on the grounds that it contains iron (ibid., 224). 
 
It seems right to me that it is unintuitive and runs counter to our ordinary talk of reasons to 
deny that the fact that spinach contains iron gives Elliot a reason to eat his spinach even 
though he lacks the concept of iron, and the fact that we would advise Elliot to eat his spinach 
on the grounds that it contains iron is evidence of this. However, Patty (and anyone else who 
cares about Leah’s wellbeing) would also be happy to advise Leah to believe there was no 






understood in a coarse-grained enough way to accommodate the thought that the surprise 
party gives Lim a reason to go home even though she can’t regard facts about surprise parties 
as reasons for going home, and the fact that spinach contains iron gives Elliot a reason to eat 
spinach even though he lacks the concept of iron, it is unclear why it should not accommodate 
the thought that the relevant fact gives Leah a reason to believe there was no infestation even 
if she cannot regard the incentive as a reason for her to believe. In all three cases, the subjects 
lack the capacity to φ in response to considerations of the relevant kind, but there is a nearby 
response subjects are capable of—φing in response to trusted advice—and the responses are 
connected in the same way to the underlying facts that favor them. Regardless of whether one 
thinks this sort of response counts as φing for a reason, the existence of normative reasons in 
these cases seems on a par. If Lim and Elliot have reasons, Leah has them too. That subjects 
have the general ability to reason from what they take to be incentives for acting to acting 
accordingly but lack the general ability to reason from what they take to be incentives for 
believing to believing accordingly is beside the point. That distinction is too abstract to capture 
any meaningful differences in Leah and Lim’s circumstances vis-a-vis their incapacity to 
respond to the relevant reason-giving facts in their circumstances. 
Moreover, while neither Lim nor Leah can reason prospectively and conclude their 
reasoning with the response favored by their reasons, they can reason retrospectively and 
conclude that their responses were favored by their reasons. After Lim goes home, she can 
recognize that the surprise party was a good reason for her to do so, even if she couldn’t 
respond to that reason at the time. Similarly, suppose Leah moved to a new building and then 






avoiding severe nausea was a good reason for her to believe there wasn’t an infestation, even 
though she couldn’t respond to that reason at the time. While neither Leah nor Lim can be 
guided by the relevant type of reason to the response it favors, both have the capacity to 
recognize the reason-giving force of the relevant fact in their circumstances.   
It is difficult to see why a subject like Elliot or Lim should count as having the capacity 
to respond to their reasons but not Leah. In the imagined scenarios, all of them are following 
testimony alerting them that they have a reason to respond to the world in a particular way, 
and their response to that testimony is appropriately-sensitive to the underlying reason-giving 
facts. If Elliot exercises a capacity to respond to the normative reason there is for him to eat 
his spinach when he follows the advice, I see no reason to deny that Leah exercises the capacity 
to respond to the normative reason there is for her to believe there was no infestation when 
she follows Patty’s advice. The fact that Leah lacks the general capacity to believe in virtue of 
incentives for believing seems no more relevant than the fact that Lim lacks the general 
capacity to act in virtue of elusive reasons for action. 
I’ll close this section by offering what I think is a more difficult case for C4, which 
arises from what I’ll call act-undermining reasons: 
TRUSTING PARTNER: Given their long-term and profoundly intimate relationship, Zeyu 
reasonably expects Amir to trust her without hesitation about some matter. That Zeyu has 
proven herself trustworthy on many occasions in several different ways gives Amir a decisive 
reason to trust her without hesitation about this matter. However, insofar as Amir takes the 
time to consider these past circumstances—his reasons to trust—he must hesitate. The very 
act of considering his reasons to trust disqualifies his response from being one of trust without 
hesitation. That Zeyu has proven herself trustworthy on many occasions in several different 
ways is a decisive reason for Amir to trust her without hesitation, but it is not a reason for 







Amir’s reason is act-undermining insofar as he cannot trust without hesitation for the reason 
he has to trust without hesitation. Trusting without hesitation is just not something one can 
do insofar as one is reflecting on one’s reasons to trust. However, intuitively, Amir has the 
capacity to trust Zeyu without hesitation for the relevant reason even though he lacks the 
capacity to reason from considerations that speak in favor of trusting her to trusting her without 
hesitation. Moreover, given the kind of thing I’m imagining trust without hesitation to be, Amir 
lacks the general capacity to reason from evidence of someone’s trustworthiness to trusting 
them without hesitation. Just as subjects are incapable of reasoning from elusive reasons to φ 
while still possessing the reason to φ, subjects are incapable of reasoning from act-undermining 
reasons to φ and still count as φing. Trusting without hesitation is just not the sort of thing 
that can be done with conscious and reflective deliberation on one’s reasons. However, it 
seems to follow that the evidence of Zeyu’s trustworthiness isn’t a reason for Amir to trust 
her without hesitation, but that is absurd. 
Granted, Way and Whiting note in a footnote that their claim “is not that, whenever a 
person φs for the reason that p, she reasons from (the premise) that p to (the conclusion) φing 
but only that reasoning of this sort provides a useful model of acting for a reason” (220, fn12). 
So, Amir still acts for the relevant reason even though he lacks the capacity to trust without 
hesitation by reasoning from the reason-giving facts to that response. However, given that 
Way and Whiting grant that responding to a reason is not always a matter of any explicit 
reasoning, why does the fact—if it is a fact—that subjects like Leah cannot engage in a piece 
of reasoning of the form: it is good for me to believe p therefore p, imply that subjects like 






he lacks the capacity to trust without hesitation for the reasons there are for him to do so, why 
does someone engaged in wishful thinking not count as believing whatever desired belief they 
end up with for the reason that it makes them feel good to believe that?  
The general lesson is that attempting to accommodate elusive reasons by giving up on 
the thought that the capacity to φ for the reason that p requires knowledge that p is 
unsuccessful. Once this requirement is abandoned, BC is rendered too weak to serve as a 
premise in the basing argument. Both Lim and Leah might know they have a reason to respond 
to the world in a certain way, they are both capable of responding appropriately to their 
knowledge, and they do so in a manner that is appropriately sensitive to the relevant reason-
giving facts. Whether one thinks that these cases amount to φing for the specified reason 
ultimately depends on which of the two accounts of basing one accepts, the more conservative 
account I outlined in §2 or the more liberal account I suggested in §6. While I have some 
concerns about the plausibility of the more liberal account, I take no sides here about which 
account is correct. My point is that if an advocate of the basing argument accepts the more 
conservative account of basing, BC is rendered too restrictive to be a plausible constraint on 
normative reasons. And, if they accept the more liberal account of basing, they cannot appeal 




I have argued that BC is either too strong to be plausible or too weak to rule out believing for 
practical reasons. I have surveyed a number of attempts to specify the relationship between 






epistemic conditions, and I argued that appealing to a subject’s actual knowledge renders the 
constraint implausibly strong, but idealizing away from the subject’s actual knowledge renders 
the connection between a subject’s reasons and her capacity to reason with them too tenuous 
to support the basing argument. Recall that the basing argument is supported by two premises: 
1. (BC) that p is a reason for someone to φ only if they can φ for the reason that p. 
2. No one can believe for reasons of the wrong kind. 
 
As I have argued, the plausibility of the second premise depends on a narrow interpretation 
of “can,” while the plausibility of the first premise depends on a more expansive interpretation 
that idealizes from the subject’s circumstances. I conclude that there is no consistent 
interpretation of the relevant sense of “can” that supports the conclusion of the basing 
argument. I’ve suggested that my sympathies lie with the narrower interpretation, as I think it 
is better able to capture the distinction between motivating and explanatory reasons, so I’ll 
conclude this chapter with a few skeptical remarks about the case for BC.  
Consider, first, the widely held principle that Reason Implies Can (RIC): that p is a 
reason for S to φ only if S can φ. To return to a previous example, the fact that I made a terrible 
mistake in the past doesn’t give me a reason to travel back in time because I cannot travel back 
in time. Some writers think RIC is best explained by BC. Consider again Kiesewetter:  
It is part of the idea of a reason that it is a consideration that can be taken to count in 
favour of a certain kind of response, a response that can be carried out from an 
understanding of that consideration as counting in favour of that very response. That 
is why there are reasons to have beliefs, but no reasons, for example, to have hiccups. 
The point is not that having hiccups is not “up to us” as it is sometimes put, for beliefs 
are not up to us either. The difference is that hiccups cannot possibly be sensible 
reactions to the recognition of reasons for them (2016: 767-8). 
 
According to Kiesewetter, what distinguishes involuntary events like hiccups from reasons-






at will either.) On his view, the relevant sense of “can” in RIC is spelled out by BC. I only have 
a reason to φ insofar as φing is something I can do in response to that reason.  
 However, one can accept the intuitive case for the existence of elusive reasons and 
reject BC without giving up RIC. To illustrate, the fact that it would make Nate happy to 
hiccup cannot be a reason for Nate to hiccup insofar as hiccupping is not something Nate can 
do. But, if Nate has a good reason to hiccup, and there are things he can do that will reliably 
cause him to hiccup, he should do those things. The simplest explanation for this fact is that 
Nate has a reason to hiccup. Assuming, in contrast, that there is nothing Nate can do to bring 
it about that he hiccups, RIC implies that he doesn’t have a reason to hiccup.54 With respect 
to belief, there are some things it might be good for me to believe but that are impossible for 
me to believe. The proverbial evil demon who threatens me with eternal suffering if I don’t 
believe some obvious falsehood comes to mind. In this case, I don’t have a reason to believe 
the obvious falsehood, but not because incentives are necessarily irrelevant to what I should 
believe, but because there’s nothing I can do to get myself to believe the falsehood and avoid 
eternal suffering. To cite a helpful distinction from James, the obvious falsehood is not a 
“living option” for me. James writes: 
A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: 
‘Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan,’ it is probably a dead option, because 
for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say: ‘Be an agnostic or 
be Christian,’ it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some 
appeal, however small, to your belief (3).    
Philosophers often appeal to examples like those involving an evil demon’s threats and 
incentives to believe obvious falsehoods to draw general conclusions about our reasons for 
																																																						
54 For a sustained defense of the view that the deontic and evaluative ought to be distinguished by appeal to RIC, 






belief and our capabilities, but in real life, not all claims are on a par with respect to the 
possibility of bringing about belief in them just as not all involuntary bodily functions like 
hiccups are on a par. I may be fortunate enough to be able to induce hiccups in response to 
incentives, but not so fortunate as to be able to induce being a foot taller or having a more 
symmetrical face in response to incentives. Similarly, I may be fortunate enough to maintain 
faith in humanity or God against the evidence, but not fortunate enough to avoid eternal 
suffering at the hands of the evil demon.  
Returning to our surprise party, the upshot is that, since going home is something Nate 
can do, it is the sort of thing there can be reasons for him to do. Whether Nate can possess 
those reasons and be moved by them to go home given his psychological or cognitive 
limitations, the peculiar nature of his circumstances, etc. is a separate issue from whether going 
home is the sort of thing for which there can be reasons. Pace Kiesewetter, to explain RIC, 
one must only accept the weaker and more plausible claim that a subject only has a reason to 
φ insofar as φing is actually possible for them. If φing is not the sort of thing that is actually 
possible for them, e.g., my being seven-feet tall, then obviously I can’t have any such reason. 
However, believing that p, like going home, is something someone could do on purpose, even 
if they cannot always do it for the very reason there is for them to do it. Granted, there is 
something Nate can’t do. Recall the two accounts of the basing relation I sketched in §2 and §8. 
If one accepts the more conservative account of basing introduced in §2, it follows that Nate 
can’t go home for the reason that there’s a surprise party waiting for him there. However, this result is 
unsurprising and unproblematic. It is a feature of the case that Nate lacks this capacity, so even 






a surprise party waiting for him at home is not a reason for Nate to go home for the reason that 
there’s a surprise party waiting for him there; it’s simply a reason for him to go home. Whether a 
reason for Nate to go home must be a reason for Nate to go home for that reason is precisely what 
is at issue, so it cannot be assumed that it follows from Nate’s incapacity to go home for the reason 
that there’s a surprise party waiting for him there that he lacks a reason to go home, which he is 
capable of doing. 
Secondly, consider the common view that the fundamental role of a reason is to guide 
us in reasoning. Rejecting BC doesn’t require denying this platitude either. It requires 
distinguishing between two claims, the claim that I must be able to reason with my reasons, 
and the more plausible claim that we must be able to reason with our reasons. Accepting the 
latter does not imply that the subject herself must always be able to reason from a 
consideration for it to count as a reason for her to φ. Of course, if a fact F is a reason for S to 
φ, it must be intelligible why F favors S’s φing. If no one could be brought to understand why 
F favors anyone’s φing, this is strong evidence that F is not, in fact, a reason for S to φ. 
However, that S is psychologically or cognitively limited such that they could not be brought 
to understand why F is a reason for them to φ in their specific circumstances doesn’t imply 
that we could not recognize that it is. Just because a subject on a given occasion could not 
reason with her reasons doesn’t mean that we cannot do so. If a fact F that favors S’s φing can 
guide me in my reasoning about whether S ought to φ (and about whether to help bring it about 










CHAPTER IV—Weighing Reasons for Belief 
 




My central aim thus far has been to dispute the supposed analogy between ethics and 
epistemology. Recall that according to the analogy, just as ethics is about what we should do 
and how we should live, epistemology is about what we should believe. I suggested that this 
analogy assumed what I termed “the separation thesis,” the claim that the epistemic and 
practical constitute distinct sources of normativity governing belief and action, respectively. I 
began by challenging the claim that epistemic standards constitute a distinct source of 
normativity for belief (in Chapter I), then criticized the assumption that intentional mental 
states and actions could be governed by wholly distinct standards (in Chapter II), and finally, 
contested the basing requirement that underwrites the most prominent argument for the 
separation thesis (in Chapter III). 
    This final chapter focuses on a different kind of argument for the separation thesis 
that relies on a supposed fundamental difference between the epistemic and the practical. To 
illustrate, a belief might be comforting, but you lack evidence for it. Lacking evidence seems 
like a reason to suspend judgment, but the fact that it’s comforting seems like a reason to 
believe. If these reasons are both relevant to what you should believe, how can you compare 
them? They seem to have nothing to do with each other, like comparing the impact of 
powerful music and the impact of a car crash. In a recent paper, Selim Berker (2018) considers 






exploits an alleged difference between epistemic and practical reasons. According to Berker, 
epistemic reasons for belief balance to suspension. If I have equally strong epistemic reasons to 
believe and disbelieve some proposition, I lack sufficient reason either to believe or disbelieve 
it. Rather, I have decisive reason to suspend judgment. In contrast, practical reasons balance 
to permission. If I have equally strong practical reasons to φ or ψ (and there are no other reasons 
on the scene), I have sufficient reason to do either. Given this difference, Berker argues that 
defenders of practical reasons for belief cannot offer a plausible explanation of how practical 
and epistemic reasons interact to yield all-things-considered normative verdicts.  
In this chapter, I defend the non-interactionist “pure” form of pragmatism I outlined 
in Chapter I against Berker’s objection. I’ll provide a brief sketch of a pure pragmatist theory, 
recapitulate why Berker thinks such views fall prey to his objection, and explain why his 
objection does not extend to pure pragmatism. Finally, I’ll consider an additional reason 
Berker’s argument might seem persuasive and show that it depends on conflating Berker’s 
objection and the distinct challenge to pure pragmatism I discussed in Chapter III. Once these 
distinct challenges are disambiguated, it is easier to see why Berker’s objection is not a 
significant concern for the plausibility of pure pragmatism.     
 
§2 
In a recent paper, Selim Berker (2018) develops an abductive argument against practical 






practical reasons: epistemic reasons for belief balance to suspension.55 If I have equally strong 
epistemic reasons to believe and disbelieve some proposition, I lack sufficient epistemic reason 
either to believe or to disbelieve.56 Rather, I have decisive epistemic reason to suspend 
judgment. In contrast, practical reasons balance to permission. If I have equally strong practical 
reasons to φ or ψ (and there are no other reasons on the scene), I have sufficient practical 
reason to do either.  
 While epistemic reasons for and against belief seem ordinarily to balance to 
suspension, it is controversial whether they always do. For instance, with respect to self-
fulfilling beliefs, epistemic reasons don’t seem necessarily to balance to suspension. To 
illustrate, imagine that Yussuf is a bowler who throws strikes whenever (and only when) he 
believes he will, and he knows this fact about himself. As he steps onto the lane, Yussuf has 
some evidence that he will throw a strike but equally strong evidence that he won’t. Should 
Yussuf believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment on the proposition that he will throw a strike? 
If epistemic reasons always balance to suspension, then (assuming there are no other reasons 
in play) Yussuf has decisive reason to suspend judgment. However, if he believes he’ll throw 
a strike, then his evidence uniquely supports this belief, and he has decisive reason to believe. 
Similarly, if he believes he won’t throw a strike, then his evidence uniquely supports that belief, 
and he has decisive reason to disbelieve. If Yussuf believes or disbelieves, at no point does he 
																																																						
55 I assume here, with Berker, that suspension of judgment is a distinct attitude, rather than the absence of belief 
(or disbelief). However, my argument doesn’t turn on the correct analysis of suspension of judgment.  
56 Throughout, I adopt Berker’s reasons-based framework according to which “X’s φ-ing has a normative status 
such as the following: X has decisive reason to φ (i.e., φ-ing is required by the overall balance of X’s reasons); X 
has sufficient reason to φ (i.e., φ-ing is permitted by the overall balance of X’s reasons); X lacks sufficient reason 







adopt an attitude prohibited by his epistemic reasons. Yussuf’s case seems to be one in which 
his epistemic reasons for and against belief are equally balanced, yet both belief and disbelief 
nonetheless seem permitted.57 Since self-fulfilling beliefs are a limited sort of example, I will 
put them aside in what follows and grant Berker’s assumption that epistemic reasons generally 
balance to suspension (i.e., prohibitively) while practical reasons balance to permission (i.e., 
permissively). 
If there are practical reasons for belief, they also balance to permission. For example, 
suppose you’ll receive a thousand dollars if you avoid believing p. There are two ways to 
achieve this end: you can either disbelieve p or suspend judgment on p. Therefore, the 
prospect of a thousand-dollar reward gives you sufficient practical reason either to disbelieve 
or suspend judgment on p; either way, you’ll receive the thousand dollars. However, as Berker 
adroitly demonstrates, since epistemic reasons for belief interact in one way, and practical 
reasons for belief interact in a completely different way, it is difficult to see how they could 
combine to yield coherent all-things-considered normative verdicts.  
Berker’s preferred “Simple Explanation” of the contrast between epistemic and 
practical reasons is that so-called “practical reasons for belief” are really reasons for action 
(e.g., reasons to bring it about that one believes), not reasons to believe. Proponents of 
practical reasons for belief (for the sake of consistency with Berker’s article, I’ll hereafter use 
the term “pragmatists”) reject this explanation (as I did for the reasons I presented in Chapter 
II), so they must provide an alternative.  
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Berker argues that the pragmatist’s explanatory burden cannot easily be discharged 
once we consider how practical and epistemic reasons would have to interact to yield all-
things-considered normative verdicts. He considers several proposals for weighing practical 
and epistemic reasons and argues that: 
Any version of interactionist pragmatism which is consistent with the Unfamiliar 
Combinatorial Contrast and which yields plausible verdicts at the overall level must 
be so gerrymandered and ad hoc that we have good abductive reason to reject it in 
favor of the Simple Explanation (2018: 434). 
 
§3 
I am inclined to agree with Berker that any interactionist form of pragmatism faces a special 
difficulty of explaining how epistemic and practical reasons could combine to yield coherent 
overall normative verdicts. Epistemic and practical reasons seem to speak in favor of belief in 
such radically different ways that it is difficult to imagine how they could be compared. 
However, as Berker acknowledges, not all pragmatist views are “interactionist.” For instance, 
according to one non-interactionist form of pragmatism, which Berker refers to as 
“separatism,” there are both practical and epistemic reasons for belief, but they do not 
combine to determine what one should believe, all-things-considered. (Some of the views I 
canvassed in Chapter I, §2, like Feldman’s, are examples of separatism.) According to such 
separatist views, there is never any fact of the matter about what should believe all-things-
considered. There is just what one should epistemically believe, what one should practically 
believe, etc. It’s beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate Berker’s case against 






refer to as pure pragmatism.58 According to pure pragmatism, a consideration is never a reason 
to believe a proposition just in virtue of being evidence for it. An alternative, equally simple 
explanation of the combinatorial contrast is available to pure pragmatists: so-called “epistemic 
reasons” for belief are not necessarily normative reasons. The only reasons to be in a particular 
doxastic state are considerations that bear on the practical value of being in that state. While 
evidence explains why believing would be correct, reasons for belief explain why (and when) 
we ought actually to care about having correct beliefs. In what follows, I’ll argue that 
pragmatists who deny the existence of epistemic reasons for belief and an independent source 
of normativity for reasons for belief face no special difficulty explaining how reasons for belief 
and evidence can be compared to deliver coherent all-things-considered normative verdicts.   
Pure pragmatists need not deny the plausible thought that there is a dimension of 
evaluation of beliefs on which only epistemic considerations are relevant. I’ll refer to the 
output of such evaluations as judgments about “epistemic correctness.” However, pure 
pragmatists hold that judgments about epistemic correctness are not themselves judgments 
about normative reasons. Recall the analogy discussed in Chapter II concerning games and 
the distinction between reason-implying and merely rule-implying facts. The rules of board 
games determine what counts as a correct move, but it is an open question whether one should 
make a correct move while playing.59 There may be good reasons to make an incorrect move—
perhaps for teaching purposes. Often, when we’re playing board games, we have strong 
																																																						
58 Pure pragmatism is endorsed by Stich (1990), and a similar view to Stich’s can be found in Rinard (2015; 2017). 
McCormick (2015), Papineau (2013), and Maguire and Woods (2020) all develop novel versions of pure 
pragmatism. See Reisner (2008 and 2009) for helpful discussion.  
59 For versions of this analogy, see Schroeder (2010), Howard (2016), Leary (2017), Côté-Bouchard (2016), and 






reasons only to make correct moves. However, the bare fact that a move is correct relative to 
the rules of the game does not contribute to determining what anyone should actually do in a 
given circumstance. One must actually have sufficient reason to adhere to the rules of the 
game (and sufficient reason to play the game at all) in order for the fact that there is a rule to 
have any actual normative significance. A pure pragmatist might argue that epistemic 
requirements on belief are analogous to the rules of board games. The fact that a belief is 
epistemically correct does not, on its own, speak in favor of actually possessing it any more 
than the fact that moving a small piece of wood one inch to the left is correct relative to the 
rules of chess speaks in favor of performing that action. If there is a reason for a person to 
have an epistemically correct doxastic attitude toward a proposition, the explanation is that 
she has decisive (practical) reason to have an epistemically correct attitude toward that 
proposition, not that the attitude is epistemically correct. According to pure pragmatists, on 
its own, the fact that an attitude is epistemically correct never explains why anyone should 
actually bother to adopt it.  
Pure pragmatists can avoid Berker’s objection to interactionist versions of pragmatism 
by denying that there are two different kinds of normative reasons that must be weighed 
against each other in order to determine overall normative verdicts. Unless something of 
practical importance turns on adopting a particular doxastic attitude, pure pragmatists contend 
that the bare fact that that attitude would be epistemically correct never speaks in favor of 
adopting it. Therefore, there is no special burden for pure pragmatists to explain the unfamiliar 
combinatorial contrast Berker highlights. On their view, all normative reasons, including 






reasons to believe p and to suspend judgment on p, then according to the pure pragmatist, 
there is no more reason to adopt one attitude rather than the other just because one attitude 
is epistemically correct.  
 
§4 
Berker’s case against pure pragmatism rests on an argument he offers earlier in his paper 
against interactionist versions of pragmatism. The guiding thought is that even if pure 
pragmatists deny the unfamiliar combinatorial contrast, they need some sort of error theory 
to explain why we ordinarily take evidence directly as a reason to believe. An appealing pure 
pragmatist suggestion is that we have strong practical reasons to respect the evidence because 
it is typically valuable to do so.60 However, Berker argues that if pragmatists help themselves 
to a non-normative concept to replace epistemic reasons in their theory, then “once we 
observe this parallel, the [pure pragmatist’s] error theory…is little more than a notational 
variant of the double-weighing version of Reisner’s proposal” (2018: 454). 
 For context, the following is a brief summary of Berker’s characterization of Reisner’s 
original proposal:  
If the practical benefits or costs of believing (or disbelieving, or suspending judgment) 
are above some very high threshold, then epistemic considerations become irrelevant 
and practical considerations alone determine the overall all-things-considered 
verdicts. Otherwise, practical considerations are irrelevant and epistemic 
considerations alone determine the overall all-things-considered verdicts (443). 
 
																																																						
60 As McCormick aptly puts a similar point, “having true beliefs and knowledge help us achieve our goals, flourish, 
and be excellent human beings. In general, forming and maintaining beliefs in accordance with evidential norms 






In his 2008 paper, “Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief,” Reisner’s initial 
idea is that what we ought to believe is ordinarily determined by the balance of our epistemic 
reasons. However, when there are sufficiently weighty practical costs or benefits to believing 
(or disbelieving, or suspending judgment), the epistemic reasons are silenced. The main 
difference between this proposal and what Berker calls the “double-weighing proposal” is that 
Reisner’s double-weighing proposal accommodates the thought that epistemic reasons may 
still be relevant even when the practical stakes are high, so long as there is no conflict between 
the attitudes these reasons support. For instance, if I have a strong practical reason not to 
believe p, I have sufficient (practical) reason either to suspend judgment on p or to disbelieve 
p. However, suppose I also have strong evidence against p. Intuitively, this gives me an 
additional reason to disbelieve p. Reisner’s double-weighing proposal aims to accommodate 
the thought that, in this scenario, I have decisive reason to disbelieve p (and lack sufficient 
reason to suspend judgment on p). If the high practical stakes did silence epistemic reasons, 
as is suggested by the quotation above, then in this scenario, disbelief and suspension would 
both be permitted even though I can conform to both sets of reasons by disbelieving p instead 
of suspending judgment. 
 To illustrate Berker’s objection to the double-weighing proposal, consider the 
following scenario: Aisha is either visiting Kate at the hospital, or she went to the movies. If 
Mel believes Aisha went to the movies (let’s call this proposition M), then he’ll confront her 
when she gets home, lose his temper, and say something he’ll regret. Regardless of what’s true, 
let’s assume that it is of overriding importance for Mel to avoid believing M tonight. At 4pm, 






Kassim, who is equally reliable, tells Mel that Aisha went to the movies. Finally, at 5pm, Mel 
opens Aisha’s laptop and sees a movie ticket confirmation page on the screen.  
Suppose that practical and epistemic reasons combine to determine an overall verdict 
concerning what Mel ought to believe. I have stipulated that, throughout the evening, Mel has 
decisive reason to avoid believing M. At 4pm, he also has a strong epistemic reason to 
disbelieve M. Therefore, the double-weighing proposal gives the verdict that at 4pm, Mel has 
decisive reason overall to disbelieve M. At 4:30pm, Mel has equally good evidence for and 
against M, so his epistemic reasons now balance to suspending judgment on M. According to 
the double-weighing proposal, this verdict yields a reason to suspend judgment on M that is 
fed into a second weighing process. Since Mel still has decisive practical reason to avoid 
believing M, he now has decisive reason overall to suspend judgment on M, since these two 
reasons combine at the overall level. However, at 5pm, Mel gains strong evidence for M, so 
his epistemic reasons now decisively favor believing M. Since the epistemic and practical 
reasons conflict, and the practical stakes are sufficiently high, the double-weighing view gives 
the verdict that the epistemic reason is silenced. Therefore, Mel now has sufficient reason 
(overall) either to disbelieve or suspend judgment on M. Berker’s issue with this result is that 
the only thing that has changed between 4:30 and 5pm is that Mel has gained strong evidence 
for M. If he had decisive reason to suspend judgment M at 4:30pm when he had equal evidence 
for and against M, and the only thing that has changed is that he has gained strong evidence 
for M, it is an odd result that he now has sufficient reason to disbelieve M again. If Mel lacks 
sufficient reason to disbelieve M at 4:30pm, how could gaining strong evidence for M at 5pm 








Berker thinks that the pure pragmatist’s view is little more than a “notational variant” (26) of 
Reisner’s double-weighing proposal because pure pragmatists must admit that evidence (or 
some preferred grounds of epistemic considerations) can support believing, so their view has 
the same problem explaining how evidence, which balances to suspension, weighs against 
practical reasons, which balance to permission. However, according to pure pragmatists, 
evidence doesn’t generate reasons for belief any more than the correctness of a particular 
move in a board game generates reasons to play the board game. Berker’s objection to the 
double-weighing proposal has force against pragmatists only insofar as they accept the 
following principle: 
 
EPISTEMIC DEFAULT: If you have equally balanced evidence for and against p, and there are 
no other reasons on the scene, you have decisive reason to suspend judgment on p. 
 
Pragmatists fall prey to Berker’s objection to the double-weighing proposal (and the other 
interactionist proposals he considers) only if they accept Epistemic Default. However, 
Epistemic Default is a principle pure pragmatists need not accept. If there are no practical 
reasons to adopt a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition, pure pragmatists can deny 
that there is decisive reason to adopt any attitude toward that proposition. In other words, if 
it doesn’t matter at all whether I believe or disbelieve some proposition, the fact that I have 
equally balanced evidence for and against that proposition is irrelevant.  
To see why Berker’s objection fails against such views, consider how he articulates his 






[According to the pure pragmatist], first we weigh the pro tanto evidence that bears on 
a belief and its doxastic alternatives in a manner that is compatible with prohibitive 
balancing. This process yields a reason in favor of its winner that we then feed into a second 
weighing process, in which that new reason is weighed against the practical reasons 
that bear on the belief and its doxastic alternatives in a manner that is compatible with 
permissive balancing (2018: 454, my emphasis). 
 
Berker’s objection misses the mark because pure pragmatists can deny that epistemic 
considerations ever yield normative reasons for belief. Rather, epistemic considerations weigh 
against each other in order to determine a verdict concerning the epistemic correctness of 
being in a particular a doxastic state, but this verdict does not determine an answer to any 
genuinely normative question. So, to return to the case of Mel, at 4:30pm, when Mel’s evidence 
balances to suspension, if it is best for him to keep disbelieving M, then that is what he should 
do, regardless of whether suspending judgment on M is now epistemically correct. If it doesn’t 
matter practically at all whether Mel continues to disbelieve or suspend judgment on M at 
4:30pm, so long as he doesn’t believe M, then either option is permitted by the balance of his 
reasons, regardless of the fact that only suspension is epistemically correct. The upshot is that 
Berker is mistaken in thinking that pure pragmatism implies that disbelieving M goes from 
being forbidden to permitted as one gains evidence for M. For pure pragmatists, disbelief is 
only forbidden at 4:30pm if one’s practical reasons rule out disbelief. If nothing for Mel has 
changed between 4:30pm and 5pm other than gaining some evidence for M, then according 
to the pure pragmatist, the balance of his reasons for belief hasn’t changed either. 
The implausible verdict—that disbelieving M goes from being forbidden at 4:30 to 
permitted at 5pm as Mel gains evidence for M—depends on thinking that Mel’s practical 
reasons balance in favor of suspending on M at 4:30pm simply because the epistemic 






scene. In other words, the implausible verdict depends on a version of pragmatism that accepts 
Epistemic Default. However, pure pragmatism entails that there is no reason for Mel to adopt 
the epistemically correct attitude unless something of practical importance depends on doing 
so. Therefore, pure pragmatists can deny that when there is a strong practical reason for Mel 
to avoid believing M and no other relevant practical reasons, the epistemic considerations 
alone provide any normative reason to favor suspension over disbelief (or vice versa).  
Berker makes a compelling case that any form of pragmatism that accepts Epistemic 
Default will have a difficult time explaining how normative reasons that exhibit radically 
different weighing behavior could combine in order to yield overall normative verdicts. 
However, unlike proponents of interactionist versions of pragmatism who accept Epistemic 




Berker thinks pure pragmatists are in no better position with respect to his objection than 
advocates of interactionist forms of pragmatism because he thinks they must accept something 
like Epistemic Default in spelling out their theory. The reason is that pure pragmatists need 
an error theory to explain why we ordinarily take evidence directly as a reason to believe. Recall 
the natural suggestion is that it is generally valuable to have epistemically correct doxastic 
attitudes, so we have a standing practical reason to respect the evidence when forming beliefs. 
Epistemic Default says that if you have equally balanced evidence for and against p, and there 






pragmatists accept the plausible thought that we have a standing practical reason to respect 
the evidence, they must accept a parallel principle to Epistemic Default: if you have equally 
balanced evidence for and against p, and there are no other reasons on the scene, you have 
decisive reason to suspend judgment on p because you have a standing practical reason to respect the 
evidence. Failing to suspend judgment on p when the evidence is equally balanced constitutes a 
failure to respond to this standing practical reason to respect the evidence.  
Berker’s worry for pure pragmatism is that the relevant practical reason that yields this 
verdict seems to balance to suspension. This is why he claims that the pure pragmatist view is 
a mere notational variant of Reisner’s double-weighing proposal. The issue is that, whether we 
call them epistemic reasons or practical reasons to respect the evidence, these reasons balance 
to suspension, while other practical reasons for belief balance to permission. Thus, Berker 
contends that pure pragmatists are saddled with a parallel explanatory burden to interactionist 
versions of pragmatism—how can practical reasons for belief and practical reasons to respect 
the evidence combine to yield coherent all-things-considered normative verdicts?  
To return once again to the case of Mel, let’s assume Mel has a standing practical 
reason to respect his evidence, as well as a strong practical reason to avoid believing M. 
According to Berker, pure pragmatists must accept that, at 4pm, when Mel has strong evidence 
against M, he has decisive reason to disbelieve M; only by disbelieving M does he avoid 
believing M and respect the evidence concerning M. At 4:30pm, when he has equally strong 
evidence for and against M, he has decisive reason to suspend judgment on M; only by 
suspending judgment on M does he avoid believing M and respect the evidence concerning 






respect the evidence concerning M. Therefore, he now has sufficient reason either to 
disbelieve or suspend judgment on M. Thus, Berker thinks the pure pragmatist’s theory ends 
up with the same problematic result implied by Reisner’s double-weighing proposal. If nothing 
has changed between 4:30 and 5pm except that Mel has gained strong evidence for M, then 
how can he go from having insufficient reason to disbelieve M at 4:30pm to having sufficient 
reason to disbelieve M at 5pm? 
 
§7 
Pure pragmatists need not accept a view structurally identical to the double-weighing variant 
of Reisner’s proposal. There is a more attractive move available to pure pragmatists that avoids 
the problematic result implied by the double-weighing proposal, which is closer to the spirit 
of Reisner’s original view.61 I’ll briefly explain how pure pragmatists ought to respond, show 
that this response is consistent, explain why Berker thinks this response faces a similar set of 
problematic consequences as the double-weighing proposal, and argue that accepting these 
consequences is not as problematic for the pure pragmatist as he suggests.   
 Recall that Berker’s general worry is: “how can it be the case that epistemic reasons 
for belief play off each other in one way, practical reasons for belief play off each other in a 
completely different way, and yet somehow all of these reasons combine together to yield 
coherent all-things-considered verdicts at the overall level?” (2018: 434). My initial suggestion 
in section 4 was that pure pragmatism can avoid the concern that these two sets of 
																																																						
61 In his 2008 paper, Reisner notes that a similar proposal to the one I outline below is compatible both with 
pure and interactionist forms of pragmatism, though he doesn’t endorse either. See pg. 27. For the reasons I give 
below, I think this approach is more plausible given a commitment to pure pragmatism than it would be if one 






considerations are too different to combine in order to yield overall normative verdicts. The 
evidence for and against p interacts in one way—to determine which attitude is epistemically 
correct—and practical reasons play off each other in another way—to determine which 
attitude one actually ought to adopt. That an attitude is epistemically correct has no bearing, 
on its own, in determining which attitude one ought to adopt. The complication is that pure 
pragmatists need some way of explaining why we ordinarily take evidence directly as a reason 
for belief. A natural response is that we have a standing practical reason to respect the 
evidence, but now Berker’s challenge can be rephrased: how does this practical reason interact 
with other practical reasons? A practical reason to respect the evidence seems to behave in a 
balance-to-suspension-like way. It permits the correct attitude and prohibits both incorrect 
alternatives. However, ordinary practical reasons, like a reason to avoid believing p, behave in 
a balance-to-permission-like way. A practical reason to avoid believing p prohibits believing p 
but permits either alternative doxastic attitude. 
 My reply on behalf of pure pragmatism rests on the following claim: whenever one 
has a strong practical reason to avoid adopting some doxastic attitude concerning p, this reason 
undercuts whatever practical reason one had to respect the evidence concerning p. 
Undercutting occurs when one consideration makes it the case that another consideration that 
would otherwise be a reason is not a reason.62 Let’s assume, for instance, that Mel has a 
standing practical reason to respect the evidence when forming beliefs because it is ordinarily 
																																																						
62 See Dancy (2004). He calls these considerations “disablers.” See also Schroeder (2011) for discussion. 
According to Schroeder, undercutting defeat is a limiting case of attenuation, which occurs when one 
consideration makes another a much weaker reason than it otherwise would be. Nothing in my argument here 
turns on whether the practical reason to avoid believing p completely undercuts the practical reason to respect 






valuable for him to do so. In virtue of this general fact, Mel has a practical reason to respect 
the evidence concerning M. However, the weight of this practical reason is not 
straightforwardly determined by the strength of his evidence for M; it is not necessarily the 
case that the stronger the evidence for M, the weightier the reason for Mel to believe M. This 
might be true according to a form of pragmatism that accepts the existence of epistemic 
reasons for belief and an independent source of normativity for reasons for belief. However, 
according to pure pragmatism, the weight of Mel’s reason to respect the evidence concerning 
M is relative to the other germane practical considerations. Though this difference is subtle, it 
has important ramifications for assessing Berker’s criticism against different forms of 
pragmatism. In the imagined scenario, Mel has decisive reason to avoid believing M regardless 
of the evidence. If he has decisive reason not to form a given attitude with respect to M no matter 
what, he cannot also have a reason to respect the evidence concerning M. Given the practical 
reasons in play, it is no longer the case that Mel has any reason to respect the evidence 
concerning M. The only thing that matters is that he avoids believing it. Any reason he had to 
respect the evidence concerning M is undercut. 
The practical reason to avoid believing M affects the weight of Mel’s other practical 
reasons. Specifically, it undercuts his reason to respect the evidence concerning M. Since he 
has decisive reason not to believe M even if the evidence strongly supports M, this practical reason 
undercuts his reason to respect the evidence concerning M. With respect to M, he has decisive 
reason not to respect the evidence, so whatever reason he had to respect the evidence 
concerning M no longer has significance in determining which doxastic attitude he ought to 






the evidence concerning M has been undercut, he has sufficient reason either to suspend 
judgment or disbelieve M (even though disbelieving M is epistemically correct). At 4:30pm, 
when his evidence for and against M is equally balanced, since his reason to respect the 
evidence concerning M has still been undercut, he still has sufficient reason either to suspend 
judgment of disbelieve M (even though only suspending judgment on M is now epistemically 
correct). And finally, at 5pm, after Mel gains strong evidence for M, his reason to respect the 
evidence concerning M has still been undercut, so he still has sufficient reason either to 
suspend judgment or disbelieve M (even though only believing M is now epistemically correct). 
Regardless of which doxastic attitude is epistemically correct, Mel has sufficient reason 
throughout either to disbelieve or suspend judgment on M. Since his practical reason to 
respect the evidence concerning M has been undercut by his decisive practical reason to avoid 
believing M regardless of the evidence, the balance of his practical reasons permits either 
doxastic alternative throughout. 
 Berker is unsympathetic to the pure pragmatist’s view about undercutting defeat. Pure 
pragmatism avoids the problematic result for Reisner’s double-weighing proposal—that Mel’s 
disbelief in M goes from being forbidden to permitted as he gains evidence for M, since 
according to pure pragmatism, disbelieving M is permitted throughout. According to the 
version of pure pragmatism I’ve outlined, the fact that Mel had equally good evidence for and 
against believing M at 4:30pm has no significance concerning which doxastic attitude he ought 
to adopt because his practical reason to respect the evidence concerning M was defeated by 
his decisive reason to avoid believing M regardless of the evidence. However, Berker thinks 






illustrate, he imagines a scenario in which I have equally strong evidence63 for and against p 
and no other reasons that bear on the matter.64 However, for some reason, I disbelieve p. 
Given the pure pragmatist’s claim that I have a standing practical reason to respect the 
evidence, I lack sufficient reason to disbelieve p. Now, imagine the practical stakes of believing 
p increase to the point that I have decisive reason to avoid believing p, and I continue to 
disbelieve p. Given the pure pragmatist view I’ve sketched, since the practical reason not to 
believe p undercuts the practical reason to respect the evidence concerning p, I now have 
sufficient reason to disbelieve p. Concerning this result, Berker writes: 
It would be extremely odd to think…my disbelief in P goes from being forbidden by 
the overall balance of all my reasons to being permitted by the overall balance of all 
my reasons merely in virtue of our changing the incentives associated with my holding 
an entirely different doxastic attitude, namely a belief in P. That would involve saying, 
‘Well, before this threat was in place, you should have suspended judgment on P 
instead of disbelieving it. But now that there are costs associated with believing P, it’s 
fine for you to disbelieve P rather than suspend judgment on it.’ It is far more plausible 
to hold that, both before and after the cost of believing P is in place, I have decisive 
all-things-considered reason to suspend judgment on P (2018: 445).   
 
In reply, it is worth noting that a strong practical reason to avoid believing p will 
typically also favor disbelieving over suspending judgment on p. This seems like the most 
natural way of spelling out Mel’s case. If it is very important for Mel to avoid believing that 
Aisha went to the movies, it seems plausible that a much better way to achieve this end is to 
remain steadfastly convinced that she went to the hospital to visit Kate. In any realistic scenario 
in which one has practical reasons against adopting some doxastic attitude, it is highly likely 
																																																						
63 See pg. 444. Since Berker presents this objection in the context of discussing Reisner’s proposal, his imagined 
scenario involves equally balanced “epistemic reasons.” In applying the criticism to pure pragmatism, I describe 
the scenario as involving equally balanced “evidence.”   
64 Again, in order to make the criticism applicable to pure pragmatism, assume that “no other reasons that bear 







that there will be some further benefits and costs associated with adopting each of the 
alternative attitudes, so it is improbable that anyone will ever be in a situation in which they 
have a strong practical reason to avoid one attitude, but equally balanced reasons for and 
against the other alternative attitudes.  
However, even if pure pragmatists grant that such unlikely scenarios could occur, it is 
questionable whether this result is as odd or intolerable as Berker suggests. If we rephrase the 
reply as a pure pragmatist would put it, it involves saying something like, “when you only had 
a reason to care about getting things right about whether p, you should have suspended 
judgment on p, but now that you only have a reason to care about avoiding believing p no 
matter what, it doesn’t really matter whether you suspend judgment or disbelieve p; just don’t 
believe it!” Insofar as I have a practical reason to care about having epistemically justified 
beliefs, it matters which doxastic attitude I adopt. However, if my reason to have an 
epistemically correct belief concerning p is undercut by a strong reason to avoid believing p at 
all costs, it’s not that odd to think it doesn’t matter any longer whether I disbelieve p or 
suspend judgment. Any reason I had to respect the evidence concerning p has been undercut; 
the only thing that matters is that I avoid believing p at all costs. If either alternative is just as 
an effective way of achieving this end, I have sufficient reason to adopt either attitude. By 
analogy, I ordinarily have a strong reason to pick up twenty-dollar bills that fall out of my 
wallet. However, if I just won the lottery and am on my way to cash in my ticket and collect 
my billion-dollar prize, it’s not odd to think it doesn’t matter any longer whether I pick up the 
twenty-dollar bill that just fell out of my wallet or keep walking. The only thing that matters 






reason (not losing twenty-dollar bills from my wallet; not forming epistemically incorrect 
doxastic attitudes) has no normative significance. Granted, it is marginally better to have one-
billion and twenty dollars than one-billion, but the value of the lottery ticket so far outweighs 
the value of the twenty that when placed side-by-side, I have virtually no reason to continue 
caring about the twenty, especially given the potential risk that stopping to pick up the twenty 
will get in the way of cashing the ticket. It doesn’t seem that odd to say, “before you knew you 
had a winning lottery ticket, you had decisive reason to pick up twenty-dollar bills that fell out 
of your wallet, but now that you’re carrying a winning ticket, it doesn’t really matter at all 
whether you pick up this twenty or keep going to cash in your ticket. Just don’t lose the 
ticket!”65  
 Moreover, for pure pragmatists, how implausible it is to think that disbelieving p is 
permitted when the stakes are low and the evidence is equally balanced depends on how 
important it is to respect the evidence concerning p. The standing practical reason to respect 
the evidence gives us some reason to respect the evidence concerning any proposition we 
entertain, but it is sometimes of immense practical importance to respect the evidence on 
some matters, while with respect to other matters, it might be insignificant whether one does 
so. If one’s evidence for and against p is equally balanced, and it is inconsequential whether 
one has the epistemically correct attitude concerning p, but there is some benefit to believing 
p instead of suspending judgment, pure pragmatists should have no qualms denying that one 
																																																						
65 The analogy is not meant to be perfect, given that it is marginally better to have one billion and twenty dollars, 
but it may not be better at all to acquire an epistemically justified belief that p when the practical reasons undercut 
adopting that attitude. As I suggest in the main text, consider a version in which picking up the twenty exposes 
me to significant risk of losing the ticket. In such a case, it is clearer why a standing reason to pick up twenty 






has decisive reason to respect the evidence concerning p simply because one generally ought 
to do so. It may matter a great deal that one has epistemically correct attitudes concerning all 
sorts of matters because epistemic errors may lead one to harm herself or others. However, 
concerning other matters, it may be of far less importance whether one conforms to the 
general practical requirement to respect her evidence.    
 
§8 
Critics of pragmatism might still think these results are bizarre or intolerable. After all, how 
could someone think their evidence for and against a proposition is equally balanced and that 
they shouldn’t suspend judgment? As I discussed in Chapter III, it is bizarre to imagine 
someone actually saying: “well, before this threat was in place, you should have suspended 
judgment on P instead of disbelieving it. But now that there are costs associated with believing 
P, it’s fine for you to disbelieve P rather than suspend judgment on it.” However, it is 
important to note in closing that some of the residual strangeness is motivated by 
considerations related to the basing constraint, not Berker’s objection. Berker’s objection 
concerns a metaphysical feature of reasons—their weights. His issue is that if there are both 
epistemic and practical reasons for belief, their different weighing behavior makes it difficult 
to see how they could be combined to yield all-things-considered normative verdicts. 
However, the claim that it is bizarre to imagine agents who reason from both evidential and 
practical considerations is a concern about the deliberative role reasons play—that we weigh 






epistemic reasons for belief in a single piece of reasoning about what to believe.66 Put simply, 
Berker’s issue is about weights, while this imagined critic’s issue is about weighing. 
Given what I have argued, pure pragmatism might still seem strange if we consider the 
relationship between Mel’s reasons and his own reasoning. For instance, it is difficult to 
imagine how Mel could knowingly believe in accordance with his reasons for belief, given a 
pragmatist account of his reasons. Mere reflection on the fact that it would be best for me to 
believe something doesn’t ordinarily result in my believing it, and it is controversial whether it 
is even possible to believe something in full awareness that one’s reasons for belief don’t bear 
on the truth of one’s belief. As the discussion in the previous chapter suggests, it is a 
complicated but distinct issue for pragmatists to explain how (and whether) people like Mel 
can reason with their reasons.67 
However, Berker’s objection does not assume any claims about the relationship 
between reasons and reasoning. Rather, his objection concerns the ability of a pragmatist 
theory of reasons to deliver coherent overall normative verdicts. This issue is independent 
from whether a person can use a consideration in her reasoning. Understanding Berker’s worry 
as a distinct concern from issues about the relationship between reasons and reasoning may 
help make the pragmatist’s verdicts seem a bit less bizarre or intolerable. To return to Mel’s 
case, since the importance of avoiding believing M undercuts whatever reason Mel had to 
																																																						
66 The claim that practical considerations cannot be reasons for belief because we are incapable of reasoning from 
non-evidential considerations to belief is a popular objection to pragmatism, but it is importantly different from 
Berker’s concern. Versions of this argument can be found in Shah (2006), Kelly (2003), Kolodny (2005), Raz 
(2011), and Persson (2007). Similar views may be inferred from Parfit (2011) and Gibbard (1990). 
67 For some pragmatist attempts to respond to this sort of objection in a different direction than I took in Chapter 
III, see: Rinard (2015; 2017; 2018) McCormick (2015), Reisner (2009), Crawford (2019), Leary (2017), Howard 






respect the evidence concerning M, he has sufficient reason to adopt either alternative attitude 
with respect to M, regardless of which attitude is epistemically correct. The fact that it would 
be very weird if Mel were actually to reason this way is irrelevant and gives no additional 
argumentative support to Berker’s objection. If the fact that Mel is incapable of employing 
some of the normative reasons for him to be in a particular doxastic state as premises in his 
doxastic reasoning is put aside, pure pragmatists can accept the result as entailed by their view 
about the source of normativity and show why it is not all that bizarre, given their commitment 
to pure pragmatism. 
In conclusion, pure pragmatists need not be concerned about Berker’s combinatorial 
argument against practical reasons for belief. Since they deny that evidential support alone is 
a normative reason for belief, their view avoids Berker’s objection to interactionist 
pragmatism. Moreover, pure pragmatists can emphasize that practical reasons to respect the 
evidence are not “epistemic” reasons for belief. Their weighing behavior is importantly 
different from putative epistemic reasons; the strength of a practical reason to respect the 
evidence concerning some particular proposition is relative to the other relevant practical 
considerations, while the strength of an epistemic reason for belief would be determined solely 
by the degree of evidential support it provides. Finally, insofar as pure pragmatism is a view 
about what explains what we ought objectively to believe, the fact that it seems bizarre for a 
person to reason from practical considerations in specific scenarios like Mel’s is beside the 









The central conclusion of this dissertation is that what we should believe is not exhaustively 
explained by the relationship between our beliefs and cognitive ideals like truth and knowledge. 
Rather, normative questions about belief must ultimately be settled by an account of the 
relative moral and personal importance of these cognitive goals in our lives. This conclusion 
casts serious doubt on the analogy with which we began. If the authority of epistemic standards 
derives from the moral and personal importance of conforming to them, then epistemology 
does not address the question “what should I believe” in the same way ethics addresses the 
question “what should I do?” That an action is morally forbidden is always at least some reason 
not to do it, but that a belief is “epistemically forbidden” is not always a reason to avoid 
believing it.  
In the first chapter, I considered the question, to whom are epistemic responsibilities 
owed, and why should we care about meeting them? What is the source, nature, and scope of 
their authority? I argued that views according to which the epistemic and practical are 
fundamentally distinct sources of normativity leave us without a satisfactory answer. I 
suggested that the distinction between the epistemic and the practical should, instead, be 
drawn with respect to differing components of wellbeing. Epistemic standards of assessment 
have authority insofar as truth, knowledge, and understanding are generally valuable and 
morally significant ends that stably contribute to our wellbeing and are embedded in the social 
roles we occupy. In the second chapter, I considered whether actions and intentional mental 
states could be governed by wholly distinct norms. I argued that views according to which 






connection between how we should be and what we should do and entail, among other things, 
that epistemic propriety is compatible with a neglect for the pursuit of truth in our choices 
and decisions. These two chapters comprised the main argument and position of the 
dissertation. In the third and fourth chapters, I examined two important questions for my 
view. First, if the relevant considerations that settle normative questions for belief are not 
evidential, why are we generally only capable of basing our beliefs on our evidence? I critically 
examined the claim that a subject must be capable of basing her responses on her reasons. I 
surveyed two ways of understanding this commitment, and I argued that the more 
conservative interpretation of the commitment was implausibly restrictive, while the more 
liberal interpretation failed to rule out basing belief on non-evidential considerations. In the 
final chapter, I examined a more recent objection to my view. Reasons have weights, and so 
does evidence, but the way that reasons weigh against each other is quite different from the 
way evidence weighs against counter evidence. If evidence and reasons are incommensurable, 
how can they both bear on the same question: what should we believe? I argued that the force 
of the objection concerning how to weigh evidence and practical reasons for belief depends 
on assuming the separation thesis. If all normativity follows from considerations of value, the 
fact that evidence balances to suspension while reasons balance permissively does not entail 
that there is no way to compare the relative importance of respecting or violating epistemic 
norms. 
In closing, according to the view I have defended here, the truth is fundamentally 
unlike the good or the right. You should believe what your evidence supports on some issue 






and believing what your evidence supports is the most reliable means of pursuing truth and 
acquiring knowledge. However, the bare fact that the balance of the evidence favors one 
proposition over another has no independent authority over what anyone should actually 
believe. There is no distinct species of normativity that attaches to the formation of beliefs 
just because they’re beliefs. The authority of epistemic standards derives from the practical 
significance of conforming (or failing to conform to) them. Epistemology can tell us how best 
to pursue truth and acquire knowledge, but only ethics can ultimately settle the question, what 
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